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Rules of Causation under Marine Insurance Law 
From the Perspective of Marine Risks and Losses 
 
By Meixian Song 
 
Causation is a crucial issue in ascertaining whether certain loss or damage is covered in an 
insurance policy. Although marine insurance is well-known for investigating the “proximate” 
cause of loss in order to determine the insurers’ liability, decisions by English courts are far 
from reconcilable. The problem has been suggested to be the inference of matters of fact, 
and consequently, causal connection is deemed as a complex and uncertain issue.  
In the light of incoherency and uncertainty of law in this respect, the value of this research 
lies in  the effort  to  conceptualize and develop a  set  of  consistent  causation  rules  in  the 
marine insurance context and to explore how perils themselves would affect the formation 
and application of causation rules. Essentially, the proximate cause in law should not remain 
as a mere open question of fact. 
In order to achieve the merits, this dissertation scrutinises the causation theory itself and 
also  the  correlations  between  the  perils  involved  in  the  policy.  Introduction  presents  the 
legal problem of causation in marine insurance law and stresses the importance of setting 
up coherent and certain rules. The research on the pure causation theory consists of two 
chapters: Chapter One regarding the test of causation, i.e. the doctrine of proximity; and 
Chapter  Two  on  concurrent  causes.  The  subsequent  three  chapters  concentrate  on 
identifying the cause of loss from the nature and concepts of different marine risks. Chapter 
Three introduces marine perils and examines how causation rules apply in the case of a few 
typical  insured  and  uninsured  perils;  Chapter  Four  and  Chapter  Five  are  concerned  with 
exclusive  researches  on  inherent  vice  and  seaworthiness  respectively.  Apart  from  the 
substantive analysis on causation, burden of proof is addressed in the last chapter. Finally, 
the Conclusion provides a summary of the issues and the set of causation rules. 
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Causation is central to various types of liabilities: criminal liabilities, tortious liabilities and 
contractual  liabilities.
1 Divergent theories of causation have been proposed due to   the 
different orientations and insights of every branch  of law. The answer to any question of 
causation is  dependent on the purpose and reason for asking the question.
2 In the law of 
insurance, a sustainable claim requires three basic elements, namely, a valid policy, an 
incidence of loss and a legal causal li nk between an insured peril and the loss.  It has been 
held that ascertaining the cause of loss is believed to be the common concern of the parties 
to a contract of insurance, thus , it has been and always  should be rigorously applied in 
insurance cases.
3 Moreover, the English Marine Insurance Act 1906 (hereinafter “the 1906 
Act”) s 55 provides that  
Subject to the provisions of this Act, and unless the policy otherwise provides, 
the insurer is liable for any loss proximately caused by a peril insured against, 
but, subject as aforesaid, he is not liable for any loss which is not proximately 
caused by a peril insured against.  
Per  Roskill  L.J.,  in  marine  insurance  cases,  the  doctrine  of  proximity  is  a  statutory 
requirement while in non-marine insurance that has always been the rule at common law.
4 
Thus,  undoubtedly,  the regime of  causation  is  a crucial  issue  for ascertaining  whether 
certain loss or damage is covered in a given policy.  
The  proximat e  cause  in law   differs  from the causes in philosophical  terms and the 
explanations  developed in the   natural sciences.
5 Specifically, causes in the philosophical 
view  focus  on  the  universal  and  inherent  essence  of  phenomenon ,  while  scientific 
explanations demonstrate how general conditions result in certain type s of events. All the 
inherent reasons or necessary conditions are treated  as being equally important in causing 
the consequential  events.  However, in the legal sense, especially under the insurance 
liability mechanism,  only the “fire-starter” cause matters for determining a liability, rather 
than all the elements that have contributed to the fact of burning. Identifying the particular 
cause among the others usually leads to disputes and arguments.  
                                                 
1 Michael S Moore, Causation and responsibility: an essay in law, morals, and metaphysics 
(Oxford University Press, 2010) 1 
2 Jenny Steele, Tort law: text, cases, and materials, (2
nd edn, Oxford University Press, 2010) 
176. The learned author came into the proposition based upon the explanations by Lord 
Hoffmann  in  Environment  Agency  (formerly  National  Rivers  Authority)  v  Empress  Car  Co 
(Abertillery) Ltd [1999] 2 A.C. 22 in terms of causation from the prospective in the tort of 
negligence  and  upon  Hart  and  Honore’s  Causation  in  the  Law  (2
nd  edn,  Clarendon  Press, 
1985). 
3 Becker, Gray v London Insurance Corporation [1918] A.C. 101 
4 Wayne Tank and Pump Co. Ltd. V Employers Liability Assurance Corporation Ltd. [1974] 
Q.B. 57,71 
5 Hart and Honore’s Causation in the Law (2
nd edn, Clarendon Press, 1985) M. SONG 
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The issue of causation in English law can be traced back to 1630; the Bacon’s Maxim stated 
that  cases  should  be  judged  upon  the  immediate  cause  without  looking  to  any  prior 
circumstances. Thereafter, during the Victorian era from 1837 to 1901, the test of the last 
cause in time order was formed. However, in the last few years of the 19
th century and in the 
beginning of the 20
th century, the law stepped into a transition period from the time-order 
test to the modern test by assessing efficiency in contributing to the loss. The 1906 Act has 
ultimately  affirmed  the  doctrine  of  proximity  by  statute,  but  without  any  detailed 
explications.  The  most  remarkable  explanation  of  proximity  has  been  provided  by  the 
decision of Leyland Shipping Co Ltd v Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd.
6 The House 
of  Lords  clearly  pronounced  that  the  real  proximate  cause  under  the  Act  should  not  be 
solved by the mere point of time but the one proximate in efficiency. Hence, “the nearest in 
time”  has  become  an  obsolete  test.  After  this  case,  various  approaches  of  measuring 
“efficiency” have been generated and adopted. 
Moreover, the recent case, The Cendor Mopu,
7 has highlighted the issue of causation in the 
context of marine insurance and it has led to broad and heated discussions. In this case, 
three  legs  of  an  Oil  rig  insured  under  a  voyage  policy  incorporating  the  Institute  Cargo 
Clauses  (A)  broke  off  due  to  fatigue  cracking  on  a  barge.  The  Judge  at  first  instance 
considered  that  the  efficient  cause  of  loss  was  inherent  vice,  while  the  Court  of  Appeal 
disapproved of the earlier decision and held that the loss was proximately caused by perils 
of the sea, and therefore the insurer should be liable. The Supreme Court sustained the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal and articulated a detailed comparison between inherent 
vice and perils of sea under marine cargo insurance. As a result, the market should now see 
fewer coverage disputes about the law regarding inherent vice in terms of causation, despite 
some difficulties remain.  
However, Akenhead J commented that the courts over the years have not set up any strict 
rule of causation as to the proof of the cause of loss.
8  It is also apparent that the authorities 
in this regard have been and continue to be difficult to reconcile . Inconsistency arising from 
the decisions  was  blamed  on  inferences  of fact  without  considering  the  matters of law  
behind;
9 whereas, there was also the judicial view that proximity is ultimately a matter of law 
so that the precedents  could be applied  consistently, though some are neither convenie nt 
nor logical.
10  
Although every case must be determined on the basis of its own factual grounds, leaving the 
issue to a determination of fact will leave the law in an indefinite state. It will not facilitate 
                                                 
6 [1918] A.C. 350 
7 Syarikat Takaful Malaysia Berhad v Global Process Systems Inc [2011] UKSC 5 
8 Fosse Motor Engineers Limited v Conde Nast and National Magazine Distributors Limited 
[2008] EWHC 2037 
9 Sir M.D. Chalmers, Chalmers’ Marine Insurance Act 1906 (9
th edn, Butterworths, 1983) 78 
10 Liverpool & London War Risks v Ocean S.S. Co [1948] A.C. 243 M. SONG 
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the formation and development of law, nor enable the courts to follow precedents. Taking 
tort  law  as  an  example,  both  the  courts  and  academics  have  expressed  an  increasing 
concern and have put significant effort into creating certainty on causation rules presently.
11 
Likewise,  it  is  necessary  and  appropriate  to  rethink  and  draw  legal  coherence  and 
consistency in the principles of causation in the law of marine insurance. 
In light of the confusion regarding causation issues under the law of marine insurance, this 
dissertation attempts to introduce a systematic theory of causation in the marine insurance 
context, extracting from extensive English cases.  
In order to  achieve this aim, the research explores the parameters of  the causation theory 
itself and the  correlations between different perils in terms of causal effect. This research 
begins with the test of causation, i.e. the doctrine of proximity . This chapter primarily aims 
to unveil and  flesh out  the  abstract  expression  “proximate”  from  its  use  in  statutory 
provisions  and  contractual  terms,  followed  by  a  historic  review  of  the  change  of  the 
standards by which proximate causes in marine insurance cases have been decided. Since 
many  doctrines  originate  in  tort  law  and  the  rules  are  comparatively  certain  in  tort,  a 
comparison  between the tests in tort law  and marine insurance law is conducted in this 
section in order to figure out whether the principles can be borrowed or merged between 
the two laws. 
As the thesis proceeds, it will come to the question of whether a loss could be caused by 
more than one proximate cause. In the context of the sole-cause model, the terms of the 
insurance  contract  and  statutory  instruments  will  be  relied  upon  for  ascertaining  the 
insurer’s liability. In contrast, where the loss is attributable to concurrent proximate causes, 
in  the  absence  of  a  statutory  indication,  numerous  cases  have  provided  authority  to 
determine the allocation of risk. However, the rules established by these landmark decisions 
have been reviewed and questioned by some of the cases after The Cendor Mopu. Therefore, 
Chapter Two answers the question of whether room for “concurrent causes” situations are 
and ought to be accepted under English marine insurance law.  
The research on marine perils is of equal importance to the issue of causation and to define 
the insurers’ scope of liability. Good definitions and understanding of marine risks, whether 
insured, non-insured or excluded, will provide substantial help in identifying the efficient 
cause to a loss. Thus, a number of specified marine perils are employed to demonstrate the 
application  of a set  of  causation rules and  to  examine whether a uniform theory can  be 
concluded.  Specifically,  Chapter  Three  refers  to  marine  perils  in  general  and  also  some 
                                                 
11 Environment Agency (formerly National Rivers Authority) v Empress Car Co (Abertillery) 
Ltd  [1999]  2  A.C.  22;  Fairchild  v  Glenhaven  Funeral  Services  Ltd  [2003]  1  A.C.  32; 
Sienkiewicz v Greif (UK) Ltd [2011] UKSC 10; [2011] 2 W.L.R. 523. Jane Stapleton, “Cause-in-
fact and the Scope of Liability for Consequences” [2003] 119 L.Q.R. 388 M. SONG 
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specific perils, addressing the point from the perspective of causal effect rather than a mere 
study on the definition of the risks.  Chapter Four and Chapter Five look further into the 
issues  of  inherent  vice  and  seaworthiness  respectively,  which  are  two  most  common 
defences of insurers. 
Apart from the substantive analysis on causation, burden of proof determines whether the 
assured can succeed in his claim in the proceedings. The balance of the onus on each party 
is worth examining by investigating and observing the remarkable authorities in the last 
chapter.  Most  importantly,  the  difficulties  in  proving  an  unexplainable  loss  or  an 
unascertainable cause are addressed and settled. 
In  addition,  it  should  be  noted  here,  having  the  modest  ambition  of  comparing  English 
marine insurance law in this respect with the operations of a few other jurisdictions’ such as 
Belgium,  the  US,  Australia,  etc.,  this  dissertation  adopts  comparative  methodologies  in 
numerous areas merely for the purpose of illustrating and enhancing a number of concrete 
propositions. In brief, the focus of this research is on English marine insurance law and its 
contribution is an attempt to address the issue of causation and to suggest a novel way in 
which to approach the question of causation in a consistent manner. M. SONG 
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Chapter 1 Doctrine of Proximity in Marine 
Insurance Contracts 
Invariably,  it  is  hardly  possible  to  lay  down  a  precise  yet  succinct  rule  of  law  which  is 
applicable  to  all  kinds  of  circumstances;
  12 the  issue  of  causation  is  not  an  exception. 
Although persistent efforts to find and follow a clear principle to ascertain the causal link 
between losses and insured risks have been made throughout the last two centuries, the 
test has been dramatically changed and the decisions made by English Courts are still far 
from easy to reconcile.  
Causa  proxima  non  remota  spectatur  has  been  frequently  quoted  as  the  fundamental 
principle in the law of marine insurance which is embodied by the doctrine of proximity.
13 
The maxim means that it is the proximate cause, not the rem ote one that should be looked 
at in determining the insurer’s liability of indemnity. The English Marine Insurance Act 1906 
has stipulated the doctrine in a statutory form, however, the courts still have to exercise 
their discretion in seeking a fair and reasonable answer to the causation question in every 
single case, which is usually recognised as a matter of fact or “common sense” eventually.  
Aiming for a better understanding of the doctrine of proximity and its application in the law 
of marine insurance, this chapter will first give an overview of the causation requirement 
from the aspects of statutes and the contractual variations respectively. It will proceed to a 
research on English case law to see how the test of causation has been changed from “the 
nearest one in time chain” to “the efficient one”. More importantly, the review of numerous 
landmark cases will be undertaken in order to exemplify and clarify the abstract term of 
“proximity”. In conclusion, applying the test of causation ought not to be described simply 
as a matter of fact; instead it ought to be a logical application of law.  
1.1 An Overview on Legal Causation in Marine Insurance 
Contracts 
1.1.1 Statutory Requirement  
Most  jurisdictions,  irrespective  of  common  law  or  civil  law,  have  widely  recognised  the 
doctrine  of  proximity  in  relation  to  causation  in  the  form  of  statutes.  Specifically,  as 
provided in s 55(1) of the English Marine Insurance Act 1906, 
                                                 
12 Malcolm Clarke, The Law of Insurance Contracts, (6
th edn, Informa, 2009)  para. 25-5 
13 Jonathan Gilman et al, Arnould's Law of Marine Insurance and Average, (17
th edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2008) 900 M. SONG 
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Subject to the provisions of this Act, and unless the policy otherwise provides, 
the insurer is liable for any loss proximately caused by a peril insured against, 
but, subject as aforesaid, he is not liable for any loss which is not proximately 
caused by a peril insured against. 
The New Zealand Marine Insurance Act 1908 and the Australian Marine Insurance Act 1909 
follow the same provision and wordings in s 55 and s 61 respectively as s 55 of the 1906 
Act.  Despite  the  fact  that  the  provision  is  headed  “included  and  excluded  losses”,  it  is 
designed to require a causal link between an insured peril and the loss. It is noteworthy that 
there are two conditions which override this provision, namely, “the provisions of this Act” 
and “the policy otherwise provides”. So far as the former phrase is concerned, the provisions 
affecting  the  validity  of  the  policy  may  prevent  courts  from  inquiring  the  causality,  for 
instance, lack of an insurable interest, breaches of utmost good faith or warranties. Under 
these circumstances, insurance contracts will be avoided or terminated and accordingly the 
insurer will not be liable for any loss, even though the loss is proximately caused by an 
insured peril. In respect of the other phrase, “unless the policy otherwise provides”, as one 
of the opening words of s 55, it indicates a possibility  of contractual deviation from the 
doctrine of proximity.
14 Therefore, the insurer may agree to undertake a narrower or a wider 
scope of obligations and liability by explicitly altering the expressions.  
Moreover, the California Insurance Code   specifies the sole legal effect of the proximate 
cause and also excludes the remote ones. As provided in s 530: 
Proximate cause 
An insurer is liable for a loss of which a peril insured against was the proximate 
cause, although a peril not contemplat ed by the contract may have been a 
remote cause of the loss; but he is not liable for a loss of which the peril insured 
against was only a remote cause. 
The provision emphasises that attention must be paid  to the proximate cause, regardless of 
the ancillary contribution and influence of the remote ones. Furthermore, this provision 
reveals that the “but for” test is not the test for ascertaining the proximate cause since the 
remote ones can also meet this test but remain irrelevant to the decision of the liability. 
In contrast, the Chinese Maritime Code simply infers a causal link in the provision defining a 
contract of marine insurance. According to Chapter XII Contract of Marine Insurance Section 
1 Basic Principles Article 216,  
                                                 
14 Donald O’May and  Julian Hill, O’May on Marine Insurance (Sweet & Maxwell, 1993) 317 M. SONG 
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[Sic] A contract of marine insurance is a contract where by the insurer undertakes, 
as agreed, to indemnify the loss to the subject matter insured and the liability of 
the insured caused by perils covered by the insurance against the payment of an 
insurance premium by the insured. 
Although in the absence of an expression referring to “the proximate cause” in the definition, 
the requirement of a proximate causal link has still been recognised and applied in Chinese 
law in the same approach as English law, which is more frequently addressed as “the cause 
of the closest connection to the loss”.
15  
1.1.2 Contractual Variations on Doctrine of Proximity 
As indicated above, although the doctrine of proximity is provided statutorily in the 1906 
Act, the requirement is still subject to the parties’ agreement in the policy. That is to say, 
the  parties  have  freedom  either  to  affirm  or  to  exclude  the  effect  of  the  doctrine  of 
proximity  through  clear  expressions.  Basically,  it  is  a  matter  of  construction  and 
interpretation of the wording of the policy. Most insurance contracts are more likely to be 
interpreted as requiring the insured peril to be the proximate cause of the insured loss. 
However,  some  expressions  have  been  held  to  have  succeeded  in  reflecting  otherwise 
intention by English courts. 
Currently, modern standard forms of marine policies provide cover for losses “caused by”
16 
or  “attributable  to”
17  certain  insured  perils.  Aikens  J,  notwithstanding  the  absence  of 
“proximately”, held that the perils following the phrase of “caused by” would be subject to 
the general rule of proximity in The Vergina (No.2),
 18 where the assured took four marine 
insurance policies with the insurers on hull and machinery, all subject to the terms of the 
Institute Time Clauses (Hulls) dated Oct. 1, 1983. The same conclusion can be found where 
the loss is “attributable to” the insured perils, although there remain divergent opinions.
19 In 
The Salem,
 20 the cargo owner of oil entered into an open cover Lloyd's S.G. policy added 
with the Institute Cargo Clauses (F.P.A.), the Institute War Clauses and the Institute Strikes 
Riots and Civil Commotions Clauses. Clause 8 of the Institute Cargo Clauses provided that in 
the event of loss the assured's right of recovery was not to be prejudiced by the fact that the 
loss might have been attributable to the "wrongful act or misconduct of the shipowners or 
                                                 
15 Pengnan Wang, The  Law  of  Marine  Insurance  Contract (2
nd edn, Dalian Maritime 
University Press, 2003) 114 
16 See Institute Time Clauses Hulls cl.6; Institute Voyage Clauses Hulls cl.4; International Hull 
Clauses (01/11/03) cl.2; Institute Cargo Clauses (B) (1/1/82) cl.1.2 and Institute War and 
Strikes Clauses Hulls-Time cl.1 
17 Institute Cargo Clauses (B) (1/1/82) cl.1.1 
18 Seashore Marine S.A. v Phoenix Assurance plc (The Vergina) (No. 2) [2001] 1 Lloyd's Rep 
698, 703 
19 It is arguable whether the use of “attributable to” in s 55(2) concerning wilful misconduct 
indicates an avoidance of proximate causal link than other expressions in this provision. 
20 Shell International Petroleum Co. Ltd. v Gibbs [1982] QB 946 M. SONG 
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their servants."[Emphasis added] When addressing the issue of causation, Lord Roskill in the 
House of Lords completely agreed with the decision of the Court of Appeal. As held in the 
Court of  Appeal, Kerr L.J.  contemplated that those words in  Clause 8  are  “neutral  words 
which cannot be read as intended to alter the well-established principles of causation in this 
field.”  
A  few  more  expressions  have  also  been  construed  to  require  an  insured  peril  to  be the 
“proximate cause”. For example, the phrase “results from” is held to reinforce the doctrine 
of  proximity  between  the  loss  and  the  named  perils  by  the  House  of  Lords.
21 Likewise, 
phrases,  such  as,  “due  to”
22 and  “consequent  upon”
23 and  “the  consequences  of”
24 do  not 
indicate the parties’ intention to deviate from applying the common doctrine of proximity in 
looking into the cause of loss. 
However, the law seems less clear when the phrases “arising from” and “arising out of” are 
used in contracts. Per Scrutton J, the words in the condition “caused by” and “arising from” 
had always been construed as relating to the proximate cause.
25 In contrast, concerning the 
construction of  “arising  from”  in  an  exception  clause,  Lord  Diplock  in  The  Playa  de  las 
Nieves
26 considered it as an expression to contemplate a chain of events, which introduced 
the presence of intermediate events into the operation of the clause between the statutory 
proximate cause and its loss. That is to say, “arising from” justifies the legal effect of the 
intermediate cause in determining the insurer’s liability instead of the proximate cause.  
In comparison, a few recent cases show that courts hold a lesser standard in respect of the 
two phrases in non-marine policies. In a motor vehicle insurance case,
27 the insurer insured 
against third parties liability for death or bodily injury ‘caused by or arising out of the use of 
the vehicle’, the Court of Appeal reaffirmed that the phrase “arising out of” contemplates 
more  remote  causal  links  than  “caused  by”  in  this  context.  Likewise  in  the  Australian 
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory has produced a common 
interpretation  in  terms  of  “personal  injuries  caused  by,  or  arising  out  of  the use  of,  the 
vehicle”: In Casalino v Insurance Australian Ltd,
28 a compulsory third party insurance policy 
                                                 
21  Lloyds  TSB  General  Insurance  Holdings  &  Ors  v  Lloyds  Bank  Group  Insurance  Co  Ltd. 
[2003] UKHL 48, Para. 45 
22 Kamilla Hans-Peter Eckhoff KG v AC Oerssleff's EFTF A/B (The Kamilla) [2006] EWHC 509 
(Comm); [2006] 2 Lloyd's Rep 238, para. 13-15 
23  Lloyds  TSB  General  Insurance  Holdings  v  Lloyds  Bank  Group  Insurance  Co  Ltd  [2002] 
Lloyd's Rep IR 113, 123; Midland Mainline Ltd v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd [2003] EWHC 
1771 (Comm); [2004] Lloyd's Rep IR 22, para. 117 
24 Ionides v Universal Marine Insurance Co (1863) 14 CB (NS) 259; this proposition has also 
been affirmed by a New Zealand insurance case, Bridgeman v Allied Mutual Insurance 
Limited  (1999) 10 ANZ Insurance Cases ¶61-448. 
25 Coxe v Employers Liability Assurance Corp Ltd [1916] 2 KB 629, 634 
26 Nacional v Hispanica Aseguradora  SA [1978] AC 853, 881-882 
27 Dunthorne v Bentley [1999] Lloyd's Rep IR 560 
28 [2007] ACTSC 25 M. SONG 
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was  issued  to  the  assured  who  was  a  young  female  driver.  She  claimed  for  damages 
thereupon,  as  she  was  forced  to  drive  at  gunpoint  and  got  assaulted  by  an  unknown 
offender. When answering whether it was personal injuries arising out of the use of vehicle, 
the Court relied upon the judgment of Government Office of New South Wales v RJ Green & 
Lloyd Pty Ltd,
29 which is worth citing in length: 
... The words "arising out of" in s 10 of the Act and in the indemnity clause of the 
policy are not merely, if at all, explicative of the words "caused by", they are 
really used in contrast to them; and in the total expression are extensive in their 
import. Bearing in mind the general purpose of the Act I think the expression 
"arising out of " must be taken to require a less proximate relationship of the 
injury to the relevant use of the vehicle than is required to satisfy the words 
"caused by". It may be that an association of the injury with the use of the vehicle 
while it cannot be said that that use was causally related to the injury may yet be 
enough to satisfy the expression "arise out of" as used in the Act and in the 
policy.  
Moreover, a very recent case has settled the question in terms of defining “arising out of” 
contained in s 145(3) (a) of Road Traffic Act 1988.
30 In this case, the defendant was accused 
of a number of offences including administering a subst ance with intent, sexual assault  
while acting as a taxi driver. The victims brought up claims against the defendant and the 
insurers of the taxi in private and public hire motor insurance. Both parties cited a number 
of authorities in respect of the construction of “arising out of” in marine context and non-
marine  context.
31 Silber J articulated that marine insurance precedents are not helpful in 
answering whether the phrase in statute indicates a lesser test of causation than “caused by 
or  not”,  as  constructing  contractual  variations  in  marine  cases  is  not  equated  with 
constructing the parliament’s intent in legislation. Relying upon the aforementioned motor 
cases, the court reaffirmed that the term “arising out of” refers to  a more remote causal 
connection between the injuries and the use of vehicles then those indicated by the phrase 
“caused by” under the Act. 
An even more flexible standard can be found in Kajima UK Engineering Ltd v Underwater 
Insurance Co Ltd,
32 a case of a professional indemnity policy. When addressing the claim 
which arose from the notified circumstances, the court simply held that “there had to be 
some causal, as opposed to some coincidental link”. On the contrary, also in the context of 
                                                 
29 [1966] HCA 6 
30 AXN & Ors v Worboys & Ors  [2012] EWHC 1730 (QB) 
31 The conflicting decisions under marine cases and non-marine cases in this respect has 
been recognised and demonstrated in the late case British Waterways v Royal & Sun Alliance 
Insurance Plc [2012] EWHC 460 (Comm) 
32 [2008] Lloyd's Rep IR 391 M. SONG 
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professional  indemnity  insurance,  it  was  held  that  in  general  both  “arising  from”
33 and 
“arising  out  of”
34  refer  to  the  ordinary  causation  test  of  the  proximity  requirement. 
Nevertheless, it was stated in the latter case that the term “arising out of” may have a wider 
significance and indicate a weaker causal connection, subject to the interpretations of the 
terms in policies.  
It  should  be  remarked  that  the  approach  of  such  interpretation  may  be  subject  to  the 
condition that the phrases “caused by” and “arising out of” are used together. Furthermore, 
it may be able to venture that when more than one causation expression is inserted in a 
term, courts are prone to define them as twofold meanings, instead of stressing an identical 
meaning.  Alternatively,  the  lesser  test  laid  down  by  the  courts  may  originate  from  the 
special  consideration  of  liability  insurance  for  the  purpose  of  enlarging  the  scope  of 
coverage. Regardless, tenuous the link may be, the limitation still exists and applies. It was 
eventually  held  by  the  Courts  that  the  real  cause,  such  as  the  threat  of  violence  and 
poisoning for assaults, were “incidental or ancillary to the normal and legitimate use of the 
motor vehicle so that it cannot be said to arise out of the use of the motor vehicle.” 
Therefore,  the  current  view  in  non-marine  insurance  law  on  the  phrases  “arising 
from”/”arising out of” seems to be a matter of construction depending upon the context, 
despite the fact that “it had always been construed as relating to the proximate cause” in 
marine cases. It should be reemphasised that the interpretations of the phrases regarding 
causation may vary in different branches of law and in different wordings. 
Besides  the  aforementioned  phrases,  the  clauses  against  certain  consequences,  such  as 
ingress of water, fire and jettison, have been proposed to be an approach not requiring a 
causal link on the ground that such marine insurance policies insures not against causes, 
but against consequences of losses.
 35 As long as the form of the loss insured against occurs, 
such  as  fire  and  jettison,  the  insurer’s  indemnity  liability  arises  regardless  of  its  cause, 
unless  otherwise  expressly  indicated  in  the  policy.  Literally  speaking,  this  proposition 
appears to suggest skipping the enquiry on the proximate cause due to the “true” mutual 
intention of the parties. However, the aforementioned proposition is hard to sustain for two 
reasons.  On  the  one  hand,  the  mechanism  of  insurance  is  based  upon  risks,  and  it  is 
designed  to  cover  against  agreed  perils  and  their  consequent  loss.
36 That is why, for 
instance,  the  policy  is  agreed  to  cover  all  risks  instead  to  cover  “all  losses”.  Such  a 
contractual term should not be interpreted in a contrary manner to the essential nature of 
                                                 
33 Sutherland Professional Funding Ltd v Bakewells [2011] EWHC 2658 (Comm) 
34 Per Christopher Clarke J  in Beazley Underwriting Ltd v Travelers Companies Inc [2011] 
EWHC 1520 (Comm) 
35  Proposed by D. Roger Englar, a distinguished American Attorney; as cited   in  Buglass, 
Leslie  J,  Marine  Insurance  and  General  Average  in  the  United  States,  (2nd  edn,,Cornell 
Maritime Press, 1981) 68 
36 Supra 13, p 898 M. SONG 
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insurance regime. On the other hand, notwithstanding terms to cover against some kinds of 
“losses”; the courts will still pay special attention to defining the concept of the loss and 
seeking its real cause, as the clause introduces ambiguity in expressing the intentions and 
expectations  of  the  parties.
37 Such phrasing may simply be an example of   an  ill-drafted 
clause, and the way the courts define the perils and adopt the causation rule may expose 
the underwriters to the risks which they do not   expect. In one word, clauses  which 
seemingly provide cover against certain losses do not naturally infer that the underwriter 
has waived the entitlement to query the proximate link between the loss and an insured 
peril.  
Paradoxically,  it  is  noteworthy  th at  The  Cendor  Mopu
38  has  further  ascertained  the 
underwriter’s liability more depending upon the consequence of an unordinary loss caused 
by an ordinary yet fortuitous “leg-breaking wave” during the voyage. “Leg-breaking wave” is 
somewhat bizarre to be used as an expression to describe a form of perils of the sea, as it 
tries to create a cause on the basis of a fact of consequence. It may find an underwriter 
equally  reluctant  to  accept  a  loss  proximately  caused  by  a  “vessel-sinking  weather”,  no 
matter how ordinary the weather is. It should always be borne in mind that the insurance 
regime is established upon the basis of risk theory and orients to cover against risks. Only 
risks can produce losses,  whereas losses cannot make up risks in reverse. It is not  only 
unsatisfying to explain the proximate cause of a loss in the approach of “leg-breaking wave”, 
but also it is worthy warning of a trend to pay excessive attention to the consequence of 
loss or damage in  marine insurance, as  much  as life insurance does, in ascertaining the 
insurer’s liability based on the present case. It seems inappropriate to take advantage of the 
consequence of loss as an excuse to imbalance the interest of equal parties in a commercial 
contract from the legal perspective. 
Nevertheless, the parties are entitled to preclude the application of the doctrine of proximity 
by virtue of explicitly phrasing the clauses. The alteration of the adverb “proximately” may 
restrain the insured perils to a more strict level than the ordinary standard to constitute the 
proximate cause.
39  For instance, the effect of exclusionary clauses can be extended or the 
insured scope is narrowed down. It has to be remarked that this approach is completely 
distinct from addi ng more exclusionary perils or deleting insured perils in the clauses. 
Nevertheless, it should be remarked that explicit words are required in order to deviate from 
the doctrine of proximity.
40  Otherwise, courts will insist on applying the principle of 
                                                 
37 Lawrence v Aberdein 106 E.R. 1133; (1821) 5 B. & Ald. 107, the court held “mortality” to 
be  one  caused  by  natural  reasons,  excluding  death  caused  by  insured  perils.  Mortality 
itself is a form of loss rather than an insurable peril. It seems implausible to contend that 
mortality causes the loss in insurance claims. 
38 Supra 7 
39 Rob Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (9
th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2010)180-181 
40 Supra 25 M. SONG 
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proximity  and  intend  to  construe  the  clause  based  upon  the  doctrine  of  contra 
preferentem.
41 
The most classic form of variation incorporated into a policy is the expression “directly and 
indirectly  caused  by”  an  excepted  peril.  The  authority  related  to  this  phrase,  Coxe  v 
Employers Liability Assurance Corp Ltd,
42  concerned a life cover excluding death “directly or 
indirectly” caused by war risks. The assured, a military officer, was accidentally killed by a 
train while he was walking along the railway in the course of duty. The court held that the 
words “directly and indirectly” denied the application of the doctrine of proximity in this 
case. Consequently, the indirect effect of the war discharged the insurer’s liability, despite 
the fact that the assured was proximately killed by the train accident. Per Scutton J, the 
words “arising from” and “caused by” did not give any difficulty in applying the doctrine of 
proximity,  however,  so  far  as  “directly  and indirectly”  is  concerned,  it  was  impossible to 
reconcile  with  the  doctrine.  Thereby,  it  is  ascertained  that  the  insurer  succeeds  in 
expressing  his  intention  not  to  indemnify  losses  occurring  indirectly  by  certain  perils, 
without  reference to  the doctrine  of  proximity.  Moreover,  having  reaffirmed the  position 
held in the former case, Mustill J in The Spinney’s
43 further elaborated and contemplated that: 
In essence, the task is to assess whether the particular act of violence simply 
takes place against the background of a "warlike" state of affairs, or whether it 
has itself (even if in a rather remote way) a warlike aspect of its own. 
Although the parties and courts need not look into the question of the proximate cause of 
the loss, the causation issue is still relevant when deciding coverage. Remote as it may be, 
the indirect cause must at least still be a cause.
44 Accordingly, the question of causal link 
remains crucial in defining the insurer’s liability by limiting the boundary of “indirect” causes.  
                                                 
41 Lawrence v The Accidental Insurance Company (Limited) (1880-81) L.R. 7 Q.B.D. 216 
42 Supra 25 
 the special condition inserted was as follows:  
“.  .  .  Condition  6.  This  insurance  does  not  cover  any  loss  or  damage  occasioned  by  or 
through or in consequence directly or indirectly of any of the following occurrences: (a) . . . 
civil war; (b) . . . civil commotion assuming the proportions of or amounting to a popular 
rising .  .  . insurrection,  rebellion,  revolution military  or  usurped power or  any act  of  any 
person  acting  on  behalf  of  or  in  connection  with  an  organisation  with  activities  directed 
towards the overthrow by force of the Government de jure or de facto or to the influencing 
of it by terrorism or violence. In any action . . . where the company alleges that by reason of 
the provision of this Condition any loss or damage is not covered by this insurance, the 
burden  of  proving  that  such  loss  or  damage  is  covered  shall  be  upon  the  Insured  .  .  .” 
[emphasis added] 
43 Spinney’s (1948) Ltd v Royal Insurance Co Ltd [1980] 1 Lloyd's Rep 406, 441-442 
44  John Lowry and Philip Rawlings,  Insurance  Law  Doctrines  and  Principles  (2
nd  edn,  Hart, 
2005) 230 M. SONG 
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Furthermore, it was held that the more frequent expression “directly caused by” does not 
always  have  to  look  into  the  proximate  cause  in  some  occasions.
45 According to this 
judgment: 
A direct cause need not be the immediate cause or the last step in the chain of 
events leading to the consequence in question. There can be more than one 
direct cause for a particular consequen ce. One looks at the efficiency of the 
cause in causing the consequence to determine whether the cause is a direct 
cause.  A  direct  cause  need  not  be  the  most  important  cause  in  causing  a 
particular consequence, so long as it is a substantive cause for the consequence. 
[Emphasis added] 
In  Merchants'  Marine  Insurance  Company  v  Liverpool  Marina  &  General  Insurance 
Company
46,  a  dispute  arose  between  two  English  insurers  under  a  reinsurance  contract 
which contained a continuation clause stating that “If the insured object is in a damaged 
condition at the time the insurance expires, and the damage comes within the underwriters' 
responsibility, the risk should continue for the immediate consequences of such damage 
until the object, without unnecessary delay, has been repaired or sold.” In construing the 
effect of “immediate”, Sankey LJ said: 
The real point for determination is whether the damage which was sustained by 
the vessel when she took the ground at Angra Reef was the immediate cause of 
her loss on Possession Island. I think that it was. Fortunately, we have not got to 
speculate  here  upon  the  meaning  of  the  words  "proximate  cause"  or  to  add 
anything to the numerous words which have been used to elucidate the meaning 
of  it,  such  as  efficient  or  effective  cause,  real  cause,  proximate  cause,  direct 
cause, decisive cause, immediate cause, causa causans, all of which have been 
used in one or other of the cases to which our attention has been directed. All we 
have to decide is whether it was the immediate consequence of the damage. I am 
clearly of opinion that it was. 
The  Court  of  Appeal  did  not  hesitate  in  holding  an  immediate  link  between  the  earlier 
damage and the final damage based upon the evident facts in the case. No  outstanding 
distinction can be drawn between a causal link of an earlier damage and a later one, and 
causation regarding an insured peril and the loss. However, this clause should be regarded 
as a measure of indemnity in the event of successive losses, but requiring a further causal 
link  between  the  losses.  Therefore,  due  to  the  construction  of  the  whole  clause,  the 
immediate consequence is confined with an obvious and simple factual occasion; it is not 
                                                 
45 Supra 7, p 181, as cited in Vastgrand Industrial Ltd v Avon Insurance Plc [2004] H.K.C.U 
475 
46 (1928) 31 Ll.L.Rep. 45  M. SONG 
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conclusive  to  say  that  the  phrase  “immediate  consequence”  is  effective  to  express  an 
intention not to follow the doctrine in any event. 
In comparison, it is more ascertained if the words “solely and independently”
47 are used in 
order to emphasise an intention to establish a stricter causation standard. The word “solely” 
was held to mean “without any intervention of other perils” in The Miss Jay Jay.
 48  
In summary, the doctrine of proximity is an important and common principle provided by 
the 1906 Act, however, the Statute has provided room for the parties’ mutual intention to 
agree to a different standard of causation, so long as a clear expression can be found in the 
policy.  As  the  expressions  in  describing  the  causal  link  between  the  perils  and  losses 
determine the scope of coverage, the parties, especially the assured, should be made aware 
of the meaning and effect of the expressions. As for the underwriters, ambiguity arising 
from  the  wordings  ought  to  be  managed  and  reduced  in  order  to  avoid  unexpected 
expansion of his coverage by the courts. 
1.2 Doctrine of Proximity in English Marine Insurance Cases 
Before the codification of the 1906 Act, the law of marine insurance in England depended 
mainly  on  common  law  and  customary  commercial  usage.
49 Per Willes J in  Ionides  v  The 
Universal Marine Insurance Co
50, “you are not to trouble yourself with distant causes or to 
go into a metaphysical distinction between causes efficient and material and causes final; 
but  you  are  to  look  exclusively  to  the proximate and immediate cause  of  the loss.”  The 
immediate or direct cause of the loss in time order used to be recognised as the test of 
materiality in determining the underwriter’s liability. However, the approach has changed 
dramatically in the early 20
th century, as the concept of causation gradually developed. On 
the  basis  of  the  landmark  cases,  Sir  Mackenzie  Chalmers  eventually  adopted  the  words 
“proximate  cause”  in  describing  the  cause  of  legal  significance  in  the  1906  Act.  In  the 
absence  of  a  further  statutory  interpretation,  it  being  an  abstract  and  complex  term, 
proximity has been construed by a subsequent leading case to be the efficient cause to the 
loss accrued. Henceforth, the test of efficiency is applied as good law in ascertaining the 
proximate  cause.  In  the  meantime,  the  test  of  common  sense  has  been  employed  in 
assisting and monitoring the test laid down by case law constantly. Courts take account of 
both tests to justify and determine the insurer’s indemnity liability.  
1.2.1 Prior to the Marine Insurance Act 1906 
                                                 
47 Southampton Leisure Holdings Plc v Avon Insurance Plc [2004] EWHC 571 (QB) 
48 [1987] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 32 
49 Leslie J Buglass, Marine Insurance and General Average in the United States (2
nd edn, 
Cornell Maritime Press, 1981) 4 
50 Supra 24, p 289 M. SONG 
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The legal theory of causation has a remarkable history through a few centuries.
51 Historically, 
the  general  formulation  in  distinguishing  remote  and  proximate  causes  in  the  legal 
perspective relied upon Francis Bacon’s maxim
52 arising from early common law: 
[Sic] It were infinite for the law to judge the cause of causes, and their impulsions 
one  of  another;  therefore  it  contenteth  itselfe  with  the  immediate  cause,  and 
judgeth of acts by that, without looking to any further degree. 
The specific application of this principle in the law of marine insurance in determining the 
insurer’s indemnity liability was to only look at the nearest cause in time to the damage or 
loss. Lucena v Craufurd,
53 a classic case regarding insurable interest, has also reflected an 
early position in the beginning of 19
th century of the approach to ascertain the cause of loss. 
The  commissioners  of  Admiralty  obtained  insurance  cover  on  a  few  Dutch  vessels  and 
cargoes to the ports of the United Kingdom, before the outbreak of war declared between 
Britain  and  the  United  Provinces.  They  were  on  statutory  duty  to  take  care  of  these 
properties by virtue of the issue of the commission. The vessels were lost majorly on the 
voyages from St. Helena to Britain by perils of sea. Consequently, the commissioner claimed 
for the indemnity under the policy but failed on the grounds of lacking insurable interest in 
terms  of  a  proprietary  or  possessory  right.  Nevertheless,  it  is  suggested  that  against  a 
complex factual matrix, the judges looked no further than the direct cause of the loss, as 
the concept of causation in insurance law was not refined at that stage.
54 
During  the  Victorian era (1837 -1901), the tendency of the courts to ascertain the cause 
relevant to deciding the recovery still related to the last one in the “time chain”. Per Erle C J. 
in Ionides v The Universal Marine Insurance Company:
 55 
The  maxim  causa  proxima  non  remota  spectatur  is  peculiarly  applicable  to 
insurance law. The loss must be immediately connected with the supposed cause 
of  it.  Now,  the relation  of  cause and  effect  is  matter which  cannot  always  be 
actually  ascertained:  but,  if  in  the  ordinary  course  of  events  a  certain  result 
usually follows from a given cause, the immediate relation of the one to the other 
may be considered to be established.  
In  Taylor  v  Dunbar,
56   the  vessel  carrying  meat  from  Hamburg  to  London  encountered 
tempestuous weather. As a result, the meat became putrid and was thrown overboard at sea 
                                                 
51 Athel Line ltd v Liverpool & London War Risks Insurance Association ltd [1946] K.B. 117, 
122 
52 Francis Bacon, The Elements of the Common Lawes of England (1630)  1 
53 Lucena v Craufurd (1802) 3 Bos. & Pul. 75, Exch; (1806) 2 Bos. & Pul. N.R. 269, HL; (1808) 
1 Taunt. 325, HL 
54 Chris Nicoll, “Insurable interest: as intended?” [2008] Journal of Business Law, 5, 432-447 
55 Supra 24 M. SONG 
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out  of necessity.  The judges unanimously agreed that the loss was solely  caused  by the 
retardation  and  delay,  although  such  delay  was  occasioned  by  the  adverse  weather 
conditions encountered. The decision was reaffirmed by Pink v Fleming,
57 where a portion of 
goods had gone bad on arrival after the vessel collided with another one. The court held 
that the loss was due to the handling which took place in discharge and re-shipment for the 
repairs and delay consequent on collision, accordingly. In these cases, the sea risks were 
merely regarded as the earlier components of the time chain, without any legal effect.   
Apart from the examples relating to delay situations, the approach was also demonstrated 
in  other  occasions.  In  Dudgeon  v  Pembroke,
58 an  iron  steamer,  the  Frances,  was  insured 
under a time policy. On her voyage from Gothenburg to London carrying oats and loads of 
iron and timber, she encountered heavy rolling sea and caught fire. After the fire was put 
out,  she  forwarded  to  Hull  but  failed  to  reach  port  and  ran  aground  ashore.  The  ship 
became total wreck eventually in spite of the endeavours and measures to rescue her. The 
underwriter sought to reject the recovery on the grounds of unseaworthiness. However, the 
House of Lords conclusively held that the loss was immediately caused by perils of sea after 
the fire, notwithstanding the contributions of some other facts such as the outbreak of the 
fire. Another application is typically exemplified by the decision of Cory v Burr,
59 where the 
ship was insured against ordinary perils including barratry of the master in a time policy of 
marine insurance. It was warranted “free from capture and seizure and the consequences of 
any attempts thereat.” The ship was seized by the Spanish revenue officers owing to the 
master’s  smuggling  act.  Consequently,  proceedings  were  taken  in  order  to  procure  her 
condemnation and confiscation. The owner tried to get the expenses for releasing the ship 
recovered. However, the insurer defended against the liability by contending that the loss 
was caused by the peril excepted by the warranty. It was again held by the House of Lords 
that the immediate cause of the expenses was the capture and seizure, which was not within 
the scope of cover. A chain of facts was established and  recognised unanimously by the 
Lords that the barratry of the master gave rise to the seizure, and subsequently to the loss 
of the ship and expenses occurred. Per Lord Fitzgerald,  
There  was  no  loss  occasioned  by  the  act  of  barratry.  The  barratry  created  a 
liability to forfeiture or confiscation, but might in itself be quite harmless; but 
the seizure, which was the effective act towards confiscation, and the direct and 
immediate cause of the loss...  
Although  that  Lord  Fitzgerald  had  held  that  the  seizure  to  be  an  effective  cause,  the 
approach complies with the last in time order, still. Had the ship been confiscated for other 
                                                                                                                                                        
56 (1868-69) L.R. 4 C.P. 206 
57 (1890) L.R. 25 Q.B.D. 396 
58 Alexander John Dudgeon v E. Pembroke (1876-77) L.R. 2 App. Cas. 284 
59 John Cory & Sons v Albert Edward Burr (1882-83) L.R. 8 App. Cas. 393 M. SONG 
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reasons without reference to the smuggling, or if the assured was able to prove that the 
smuggling was a mere excuse for the local authorities’ intentional confiscation, it would be 
accurate  to  maintain  that  the  barratry  was  irrelevant  or  harmless.  However,  as  a  direct 
consequence of the barratry, it is bizarre to blame the loss on the seizure instead of the 
barratry itself, which is simply a performance of a legally authorised duty in the modern 
context. For instance, if a driver with a higher intake of alcohol over the legal limit has been 
fined by the police, it is implausible to contend that the proximate cause of the penalty is 
the police’s exercise of duty, i.e., checking the driver and his car. According to Arnould’s, 
the barratrous act of smuggling is a direct and natural cause of forfeiture as the proximate 
cause, when it is detected.
60 However, it has to be noted that this decision still remains good 
law and has been relied upon as a case cited in  The Salem. In order to reject the barratry of 
the crew to scuttle as the proximate cause, Lord Roskill in The Salem reasoned that: 
No doubt the balance of the cargo would not have been lost but for the fraud or 
fraudulent conspiracy. But that alone does not make either of those causes the 
proximate cause of that loss any more than the fact that the seizure of the ship 
in John Cory & Sons v. Burr (1883) 8 App.Cas. 393 would not have happened 
without the prior barratrous acts of smuggling by those on board the ship made 
the loss of the ship a loss by barratry and not by seizure. 
Moreover, in terms of freight policies, the test of time chain was also applied. It is frequent 
that  a  freight  policy  is  closely  concerned  with  the  clauses  which  are  contained  in  the 
charterparties.  For  instance,  in  Mercantile  Steamship  Co.  v.  Tyser,
61 the  charterer  was 
entitled to cancel the charterparty where the vessel failed to arrive at the port of New York 
on or before 1
 September, 1875 in compliance with the charterparty. The vessel lost time 
and arrived delayed due to failure of machinery on the voyage, which required the vessel to 
be returned for repairs. The charterer cancelled the charterparty thereupon. It was held that 
the loss of freight was not caused by any peril insured against but the exercise of cancelling 
the contract. It was reiterated in The Alps
62 by the same token, that  
Here the loss arose,  not from  perils  of the sea,  but because it  fell within the 
clause in the charter. The fire created the want of repair, but it was the want of 
repair that made the clause operate. Time may be lost by the shipowner, and yet 
the hire not be lost, if it does not fall within the clause.... 
It shows that in freight policies, courts also looked for the direct cause of the loss in time 
sequence. 
                                                 
60 Supra 13, p 927 
61 (1880-81) L.R. 7 Q.B.D. 73 
62 [1893] P. 109 M. SONG 
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Although the “nearest in time” test had been set up and followed for judicial convenience 
and  certainty  in  identifying  the  proximate  cause  to  some  extent,  it  lacks  accuracy  and 
fairness in certain cases where an earlier event had exerted a more substantial influence on 
the consequence of loss. The emphasis on the legal effect of breaching warranties, such as 
unseaworthiness  in  a  voyage  policy,  justly  reflects  the  judicial  attention  to  avoid  the 
inflexibility and constringency arising from the last cause in time. Per Lord Mance in  The 
Cendor Mopu
63: 
A  historical  riposte  might  then  be  that  the  famously  and  sometimes  unfairly 
stringent principles governing insurance warranties were themselves the product 
of the Victorian view of causation referred to in para 56 of this judgment. If the 
only relevant cause is the last cause in time, then a prior  breach  of a simple 
contractual obligation regarding fitness could have been regarded as irrelevant. 
Hence,  the  development  of  the  concept  of  a  warranty  which,  if  broken, 
automatically discharged from liability for loss or damage, irrespective of how 
such loss or damage was in law to be regarded as caused.  
As courts increasingly paid attention to the requirement of proximate cause, the test was 
gradually changed towards the end of the 19
th century. In Reischer v Borwick,
64 the vessel 
was covered merely against the risk of collision rather than perils of sea. It ran into a snag 
which resulted in leakage. Temporary repairs had been taken in case of immediate danger. 
However, the vessel was aground and abandoned finally due to the motions of the sea while 
it was tugged to the nearest dock for further repairs. The Court of Appeal held that the loss 
was recovered as the proximate cause was the collision rather than subsequent perils of sea. 
Although per Lindley L.J., his decision was consistent with Pink v Fleming, it has to be noted 
that  the  judgment  did  not  follow  the  early  test  literally.  Lopes  L.J.  articulated  that  the 
consequences of the collision “never ceased to exist, but constantly remained the efficient 
and predominating peril to which the damage now sought to be recovered was attributable.” 
[Emphasis added]  
1.2.2 After the Marine Insurance Act 1906 
The 1906 Act has affirmed the principle of proximity in the statutory form, which is of great 
significance. Before the usage of “proximately” in the 1906 Act, the causal link is described 
in  various  ways,  for  instance,  causa  causans
65; immediate cause
66;  “direct  and immediate 
cause”
67. After the Act came into effect, the House of Lords preferred to equate it with “direct 
                                                 
63 Supra 7 
64 [1894] 2 Q.B. 548 
65 Gordon v. Rimmington (1807) 1 Camp. 123, per Lord Ellenborough 
66 Walker v. Maitland (1821) 5 B. & Al. 171 per Abbott C.J 
67 Supra 59 M. SONG 
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cause” as a better expression.
68 However, the expression as to the terminology of causation 
in English law is not an ideal one,  as a plainer one is always desired for  the handling of the 
disputes. It was stated by Lord Macm illan in  The Coxwold
69 that the adverb “proximately” 
does not supply a sound and perfect solution to the cause and effect problem, however, at 
least it has been emphasised that it is the predominant and determining cause that is to be 
sought for. Moreover, according to Halsbury’s, ‘proximate cause’ means the same thing as 
‘dominant’ or ‘effective’ or ‘direct’ cause. Thus, the term ‘proximate’ is the safest word to 
describe the requirement for a legal causal relationship between the risk and loss, which 
evidently requires further explications. 
The most remarkable explanation of proximity, the test of efficiency, has been established 
in  the  decision  by  the  House  of  Lords  in  Leyland  Shipping  Co  Ltd  v  Norwich  Union  Fire 
Insurance  Society  Ltd.
70 In  this  case,  the  ship  insured,  The  Ikaria,  was  torpedoed  by  a 
German submarine at 25 miles away from its destination on her voyage from South Africa to 
Havre. The explosion seriously disrupted its bulkhead so that she began to settle down by 
the head. Nevertheless she did not sink immediately, but managed to arrive at Havre by the 
aid of tugs soon. She was asked to berth in the outer harbour for repair when a gale sprung 
up and a swell ensued. The ship began to bump. The port authorities feared the ship would 
sink and block the quay, therefore, ordered her to moor inside the outer breakwater. At last, 
the ship grounded there and sank by the head after the two days’ unavailing effort, mere a 
small part of cargo was saved. The policy contained an express term of warranty free from 
all consequences of hostilities. The assured, accordingly, claimed the total loss of the ship 
caused by the perils of sea within the insured perils. However, the House of Lords approved 
the decision of the Court of Appeal and the Commercial Court, holding that proximate cause 
of the loss was the torpedo, otherwise the sea conditions afterwards, the real proximate 
cause under  the  1906  Act  should not  be solved  by  the  mere  point  of  time  but  the  one 
proximate in efficiency. Hence, the age of “the nearest cause in time” has become a mere 
legal history. It is worth quoting Lord Shaw’s explanation on the meaning of ‘proximate’ in 
length: 
To  treat  proxima  causa  as  the  cause  which  is  nearest  in  time  is  out  of  the 
question. Causes are spoken of as if they were as distinct from one another as 
beads  in  a  row  or  links  in  a  chain,  but  -  if  this  metaphysical  topic  has  to  be 
referred to - it is not wholly so. The chain of causation is a handy expression, but 
the  figure  is  inadequate.  Causation  is  not  a  chain,  but  a  net.  At  each  point 
influences, forces, events, precedent and simultaneous, meet, and the radiation 
from each point extends infinitely. At the point where these various influences 
                                                 
68 British & Foreign Marine Insurance Co v Samuel Sanday & Co [1916] 1 A. C. 650, 659. See 
also Becker, Gray v London Assurance [1918] A.C. 101 
69 Yorkshire Dale Steamship Co Ltd v Minister of War Transport [1942] A.C. 691 
70 Supra 6 M. SONG 
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meet  it  is  for  the  judgment  as  upon  a  matter of  fact  to  declare  which  of  the 
causes thus joined at the point of effect was the proximate and which was the 
remote cause. 
What  does  “proximate”  here  mean?  To  treat  proximate  cause  as  if  it  was  the 
cause  which  is  proximate in  time is,  as  I  have  said,  out  of  the question.  The 
cause  which  is  truly  proximate  is  that  which  is  proximate  in  efficiency.  That 
efficiency may have been preserved although other causes may meantime have 
sprung  up  which  have  yet  not  destroyed  it,  or  truly  impaired  it,  and  it  may 
culminate in a result of which it still remains the real efficient cause to which the 
event can be ascribed. 
Moreover, it is noteworthy that Lord Shaw articulated that “the chain of causation is handy 
express, but the figure is inadequate. Causation is not a chain, but a net. ” When a voyage 
commences, the subject-matter insured may be endangered by various situations, even if 
they can be listed orderly on a time arrow. Each occurrence may spread out several incidents 
which may have contributory effect on the final loss, and each event may involve a cause-
and-effect link to some other. The expression seems simply effective and satisfactory in a 
mere event of successive causes of loss. However,  for  most  occasions,  a combination  of 
facts is far more complex than a chain. Therefore, the proximate cause of the loss in English 
law should lie in the most material and efficient knot in the net.  
The  doctrine  of  proximity  requires  the  event  to  play  an  active  role,  which  is  the  most 
striking distinction from a condition necessary to the occurrence of the loss in the legal 
sense. The proximate cause is a risk, which arises independently, that triggers and leads to 
the  loss  ultimately.  Two  material  indicators  in  evaluating  efficiency  must  be  taken  into 
account. First, having been established, proximity is not restricted to the last in time order. 
By the same token, the remote causes are not logically those earlier in time. Frequently, the 
starting point of the hazard is the most efficient cause leading to the consequence of loss. 
The inception of the high incidence of loss is more likely to be the proximate cause, though 
not as far as being inevitable. It should be noted here that the first peril to be considered in 
the “net of efficiency” is determined by the possibility of the loss, which has nothing to do 
with  time  order.  Secondly,  after  the  triggering  risk  occurs,  a  few  natural  events  or  even 
passive conditions may contribute to the occurrence of the loss ultimately; whereas, some of 
the incidents are more active. If the triggering risk has been effective in the process of loss 
constantly  without  intervening  new  causes,  the  loss  should  be  regarded  as  the  result 
proximately caused by the risk. Hence, in the absence of any other outstanding peril which 
cuts off the earlier causal link, the insurer should be liable as long as the triggering risk is 
agreed or deemed to be agreed in compliance with the parties’ intention or the common 
sense construction. M. SONG 
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(a) Necessary Condition and Inevitable Consequence 
It used to be one of the prevailing approaches to identify the proximate cause of loss by 
virtue of the “but for” test. On applying this test, the proximate cause is deemed to be the 
peril without which the loss would not have happened. It is suggested that this test is more 
effective in finding out all the conditions necessary for the loss, including the indispensable 
yet auxiliary elements. Opposite to the “but for” test, a notion focusing on the “inevitable 
consequence”  relation  is  also  raised  when  looking  for  the  proximate  cause.  It  has  been 
stated  by  MacGillivray  and  Parkington
71  that  “if  the  loss  or  damage  is  the  necessary 
consequence of the peril insured against under the existing physical conditions, there is, 
prima facie, damage by that particular peril”. However, both “but for” test and “inevitable 
consequence” test are not able to provide a precise method in evaluating the efficiency of 
the peril. 
The “but for” test is a usual method of ascertaining factual causation especially in tort law, 
known  as  a  test  of  necessity.  It  has  been  widely  recognised  that  this  test  is  far  from 
satisfactory in identifying the most efficient cause in tort law and other branches of law, as 
all the necessary causes of divergent extents will answer this test.
72 In relation to carriage by 
sea, the proximate cause test was held to replace the “but for” test. In  The Kamilla,
73 the 
insured vessel was chartered under a time charterparty in the form of NYPE incorporated 
with the Inter-Club Agreement. A minor amount of the cargo of lentils was damaged by the 
ingress of seawater due to unseaworthiness in the No. 2 hold, whose hatch covers were not 
completely watertight. The local Authorities of the discharging port arrested the vessel on 
the report of the cargo receiver, who sought to reject the entire cargo due to the minor 
damage. The shipowner claimed an indemnity for the financial loss arising from the arrest 
against the charterer under the Inter-club  Agreement; whereas, the  charterers contended 
that the loss was proximately caused by seaworthiness which is the entire liability on the 
shipowner.  Having  sustained  the  arbitration  award,  Morison  J  dismissed  the  shipowner’s 
appeal  by  holding  that  unseaworthiness  was  the  effective  cause  of  the  whole  loss.  In 
particular, the Judge contemplated that although the ‘but for’ test is appropriate to establish 
whether there is a causal link between the act or default and the alleged damage, the “but 
for” test, is a necessary but insufficient test in looking for the proximate cause.  
                                                 
71 MacGillivray et al, MacGillivray and Parkington on Insurance Law, (6
th edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1975) 1752 
72 Hart and Honore argued in their influential work, Causation in the Law (2
nd edn, Clarendon 
Press,  1985)  that  although  the  “but  for”  test  is  useful  and  effective  in  most  cases  in 
answering whether the defendant’s conduct is a cause of the loss or damage as required in 
tort law, it is not, however, a sound test as a method of finding a mere causal element or 
one of the normal conditions in the loss. Under maritime commercial law, this argument is 
also plausible  in terms  of causation.  More detailed comparison on  the tests  of  causation 
between tort law and marine insurance is provided in the following subsection. 
73 Supra 22 M. SONG 
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Furthermore, the “but for” test has been thoroughly discussed in a recent insurance case, 
Orient-Express Hotels Ltd v Assicurazioni General SpA (UK) (t/a Generali Global Risk)
74.  In 
order to prove that the test is not applicable in the issue of causation, the assured provided 
legal authorities of the US and English law from the perspective of tort law and contract law. 
The  assured  suffered  substantial  physical  damage  on  the  property  insured  and  business 
interruption losses due to the effects of Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita in New Orleans. 
Initially, the arbitral tribunal held that the assured could only recover the loss which it could 
be shown would not have occurred but for the physical damage of the Hotel. The assured 
appealed for one of the grounds that the Tribunal erred in law in applying the “but for” 
causation  test.  In  answering  this  contention,  Hamblen  J  approved  the  approach  of  the 
Tribunal  but  explained  that,  not  limited  to  tort,  the  test  is  a  necessary  condition  for 
establishing causation in fact, and the Tribunal was correct in applying this test, owing to 
the interpretation of the express wordings under this policy and facts.  
Prof  Rob  Merkin  has  suggested  an  insightful  angle  in  interpreting  the  result  and  the 
authoritative effect of applying the “but for” test in this judgment from the principles of 
procedural law.
75 The decision might not be persuasive in substantive law, as Hamblen J was 
being asked to challenge a factual  finding that it was appropriate  “in the circumstances” to 
apply  the  “but  for”  test.  According  to  s  69  of  the  Arbitration  Act  1996  (England),  an 
appellate court is allowed to overturn an appeal only if the arbitrators have erred in law, and 
they cannot be said to have so erred if the point in question was not raised before them. 
Thus, the award and the test had to be sustained on the procedural ground. 
Moreover, assuming that the hurricane and the curfew are consecutive but not concurrent 
causes, one cause cannot prevail over the other. However, the two losses have an overlap in 
time.  And  time  is  the  only  material  factor  in  determining  the  indemnity  in  Business 
Interruption claims. The essential issue is how to deal with the overlap loss which is not 
apportionable  in  Business  Interpretation  Claims.  The  solution  in  this  case  resorts  to  the 
construction of the policy in the literal manner. Thus, the "but for" wordings and the test 
seem  to  answer  the  question  as  if  the  uninsured  peril  prevails.  In  light  of  the  peculiar 
character of Business Interruption claims, it is still in essence concerned with the drafting of 
                                                 
74 [2010] EWHC 1186 (Comm), [20] –[41], The Policy's Insuring Clause:  
“In  consideration  of  the  Insured  …  paying  the  premium  …  the  Insurers  …  agree  …  to 
indemnify the Insured 
a)  under  the  Material  Damage  and  Machinery  Breakdown  Sections  against  direct  physical 
loss destruction or damage except as excluded here in to Property as defined herein such 
loss destruction or damage being hereafter termed Damage 
b) under the Business Interruption Section against loss due to interruption or interference 
with the Business directly arising from Damage and as otherwise more specifically detailed 
herein.” 
75 Rob Merkin, “The Christchurch Earthquakes Insurance and Reinsurance Issues”, 
forthcoming in the Canterbury Law Review  
. M. SONG 
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the policy in the first place. One cannot say the court or tribunal has erred in law on the 
ground that it interprets a clause by adopting a literal approach. Accordingly, in principle, 
the “but for” test can be applicable in the causation question only if the policy and the fact 
unequivocally indicate.  
On the other hand, as the proximate cause is a necessary condition in the first place, the 
“but  for”  test  may  be  an  effective  defence  for  the  underwriter  in  order  to  detach  the 
consequence of the loss from certain perils if he succeeds in proving that the loss would still 
have  happened  in  the  absence  of  the  causal  element.  Irrespective  of  various  forms  of  a 
necessary condition, the proximate cause of efficiency, as one of them, still meets the “but 
for” test.  
In respect of the “inevitable consequence” test, Prof Malcolm Clarke contends that “the loss 
of the kind covered must be inevitable,  but the extent of the loss need only be such as 
would  have  been  within  reasonable  contemplation  or  not  unlikely  to  occur.”
76  This 
proposition  seems  to  be  an  appropriate  understanding  of  the  decision  of  The  Leyland 
Shipping  by  merging  the  tests  of  inevitability  and  reasonable  contemplation  of  the  loss. 
Logically speaking, if the proximate cause sufficiently leads to the loss, it means the loss is 
a necessary consequence of the cause. However, as a matter of fact, the loss cannot result 
solely from the proximate cause without the assistance of a series of causa sine qua non. An 
efficient cause is hardly a sufficient cause of loss on its own. Therefore, in this context it 
ought  not  to  follow  the  aforementioned  logic  rule.  Moreover,  the  operation  of  different 
combinations of factors may lead to divergent kinds and extents of loss. Thus, necessary 
consequence or inevitable consequence cannot be adopted as a universal test in identifying 
the proximate cause in insurance cases.  
Professor Clarke also warns that a broad test of connection should not be allowed, which 
means  that  a  mere  foreseeable  consequence  is  not  able  to  provide  sufficient  help  in 
isolating  the  proximate  causes  from  a  complex  factual  matrix,  as  the  connection  is  too 
tenuous.  It  was  affirmed  in  The  Kamilla
77  that  foreseeability  is  not  the  criterion  for 
ascertaining a causal relation at all. It seems more precise to regard the loss as the natural 
consequence
78 of the insured peril in compliance with the cause -and-effect theory, without 
reference to inevitability or foreseeability.  
In summary, although the proximate cause is one of the necessary conditions , it is of the 
most efficiency for the occurrence of loss. The loss does not have to be the inevitable and 
predictable consequence of the proximate cause, which is taken as if a test of causation. 
                                                 
76 Malcolm Clarke, “Insurance: The Proximate Cause in English Law”, Cambridge Law Journal 
40(2) Nov. 1981 
77 Supra 22 
78  Right Honorable Lord Justice Mance, Iain Goldrein QC, Prof Robert Merkin,  Insurance 
Disputes (2
nd edn, LLP, 2003) p167 M. SONG 
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Both the “but for” test and “inevitable consequence” tests alone are not sufficient or effective 
in ascertaining the proximate cause under the law of marine insurance. 
(b) Successive Causes—A Chain of Efficiency 
Timing,  although  it  is  not  always  accurate,  has  provided  a  clear  clue  in  seeking  the 
proximate cause. In the occasion of successive causes, the time chain is a plausible and 
convenient expression in describing the successive link in time among the relevant causes. 
It should be remarked that the terminology of “successive causes” is entirely distinct from 
“successive losses” which is provided by s 77 of the 1906 Act.
79 Successive losses refer to 
the circumstances  in which a partial loss is followed by another or a total loss, which is 
designed to be measure of indemnity.
80 Whereas, successive causes consist  of a series of 
related  perils  occurring  one  after  another  in  a  time  order,  finally  leading  to  the 
consequence(s)  of  loss.  Successive  losses  are  normally  independent  events  which  are 
proximately caused by different incidents of perils. In most cases, the term “successive” as 
to losses simply indicates a literal meaning of time sequence without more. In contrast, the 
chain of causes infers an inter-dependent connection among the subsequent cause and the 
previous  one.  Thus,  it  is  more  accurate  to  describe  the  successive  link  as  a  chain  of 
efficiency which the earlier event passes on the efficiency of the later one. 
The chain of efficiency starts from the point when the real risk arises, rather than when the 
first necessary condition comes up. That is to say, the first peril which introduces the actual 
substantive hazard of loss is very likely to be the proximate cause of the loss initially. In The 
Toisa  Pisces,
81 the  assured  took  a  loss-of-hire  marine  policy  on  the  vessel  Toisa  Pisces, 
incorporating Institute Time Clauses Hulls (1/10/83) and also insured against breakdown of 
machinery unless it not resulting from wear and tear or want of due diligence by the assured. 
A propulsion breakdown occurred on 25 February 2009 and resulted in a loss equivalent to 
30 days’ off–hire. It was held by Blaire J that in pure causation terms, after the failure of the 
port motor on that day, one thing led to another. In other words, the whole process of loss 
of hire was a chain of reaction of the first breakdown. In this case, the proximate cause for 
                                                 
79 77. Successive losses  
(1) Unless the policy otherwise provides, and subject to the provisions of  this Act, the 
insurer is liable for successive losses, even though the total amount of such losses may 
exceed the sum insured. 
(2) Where, under the same policy, a partial loss, which has not been re- 301 paired or 
otherwise made good, is followed by a total loss, the assured can only recover in respect of 
the total loss: Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the liability of the insurer 
under the suing and labouring clause. 
80 Kusel v Atkin [1997] C.L.C. 554; Kastor Navigation Co Ltd v AGF MAT (The Kastor Too) 
[2004] 2 C.L.C. 68 
81 Sealion Shipping Ltd v Valiant Insurance Co (The Toisa Pisces) [2012] EWHC 50 (Comm), 
para 136 
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determining the recovery was the machinery breakdown, unless it was caused by want of 
diligence of the assured or wear and tear. 
The  exception  to  the  rule  applies  where  an  ensuing  event,  also  known  as  novus  actus 
interveniens, breaks the initial proximate causal relationship. A new intervening cause does 
not only end the former chain of causation but also gives rise to an independently new chain 
of efficiency in causation. Therefore, it is necessary to take account whether an independent 
subsequent occurrence takes over the earlier ones to be attributed, but no more than an 
exceptional rule. Additionally, it may be plausible to suspect that one of the rationales to 
adopt the historic test of last one in time may be the excessive concern of the possibility 
and effect of intervening events at that time, so that it was legally presumed that the later 
incident had cut the causal link of the earlier one as a principle.  
Frequently, the later risk or occasion is strongly connected to the previous one in various 
forms, in particular, in the event of an inevitable consequence of the earlier one, which is 
known as “inevitable cases”.
82 The earliest event has been  recognised to be the proximate 
cause. That is to say, the only ground to determine whether the underwriter is liable is the 
proximate cause in the earlier stage irrespective of the subsequent risks occurring inevitably 
or naturally. Specifically speaking, where  the first cause is an insured peril and leads to an 
excluded (or a non-covered) peril, the loss is to be covered. On the contrary, where the first 
cause is an excepted peril and leads to an insured peril , however, the loss is unlikely to be 
covered. 
However, the connection between the successive causes does not have to be so close as to 
be inevitable; whereas, if the link is too vague and distant, the later incident may amount to 
a new intervening peril. This situation is perfectly demonstrated by the case   of  Fooks  v 
Smith.
83 The  assured,  a  hide  merchant,  shipped  his  goods  on  a  voyage  from  Calcutta  to 
Bourgas. He took out a policy against marine risks and also a Lloyd’s policy against war risks, 
including restraint of princes. Goods were reshipped on an Austrian vessel on the transit at 
Trieste. On her subsequent way to Bourgas, the master returned to Trieste since he received 
the shipowner’s order to follow the general instructions issued by the Austrian Government 
to  Austrian  shipowners  to  get  their  vessels  into  a  place  of  safety  in  anticipation  of  a 
declaration of war. The voyage was frustrated and the goods were landed in Trieste. About 
one  year  later,  the  goods  were  requisitioned  and  sold  by  the  Austrian  Government. 
Consequently, the assured raised a claim on constructive total loss (CTL) due to the restraint 
of princes, or alternatively, an actual total loss (ATL) as a result of the confiscation. The 
Court held although there was a CTL caused by the restraint of princes, the assured did not 
deliver notice of abandonment which is a requirement to claim for a CTL. In respect of the 
                                                 
82 Rob Merkin, Colinvaux & Merkin’s Insurance Contract Law, vol. 2 (Sweet & Maxwell, 2002-)  
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subsequent ATL, it was proximately caused by an ensuing event, i.e. confiscation, which was 
incurred beyond the duration of the cover. Therefore, the court held that the underwriter 
was not liable for the loss on either ground.  
One  of  the  significance  of  the  decision  is  that  it  has  clarified  the  correlations  between 
successive losses and successive causes. In the first place, successive losses may arise from 
a series of successive incidents or from different and independent events such as two non-
related partial losses. In determining which type of situation it falls under, each/every loss 
should be examined in compliance with its individual causation rules respectively. In the 
case of a series of successive incidents, as a second step, it needs to be figured out whether 
it is a chain of efficiency or intervened by new causes in a successive time order. Under the 
former  circumstance,  the  conclusion  of  causation  is  the  same  as  if  the  losses  are 
proximately caused by one peril. On the contrary, in the later occasion as the fact of this 
case, the intervening cause resulted in an unconnected event of loss, where the rules of the 
measure  of  indemnity  followed  as  if  the  losses  were  caused  by  totally  different  and 
independent events. In the instant case, per Bailhache J.: 
…if in the ordinary course of an unbroken sequence of events following upon the 
peril insured against the constructive total loss becomes an actual total loss - as, 
for instance, if there is a capture followed by confiscation  - the underwriter is 
liable in respect of the total loss. If, however, the ultimate total loss is not the 
result of a sequence of events following in the ordinary course upon the peril 
insured against, but is the result of some supervening cause, the underwriter is 
not  liable.  That  is  an  illustration  of  the  doctrine  Proxima  causa  non  remota 
spectatur. 
Another  contribution  of  the  judgment  is  that  it  has  established  a  test  for  identifying  an 
intervening cause from the successive causes on the chain of efficiency. The question of 
materiality, per Bailhache J, is whether the new cause is a necessary and direct result of the 
earlier insured peril. If the result is a natural, necessary and direct result of the earlier peril, 
it is just one of the causes passing on the efficiency of the triggering peril on the chain. In 
that case, the proximate cause is the earlier cause. It also means that the later event does 
not have to be as strict as an inevitable consequence of the earlier  one. In essence, the 
connection is also a cause-and-effect link with incidence. However, unlikely, the test of this 
type of causal link ought to follow the decision of Merchants' Marine Insurance Company v 
Liverpool Marina &  General  Insurance  Company
84,  a lower standard than the principle  of 
proximity (i.e. immediate consequence). In contrast, if the answer is negative, the new event 
intervenes over the old causation chain and leads to its own consequence of effect, which 
constitutes a different causation chain.  
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In  addition,  it  should  be  emphasised  that  notwithstanding  the  ensuing  event,  without  a 
consequence of loss, the ensuing event cannot amount to a cause at all. For example, in 
Andersen v Marten,
85 a neutral ship was insured against perils of sea and warranted free 
from capture during the Russo-Japanese war. It was captured by the Japanese and on the 
way  to  the  Court  of  Prize  it  was  wrecked  and  became  a  total  loss  as  a  result  of  heavy 
weather.  It  was  held  in  the  first  trial  that  the  total  loss  was  proximately  caused  by  the 
capture which was affirmed by the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. Per Channell J., 
the  assured  lost  his  vessel  at  the  time  of  capture  and  the  capturer  lost  his  prize 
subsequently, therefore under this marine policy the insurer was held not liable for the total 
loss which was proximately caused by an excluded peril. In this case, although perils of sea 
led to the physical loss of the vessel, the assured’s loss accrued at the time of the seizure, 
and the chain of efficiency ended. In this insurance claim, the incident of heavy weather had 
no consequence of legal effect. Therefore, the ensuing event could not be considered as the 
proximate cause or even a contributing factor.  
In  summary,  as  the  nearest  cause  in  time  order  is  no  longer  a  valid  test  in  law,  the 
expression of “chain of time” should be replaced by “chain of efficiency” and a new set of 
rules are established accordingly. The efficient cause should be the peril which profoundly 
inserts the incidence of the loss at the starting point of the chain. On the other end, the 
chain  of  efficiency  will  be ended either by the consequence of loss  or  by an intervening 
cause. Under the latter circumstance, if the intervening event  contributes to the ultimate 
loss or a new loss, a new chain of efficiency is set up and it should be the proximate cause 
in  the  claim.  In  this  regard,  the  causation  rules  should  be  applied  in  each  causal  link 
respectively for the purpose of ascertaining the scope of the underwriter’s liability. 
1.2.3 Test of Common Sense 
Compared with the test regarding the time order, efficiency seems to be a more accurate 
and  plausible  approach  in  seeking  the  proximate  cause  of  the  loss.  Nonetheless,  such 
criterion  has  been  criticised  on  the  grounds  of  having  produced  arbitrary  decisions  in 
identifying the cause. A test of common sense is demanded and complied with where the 
decisions are prone to be beyond a rational and commonly acceptable scope. After all, the 
causal issue in law  does not seek the impersonal actual physical  causes in the technical 
sense exclusively; rather, it asks whether the loss is the consequence of the risks within the 
limit  which  the  insurer  agreed  to  assume  under  the  policy.
86 Accordingly, besides the 
“efficiency”  test  affirmed  by  the  Leyland  case,  the  “common  sense  test”  has  played  a 
supplementary yet important role for an even longer time. Overall, the efficiency test aims to 
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specify the single or concurrent causes of the loss in every individual case, whereas, the test 
of  common  test  purports  to  ensure  the  approach  within  general  legal  and  common 
rationales,  which  avoids  arbitrary  judgments  owing  to  the  excessively  strict  analysis  on 
isolating the proximate cause from the complex factual matrix.  
It has been stated that a philosophical refinement would be adopted in judging the issue of 
causation since 19
th century, in the form of ‘the commonplace test’ based upon which an 
ordinary businessman is familiar with on such issues.
87 It was reaffirmed by Lord Denning a 
century later that causation questions should be answered based on common sense.
88  This 
proposition has been clarified and elaborated by Bingham LJ, to the extent that   the 
ascertainment of the proximate cause sh ould  apply the common sense of a business or 
seafaring man in the context of the marine insurance.
89 Likewise, it does not  require the 
courts to act as  experts in the scientific  aspects  of maritime scope. What can  merely be 
expected from the courts is the  judgment or construction of law in practical language upon 
particular circumstances under a commercial contract.
90 
As “commons sense” connotes a general and indefinite meaning, it is very likely there would 
be arguments on defining what falls within common sense or not. It has to be borne in mind 
that  common  sense  is  not  a  subjective  test,  although  it  remains  flexible  in  the  courts’ 
discretion. In The Sivand,
91 which was concerned with damages due to a collision between a 
tanker and harbour works, Evans LJ articulated that common sense:  
...is not a subjective test, which would be an unreliable guide. It implies a full 
knowledge of the material facts and that the question is answered in accordance 
with the thinking processes of a normal person. The reference to “material” facts 
means that some mental process of selection is required. 
Paradoxically, common sense cannot be equated with common conclusion. The test has to 
rely on the explanation and reasoning of the judges based upon the facts in every case. It is 
inevitable that not all judges consider the common sense test as a solution to lead them to a 
common  conclusion.
92 Common sense ca n only  be  reached on the assumption that the 
decision is not subject to the judges’ own cognition but in a common manner as a normal 
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person.  On  this  basis,  common  sense  can  be  adopted  as  a  supporting  approach  of 
processing and identifying the proximate cause of the loss or damage. 
How can common sense apply in law? Common sense is not confined by rules of law; it 
assists  to  reach  the  conclusion  which  the  law  does  not  allow.
93  Common sense has 
established the bottom line of making good law and its proper application. In other words, 
the proper application of a good law should be at least within the scope of general common 
sense. Although the law would be made sophisticatedly and precisely and complied with 
coherently, it mig ht still fall into the question of common sense as a result of the 
unsatisfactory outcome. The reason  for introducing this method into resolving the issue of 
causation is to fill the blanks of the rule and to cope with the conflicts between the common 
ground and law owing to the constraint  in  application or defective rules. Theref ore, the 
common sense test can apply   under the circumstance that rules of law cannot answer 
effectively and reasonably. In general, however, common sense  should not be relied upon 
solely as an authoritative ground , where valid legal rules are still available under common 
law. In the case of causation in marine insurance, the doctrine of proximity remains the 
paramount test to apply unless otherwise provided in the policy. The common  sense test 
should be regarded as a supplementary test in case of  an unreasonable and unexpected 
conclusion. 
The common sense test may be applicable in cases  where the courts are faced with  the 
possibility of making an arbitrary or unjust decision , if strictly following the causation rules 
established in law. Nevertheless, the test sh ould not be availed as an obstruction to apply 
the legal causation rules simply because a decision appears to imbalance  the  interest 
between the two parties. Viscount Simonds i n Mcwilliams v Sir William Arrol & Co. Ltd,
94 
where an experienced steel erector fell from a height at work, held that the employer was 
not liable for his breach of duty of not providing a safety belt, as it had not caused the death 
on the balance of probability. Notwithstanding  the effect of the “but for” test in tort law, the 
learned Judge and Steele in her book warned that a causal link must be established between 
the conduct and the consequence for a valid claim, in spite of the occurrence of an adverse 
consequence  on  the  victim,  as  causation  is  related  to  responsibility  to  the  consequence 
only.
95 Moreover, although common sense princ iples have a moral basis and accords with 
ordinary moral notions of when someone should be considered responsible for  some 
occurrences, they may not  serve equally well in the event of liability without reference to 
fault.
96 Accordingly, under the insurance law, the common sense test is only effective in the 
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process of selecting the proximate cause of a causal link in law, but not as a ground for 
making a decision favourable to the assured, as long as an insured peril is involved. 
It is also noteworthy that both The Inkonka
97 and The Coxwold
98 were held to remove the 
need for metaphysical analysis of causation; however, it is interesting and appears to be 
somewhat  controversial  that  The  Cendor  Mopu,
99  which  also  involved  a  metaphysical 
question on ascertaining the proximate cause of the broken legs of the oil rig, depended 
heavily on the expert evidence to conclude that the leg-breaking wave was the proximate 
cause eventually. On the other hand, in the same case, holding that the fortuitous external 
accident or casualty should not have to be exceptional or extraordinary, the House of Lords 
have denied the authoritative effect of the The Mayban,
100 which indicates that the complex 
expert evidence on the weather conditions during the designated voyage is not necessary 
and  material  any  more.  The  common  sense  test  seemingly  sets  a  low  threshold  for  the 
courts to process the selection of the proximate cause, but it does not prevent the courts 
from exploring and figuring out the proximate cause of efficiency to the loss incurred on a 
legal level, nor purports to reduce the burden of proof on either concerned party. It should 
be clarified that in the context of the law of marine insurance that the common sense of the 
marine professionals, along with the expert evidence upon particular facts, should jointly 
assist the courts in finding the efficient cause. 
1.3 Comparison: Causation Tests in Marine Insurance Law and 
Tort Law 
Tort law and insurance law are  both classified as branches of civil law.
101 The law of tort 
purports to provide  a remedy in order to protect certain rights or interests against civil 
wrongdoings. In contrast, marine insurance law essentially has its origin and basis in the law 
of contract, where the insurer and the assured come into an agreement upon the recovery of 
certain loss or damage by virtue of a policy. The law of tort is frequently combined with 
liability insurance, playing a role  in distributing losses and compensating   injuries.
102 For 
instance, the system of compulsory third-party insurance to cover liability for road accidents, 
and of compulsory insurance to cover liability of employers to their employees, are designed 
to facilitate the operation of  the accident compensation system in tort law. In the case of 
subrogation, an insurance claim may be followed by a tort one. 
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It  appears  plausible  to  propose  to  adopt  the  same  approach  for  addressing  the  causal 
question in tort law and insurance law, as there is an overlap in the process of ascertaining 
the  party’s  liability  in  tort  claims  and  liability  insurance  claims.  Specifically,  the  named 
defendant, who is also known as the alleged tortfeasor, is simply a nominal party in many 
tort claims. The disputes are frequently conducted and settled by his insurer under a liability 
policy.
103 The question whether the underwriter is liable for the damage depends upon the 
answer to the question whether the insured is liable to the claimant, i.e. the injured party, 
under the law of tort in the first place. As aforementioned, if the assured seeks  a valid claim 
on the recovery of loss or damage from his insurer, one should prove the occurrence of an 
insured peril and his loss  of  the subject-matter insured. Also ,  a proximate causal link 
between the peril and the loss has to be established, unless otherwise provided in the policy. 
Likewise, such a link is required between the alleged tortious conduct and the damage 
occurred in order to find the defendant is liable under both strict liability and fault -based 
liability.
104 In comparison, the incidence of certain tortious conduct is equal with the insured 
risk; damage and loss both refers to an adverse consequence which triggers the enquiry 
about responsibility and liability. The causal requirement between them is naturally to be 
established in the same met hod in order to obtain consistent decisions of liability in one 
trial depending upon two distinct branches of law. Therefore, the interaction in terms of 
liability insurance between insurance and  tort provides a powerful support  for adopting an 
identical approach for the causal requirement.  
Nevertheless, it is worth m entioning the commercial court  decision of  Lloyds TSB General 
Insurance Holdings and Others v Lloyds Bank Group Insurance Company Limited,
105 which 
discussed the difference between tort law and insurance law in ascertaining the proximate 
cause. The assured in this case was seeking to recover against a sum paid out due to his 
failure  of  financial  advice  under  a  policy  of  professional  indemnity  insurance.  The 
commercial court held that the proximate cause of the bank’s liability to his investors was 
the negligence in providing inadequate advice, and the assured’s failure to provide proper 
training  to  his  employees  (the  consultants)  was  irrelevant.  In  particular,  the  underwriter 
sought to distinguish the insurance test from the tort test in this regard, however, Moore-
Bick J disagreed that a different and more restrictive approach to causation applies generally 
in the case of contracts of insurance than the case of tort law. Accordingly, the underwriter 
was held liable to the indemnity. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal
106 but 
reversed by the House of Lords.
107 Having construed the aggregation clause differently from 
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the Court of Appeal, the House of Lords considered the failure to provide proper training as 
an essential fact which entitled the underwriter to deduct his liability of indemnity under 
each claim rather than aggregate all the claims as a “result from any single act or omission 
(or related series of acts or omissions)”. Although the concern of the dispute shifted from 
the causation issue to the construction of terms in the contractual framework eventually, the 
initial decision made by the commercial court has addressed and expressed an intention for 
convenience to follow the same causation rule in tort law in the context of liability insurance. 
On the other hand, the appellate decision, however, has revealed that different facts may be 
looked  into  and  considered  to  be  relevant  and  may  come  to  opposite  conclusions  in 
answering the two distinct questions: is the alleged tortfeasor liable and is the insurer liable. 
As  an  independent  category  of  insurance  from  liability  insurance,
108 so far as the marine 
insurance including the hull and cargo policies are concerned, the approach of causal 
requirement in tort law can even hardly be introduced and applied. In essence, the two laws 
protect the rights of different natures. The underwriter’s liability under the marine insurance 
law  derives  from  the  basis  of  contractual  obligations  and  from  the  perspective  of 
commercial sense, while tort law has an independent source and provides protections to 
civil  legal  rights  and interests  from  unlawful  human  acts.  Consequently,  there  are  a  few 
remarkable distinctions in terms of causation between the two branches of law. In the first 
place,  the  most  striking  difference  resides  in  the  approaches  and  tests  to  establish  the 
causal link of legal effect. Tort law depends more upon the factual basis of the civilian’s 
conduct and the damage or injury, which means when referring to causation, the judges rest 
their concerns equally or even more on the factual links.
109 Whether the allegedly tortious 
conduct really caused the damage is the key question in establishing the causal relation. 
The mode in tort law can be perceived and concluded as that the defendant is liable in the 
event that the conduct contributed to the  consequence of the damage in fact with the 
exceptions that the link is too weak because of remoteness or the lack of foreseeability.
110 
Accordingly, there have been proposed three divergent tests in tort law, namely, the “but 
for” test, the test of remoteness and the test of foreseeability. In contrast, in shipping cases, 
the tendency  is  to  address  the  causation  issue  within  the legal  scope, as  the liability  of 
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indemnity is created by contract with mutual intentions, even though courts have sometimes 
commented that the causal question is a matter of fact. It is natural that no decision can be 
made by not relying upon the facts. However, in the context of marine insurance, it has 
been well-established by law that the cause of efficiency is the proximate cause and only 
relevant cause in ascertaining the underwriter’s liability. Logically, it seeks the very cause 
through several factual contributing events by examining the proximate or remote links to 
the loss rather than to being confined in establishing and checking ONE causal link between 
one targeted conduct to the damage. All kinds of causal factors insured or non-insured are 
required to be considered before coming to the conclusion, unlike the tendency in tort law 
to treat or presume the human conduct as the ”operative” or “effective” cause.
111 In essence, 
the causation issues in these two laws are starting from different points and experiencing 
divergent  logical  processes,  even  though  leading  to  a  common  effect  to  ascertain  the 
liability of one side of the parties. 
In general, tort academia used to analyse the tortious scenarios by the “but for” test, which 
is the same point shared in insurance law.
112 Also, the test of direct consequence has been 
fully considered and relied upon in  cases decided under the law of  tort.
113 Apart from the 
fact that two tests can be observed under both laws, the issue of causation in tort law is also 
resolved by answering whether the loss is foreseeable  and reasonably resulting from the 
prospective proximate cause.
114 In effect, the “but for” test itself as discussed above is no 
longer a sound test both in marine insurance law and in tort law, and the foreseeability 
between the risk and the loss is not traceable in marine insurance cases. Regardless, the 
notion of “remoteness” as opposed to proximity is the statutory test shared in the law of 
marine insurance but with different implications and application.  
Specifically,  the  proximate  or  direct  cause  and  the  “foreseeability”  test  have  exerted 
substantial influence on the decisions in tort law. Defendants frequently take advantage of 
either of them as a defence to detach the causal link from his conduct and the loss in order 
to discharge his liability.
115 Also, these two approaches in argument contribute to support 
and value in addressing the  same question in the context of marine insurance law. A 
remarkable case of the first of two approaches is  Re Polemis and Furness Withy & Co Ltd,
116 
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where a charterer was held by the Court of Appeal to be liable for the total loss of the ship 
in a devastating fire which was caused by his employee’s negligence in dropping a board 
into  the  hold  during  the  loading  operation  with  inflammable  cargo  on  board.  Having 
reversed  the  decision  of  the  trial  judge  which  was  on  the  grounds  of  the  test  of 
foreseeability, the Court of Appeal reasoned the loss to be as a direct consequence of the 
negligent  conduct,  even  though  it  was  not  foreseeable.  As  a  case  closely  related  to  the 
carriage  of  goods  by  sea  in  terms  of  charterparty,  this  decision  has  reflected  the 
considerations in the shipping industry instead of being a mere negligence claim in tort.
117 
As commented by Davis ,
118 the decision is acceptable and popular in the shipping world 
given the social context of the time; while tort law developed  it, it is no more than a “self-
applying” rule. In particular, another landmark case in tort law, The Wagon Mound (No. 1)
119 
which overturned the former case, is frequently cited as an authority for returning to the 
“foreseeability” test. The charterer’s servant negligently allowed bunkering oil to spill into 
the sea, which flowed to water underneath a wharf by wind. Not bound by the decision in Re 
Polemis, the Privy Council (Australia) found the charterer of the vessel was not liable for the 
damage to the wharf caused by the fire in the absence of foreseeability that the spilt oil 
would contribute to the outbreak of the fire.  
Nevertheless, the two decisions can be understood from a comparison vision. The causal 
link in tort law does not require as close and direct a connection as the one required in 
shipping law, in particular the law of marine insurance. A weaker form of causal link may 
satisfy the legal requirement of tort liability, for example, employer can be held vicariously 
liable  if  one  of  his  employees  harm  another  on  the  grounds  that  he  contributed  to  the 
opportunity to the consequence.
120 However, if a remote link is too weak in effect to cause 
the damage, it will not establish a liability thereupon. Accordingly, the satisfaction of the 
test of “remoteness” not only embraces the situations of direct and effective causes but also 
indirect but reasonable contributory ones. At the same time, foreseeability, as another limit 
of equal importance in ascertaining the defendant’s liability, must be satisfied in the same 
case. In other words, although the direct consequence test may not be preferable in the tort 
law context, a cause in fact
121 (normally refers to the allegedly tortious conduct) must be 
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neither too remote nor unforeseeable in order to find the defendant is liable for the injury. 
Thus, The Wagon Mound (No.1) should not be cited as an authority for exaggerating the 
effect of the “foreseeability” test as the sole limit excluding the limit of remoteness; or even 
to be treated as the prevailing test in tort law over the fact-based test. It is a decision which 
has also drawn our attention to the limitation of foreseeability, but not a symbol returning 
to the so-called  TEST of Foreseeability. Its emphasis should be understood to have been 
simply  put  on  the  correctness  of  the  “direct  consequence”  instead  of  the  test  “not  too 
remote”  applied  in  Re  Polemis.  Although  it  may  be  inaccurate  to  treat  the  “direct 
consequence” as a  rule or general test which leads all the direct consequence to be the 
liability of the defendant, however, an attention in remoteness of the causal link should be 
paid  independently.  It  should  be  remarked  that  remoteness  in  causal  effect  is  a  distinct 
concept from unforeseeability, even though they may overlap in some occasions when the 
consequence is too remote to anticipate. For instance, interventions of new causal factors 
typically  demonstrate  the  earlier  conduct  to  be  a  cause  of  remoteness,  but  remaining 
foreseeable.  An  evident  margin  is  perceptible  between  the  consequences  which  are  not 
remote in tort law but not foreseeable as a matter of fact and vice versa. Therefore, it is 
better to treat both remoteness and foreseeability as two independent limits to the principle 
rule of cause in fact.  
Furthermore, the maritime law style reflected in Re Polemis is not simply a need in history. 
The  concepts  of  remoteness  and  foreseeability  are  traditionally  distinct  and  even 
contradicted in tort law and in contract law in the maritime context. From the perspective of 
carriage of goods by sea, the cause of action in Re Polemis in relation to the charterparty 
was  dropped  by  the  time  the  case  reached  the  court.  However,  it  seems  indefinite  yet 
unlikely  whether  the  decision  would  be  different  in  having  ascertained  the  charterer’s 
liability  of  recovery  had  the shipowner  insisted  on  claiming  in  contract.  The  charterer  is 
basically obliged to properly use the vessel, which is implied in the contract. Remoteness 
under contract law has been defined in Hadley v Baxendale
122 of carriage of goods by sea 
                                                                                                                                                        
Consequences” (2003, 119 L.Q.R.,388), is not justified and necessary. Lord Hoffmann has 
presented sufficient reasons to regard this distinction as an example of over-complication of 
causation questions. However, for the convenience of comparison, in this part of the Thesis, 
“cause in fact” is used, referring to the real and actual causal link between a human tortuous 
conduct and the consequence, for the purpose of describing and emphasising that the tort 
law test is fairly fact-based and fault-based. It does not aim to make a distinction in terms of 
legal concepts. 
122 156 E.R. 145. The principles established in this case  remain good law till now and have 
been applied, for instance, in The Sylivia [2010] EWHC 542 (Comm), when the loss naturally 
caused by the breach, it should be recoverable. However, in some unusual cases regarding 
the assumption of responsibility, such as The Achilleas [2008] UKHL 48, applying the test of 
remoteness  may  lead  to  an  “an  unquantifiable,  unpredictable,  uncontrollable  or 
disproportionate liability or where there was clear evidence that such  a liability would be 
contrary  to  market  understanding  and  expectations.”  Under  this  circumstance,  English 
courts protect the party in breach from a wider responsibility in the commercial sense and in 
contract law, unlike the result of applying the legal test of foreseeability in tort. M. SONG 
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that  damages  recoverable  for  a  breach  of  contract  should  be  such  as  might  fairly  and 
reasonably  be  considered  as  arising  naturally  from  the  breach  or  might  reasonably  be 
supposed to have  been in the contemplation  of the parties at the time the contract was 
made. A consequence is highly probable to be a direct one if it has naturally arisen from the 
breach,  while remoteness  can  be  found  where  the party  in  breach  can  prove his  lack  of 
information so that he cannot reasonably be aware of the counter party’s contemplations at 
the time of concluding the contract. It should be remarked that the awareness is based upon 
the parties’  disclosure  of  information  rather than  general  common  sense.  In  Re  Polemis, 
having known benzine was on board and possessing a duty of care to conduct safely, a fire 
was  triggered  naturally  when  the board negligent  fell into  the hold.  Consequently,  strict 
liability arises on the part of the charterer as the situation does not satisfy the remoteness 
exception in the contract law context.  
Under the law of marine insurance, it reveals a more significant style of maritime law as to 
the concepts of remoteness and foreseeability. Only the direct and efficient cause meets the 
statutory test, subject to the parties’ contractual agreement to the contrary; and the marine 
insurance market concerns itself with the question of foreseeability in terms of both the 
incidence  of  perils  and  loss  from  the  opposite  side  of  tort  law.  Insurance  contract  is  a 
contract based upon fortuity, which excludes voluntary conduct and inevitable and naturally 
occurring  losses  which  can  certainly  be  foreseeable  from  the  coverage.  Therefore,  the 
foreseeability test seems even unpopular in the marine insurance context, as foreseeability 
might diminish the fortuity of the risk and loss. For instance, in The Cendor Mopu, it was 
argued that only the losses proximately caused by the unforeseeable perils of sea should be 
recovered; and the loss caused by inherent vice is not insured as it is too foreseeable almost 
to be inevitable. In addition, since tort law is fault-based essentially, a consideration of the 
subjective factors should be taken into account when ascertaining the defendant’s liability, 
which is not shared with contract claims, in particular with marine insurance. Therefore, a 
subjective judgment in common sense of the moral impact has been introduced into the 
decisions so that the defendant will not be liable for the loss beyond foreseeability, owing to 
his behaviour. In contrast, the insurer agrees to undertake the liability of indemnity of the 
loss solely for the “consideration” of premium of the policy. The question of foreseeability is 
simply a matter of construction of the literal terms, if any arise. An arguable test of common 
sense, as discussed above, exerts a rather flexible limit on the statutory test of proximity in 
efficiency.  Hence,  the  tests  of  causation  in  tort  law  are  strikingly  different  from  the 
operation under the law of marine insurance. 
Will the causation question be simpler in insurance cases if it confines  itself to inquiring 
only about the link between the perils which are agreed and listed in the policy and the loss, 
as the approach in tort? Obviously, the answer is positive. Once one of the insured perils is 
efficient in causing the loss, irrespective of how much it contributes to the loss, the causal M. SONG 
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link is established and the underwriter is liable. However, what is more important and tricky 
is whether it should be. As discussed and concluded above, unlike tort law, there is no fault 
on the insurer’s part when deciding the liability of indemnity, therefore, as a contractual 
party, the insurer is entitled to the equal right in establishing another causal link of a non-
insured or excluded peril in order to discharge his liability, so long as he can prove it to be 
the proximate cause of efficiency. If following the tort model of causation, the underwriter 
loses the ground of defence by contending that the proximate cause is a non-insured or 
excluded peril; and the rules regarding concurrent causes are also meaningless. To make it 
worse,  the  underwriter  will  almost  be  liable  in  every  case,  as  he  can  only  discharge  the 
liability  when the loss is remote and unforeseeable from  all the insured perils  or all the 
contributing factors are non-insured or excluded perils. Thus, the causation rules in marine 
insurance should not follow the rules in tort. 
In summary, in spite of the convenience of applying the same causation rules between tort 
law and insurance law in the form of liability insurance, the law of marine insurance has 
established  and  followed  a  set  of  causation  rules  which  is  influenced  by  other  types  of 
insurance  and  tort  law.  However,  the  causation  rules  which  are  essentially  shared  in 
common in insurance law are radically different from those under the law of tort, owing to 
the  fundamental  difference  between  contract  law  and  tort  law.  Starting  from  the  well-
established statutory test, the law of marine insurance concentrates on the occurrence of 
the peril which introduces the risk of the loss most effectively. The limit of the statutory 
principle of proximity is the common sense test for the purpose of avoiding unpractical and 
irrational  decisions.  In  reverse,  tortious  liability  is  on  a  factual  basis,  from  the  common 
sense perspective, with the limits of remoteness and foreseeability in the legal sense. In 
general, both laws take account of the factors of legal cause and cause in fact, however, 
compared  with  the  insurer’s  liability  of  indemnity,  tortious  liability  requires  a  lower 
threshold in establishing a legal causal link but, pays more attention to the contributing 
cause in fact. Therefore, the causation rules in the law of marine insurance are distinct and 
should be applied independently. M. SONG 
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Chapter 2 Concurrent Causes 
“Concurrent  causes”,  interchangeably  referred  to  as  “combined  causes”  and  “multiple 
causes”, is an arguable term in the marine insurance context. It has been disputed by some 
early cases whether there is room for a principle that ‘concurrent causes’, as opposed to a 
sole cause,  can result in the consequence of a loss or damage in law. There used to be the 
mainstream view of English courts that in the case of two causes, one or other of them must 
be closer as the proximate cause.
123  Despite the fact that the House of Lords showed an 
intention of not supporting the submission on the existence of more than one proximate 
cause of the loss,
124  however, the notion of concurrent proximate causes in English law can 
be tracked from nearly two centuries ago,
125 and has been legally accepted subsequently. A 
set of rules concerning concurrent causes has been established by several remarkable 
precedents.
126 Until recently, the judgment of The Cendor Mopu
127 provided a review on the 
recognition of ‘concurrent causes’ in marine insurance cases, Lord Mance expressing doubt 
on the occasion of concurrent proximate causes in the legal sense, yet leaving the question 
open in his decision.  
It has been suggested that there are concurrent causes where the two causes are of equal 
efficiency to the loss.
128  Per Lord Mance in The Cendor Mopu, to constitute concurrent causes, 
a loss should be attributable to two concurrent risks arising independently but combining to 
cause a loss. It seems, along with the development of the causation rules, that “concurrent 
causes” embraces a more sophisticated connotation. On the basis of a review of the English 
precedents in the first place, it is challenging yet essential to seek and to conclude a clear 
and  accurate  definition  of  “concurrent  causes”  in  the  modern  law  context.  This  work 
purports to provide a clear standard to ascertain such, given that there is legal room for 
concurrent causes. 
Notwithstanding the obscure status of concurrent proximate causes before English courts, 
in every case, initially, the efficient cause is selected among numerous relevant facts, which 
the first chapter helps in understanding. Subsequently, in the majority case of a sole cause, 
a conclusion is reached by determining whether the cause is within the insured perils or 
excluded. In contrast, where courts consider a possibility of concurrent causes, each/every 
cause will be tested respectively in the manner as a sole cause. The rules as to concurrent 
                                                 
123 Supra 70, Per Lord Dunedin 
124 Liverpool & London War Risks v Ocean S.S. Co.[1948] A.C. 243 
125 Hadedorn v Whitemore 1816, 1 stark, 157 
126 For instance, J.J. Lloyd instruments Ltd. V Northern Star Insurance Co. Ltd. (The Miss Jay 
Jay) [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 32 and Wayne Tank and Pump Co. Ltd. V Employers Liability 
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causes have been set up and should be applied under this circumstance. Therefore, it is 
worth studying these specific rules by virtue of looking into the relevant English cases. 
2.1 Concurrent Causes and Sole Cause 
It is quite usual that a few causes on the factual basis may be the competing candidates for 
the proximate cause. However, concurrent causes are somewhat rarely  recognised by the 
courts, due to their preference of isolating a single peril as the dominant cause.
129 For one 
reason, it has to be admitted that a real “concurrent causes” situation is practically rarer. 
Moreover, it would simplify the process of determining the insurer’s liability of indemnity by 
avoiding the application of the rules of concurrent causes by holding a sole proximate cause, 
even though such decision is prone to produce an arbitrary outcome.  
In the light of various considerations, English courts have changed their mild attitudes in 
recognizing a loss arising from more than one proximate cause and they seem to have set 
up a rather harsh standard. Consequently, doubt as to whether there is still room for cases 
of concurrent causes has been raised. Therefore, this concept should be clearly defined in 
the modern context in order to ascertain the underwriter’s liability and to acknowledge the 
defences.  
2.1.1 Room for “Concurrent Causes”  
The English Marine Insurance Act 1906 merely provides the doctrine of proximity in s 55, 
without the indication of room for concurrent proximate causes. Should the 1906 Act apply 
in a strict manner, a single cause must be isolated in any event due to the singular wording 
used in the provision. However, it seems that the literal application and interpretation of this 
section  is  far  from  satisfaction  for  the courts.  From  the aspect  of  the provision  itself,  it 
seems that it merely aims to emphasize the term “proximately”, regarding the standard of 
the causal connection. It is logical to assume that if a loss was proximately caused by two 
insured perils, pursuant to s 55(1), the loss should be recovered by the insurer. Therefore, 
the provision does not deny the possibility of the existence of more than one proximate 
cause.  Chalmers’  explanation  in  this  respect  affirms  that  “there  may  be  more  than  one 
proximate (in the sense of effective or direct) cause of loss”.
130  
Undoubtedly,  in  practical  scenarios,  the  situations  are  more  divergent  and  complex. 
Different types of risks, whether insured or non-insured or even excluded, may combine and 
merge to the occurrence of the loss. Although English courts may frequently be encountered 
with the net of facts and intend to simplify the situation by isolating one cause of all causes, 
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th edn, Butterworths, 1983) 78 M. SONG 
40 
 
a  few  landmark  precedents  have  set  up  and  been  decided  upon  the  rules  regarding 
concurrent causes, and no decisions nor dicta can be found in respect of s 55(1) to exclude 
the justification of the admittance of two concurrent causes in marine insurance cases.  
In  retrospect,  rules  of  causation  in  English  marine  insurance  law  have  experienced 
remarkable developments, not only in terms of the test of proximate cause, but also in the 
recognition of concurrent causes. It is maintained that the view that a loss may have more 
than one proximate cause has been authoritatively accepted in English law in compliance 
with the decision of Hagedorn v Whitemore,
131 as early as a historical case in 1816. In this 
case, a vessel carrying the insured cargo  was taken in tow by a British vessel of war on 
concealment of the British license under a mistake. The cargo on board was damaged by 
exposure to the tempestuous sea. Lord Ellenborough held that it was proximately caused by 
perils  of  sea;  moreover,  “the  loss  might  have  been  alleged  to  have  been  occasioned  by 
capture and detention”. From his learned judgment, Lord Ellenborough seems solely to show 
his concern on the allegation of capture and detention, otherwise than on whether there was 
the  possibility  of  concurrent  causes  of  detention  and  perils  of  seas.  The  trace  of  the 
recognition of concurrent causes is relatively vague and indefinite. It is more appropriate to 
be taken as a case of how to exclude one of the competing causes. Although this ancient 
judgment failed to provide strong support in acknowledging the concurrency of proximate 
causes under marine insurance cases, it might be a good starting point for looking into the 
legal acceptance of concurrent causes.  
In the judgment of the latter case, Reischer v Borwick,
132 where the ship was insured against 
damage caused by collision with any object, perils of sea not included, and ran against a 
snag,  Lindley  L.J.  advocated  that  the  sinking  was  proximately  caused  by  injuries  by  the 
collision and by the ingress of  water  while being towed  for repair.  In  contrast, although 
Lopes L.J. admitted that “this [towing after the collision] may have been a concurrent cause, 
and  one  without  which  the  loss  would  not  have  happened”,  he  held  that  the  broken 
condenser  resulting  from  the  collision  was  the  sole  proximate  cause  of  the  loss  finally. 
Whether the loss was caused by perils of sea and the collision jointly and proximately would 
not alter the result of the decision in compliance with “good sense”, per Lindley L.J. and 
under  modern  rules,
133 since collision was an insured peril and perils  of  sea was non -
included. Although the concurrent causes  of  the sinking have not been unanimously 
recognised by the judges, this decision can be deemed as a sign ificant trace of the 
consideration and room in respect of the notion of “concurrent causes” by courts.  
It is particularly noteworthy that two strikingly contrary attitudes have been held in this case. 
Although it is a case prior to the enactment of the 1906 Act, the judges in this case were not 
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confined to merely looking at the last cause occurring in time order. Both Lindley L.J. and 
Lopes L.J. considered the indispensable effect of each cause. On account that the sinking 
was due equally to one of these causes as the other, Lindley L.J. held a rather open attitude 
by admitting that the loss would be indemnified in a cover for perils of sea as well. However, 
Lopes L.J. emphasised that  
In cases of marine insurance it is well-settled law that it is only the proximate 
cause that is to be regarded and all others rejected, although the loss would not 
have happened without them.  
Literally,  this  proposition  seems  to  indicate  that  once  a  proximate  cause  is  found,  it 
automatically  excludes  the  circumstance  of  concurrent  causes.  That  is  to  say,  the 
proposition seems to allow no room for a second proximate cause in one case. However, it 
is illogical and implausible to disregard all other contributory causes of efficiency but for 
which the loss would not have happened, since all other “but for” causes cannot be self-
proved  to  be  proximate  or  not.  The  doctrine  of  proximity  in  determining  the  marine 
underwriter’s liability should be applied in a neutral manner with an equal preparedness to 
find  the  possibility  of  concurrent  causes  as  with  a  sole  cause.
134 Although  the test of 
efficiency may have not come into the minds of the judges at the time of making the 
decision, the contribution in efficiency, no matter how minor it turns out eventually,  should 
always be material to the courts, until reaching a conclusion by an overall evaluation.  
The Leyland Shipping,
135 which is the leading decision on the test of proximity, appears to 
have shown a unanimous intention by the House of Lords in ascertaining a sole proximate 
cause irrespective of the complexity of the facts at that period. Confronted with the thorny 
question as to which was the proximate cause, perils of sea or man-of-war, Lord Dunedin 
suggested  that  the  question  should  be  resolved  as  a  matter  of  fact  by  identifying  the 
dominant  cause  of  the  two.  Likewise,  Lord  Shaw  of  Dunfermline  articulated  that  “where 
various factors or causes are concurrent, AND one has to be selected” [emphasis added], the 
matter should be determined by efficiency as a matter of fact. It has to be admitted that the 
core attention of the Lords rested on the test of efficiency in order to replace the test of 
time order in this case. However, according to the judgment, it seems the Lords showed less 
concern on whether there would be any possibility of concurrent causes. Since it abandoned 
the last ONE in time  order test by  looking into efficiency  instead, it is possible that the 
House of Lords was not prepared to abandon the obligation (or a habitual thought perhaps) 
of seeking the one cause as a result of the influence of the old test. Nevertheless, the new 
test concerning efficiency literally embraces the possibility of equal efficiency in causation, 
which is distinct from the last ONE test. Thus, it would be arbitrary if one comes to the 
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conclusion that a sole cause must be chosen as the proximate one, solely based upon this 
decision. 
Furthermore, still in this case, Lord Atkinson criticised the tendency or an approach to divide 
concurrent  causes  into  a  preceding  and  a  succeeding  cause  by  establishing  a  sequence 
between them, the latter being proximate and the former is remote. It implies that at least a 
possibility  remains  by  measuring  efficiency  of  competing  causes  and  owing  to  common 
sense  and  parities  agreement  in  marine  insurance  law.  Therefore,  in  the  law  of  marine 
insurance, The Leyland Shipping cannot and should not be treated as a definite authority for 
answering the question as to the room of “concurrent causes”. 
In contrast, the decision of a non-marine insurance case which is concerned with liability 
insurance has given enlightenment to the question by citing a marine insurance case. In 
Wayne  Tank  and  Pump  Co.  Ltd.  V  Employers  Liability  Assurance  Corporation  Ltd.,
136 the 
assured entered a public liability policy with the underwriter indemnifying the accidental 
damage to property, excluding the damage caused by the nature or condition of any good s 
sold or supplied by the insured. A fire broke out and destroyed the factory. On appeal, it 
was held that the underwriter was not liable for the indemnity on account of the exception 
clause. It was interesting that Lord Denning M.R. and Roskill L.J. were  attempting to assume 
both the condition of the goods and negligence of the servants as the concurrent proximate 
causes, however, neither relied on this assumption to produce their  judgments. Instead, 
both of them insisted that the proximate cause of the fire was the defective material of the 
goods, which has been excluded in the cover.  
Nevertheless, Cairns  L.J.  admitted the  possibility  of having  two proximate  causes by 
considering the decision of  Board of Trade v Hain Steamship Co. Ltd.
137 That was a special 
case having gone through arbitration and court decisions. Finally, the House of Lords upheld 
the award and dismissed the appeal by holding that the loss was proximately caused by 
warlike  operations  solely.  A  collision  occurred,  the  negligent  navigation  of  both  vessels, 
being  equally  to  blame.  The  counter-vessel,  otherwise  the  appellant’s  which  was  under 
requisition to the Government upon a charterparty, was belonging to the United States Navy 
during the war time. Accordingly, the government was held to be liable for the loss in the 
collision in light of the warlike operations. Viscount Sumner held that every collision loss 
should  be  regarded  as  the  result  of  two  causes  jointly  and  simultaneously,  namely,  the 
operations of the two vessels respectively. This proposition has been relied upon by Cairns 
L.J.  in  Wayne  case  for  the recognition  of  two  proximate  causes  to  one  loss.  However,  it 
seems to be not within the conventional scope of “concurrent causes” in a collision context, 
looking into the fault of the two vessels respectively. The so-called concurrent causes are 
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the quantitative base to ascertain the apportionments of liability between the two vessels, 
which directly determines the amount that each one’s underwriter may recover against to 
his  vessel  insured.  An  affirmative  answer  can  hardly  be  reached  as  to  whether  the 
underwriters are entitled to defend themselves from the liability of the indemnity against the 
assureds  on  the  same  basis.  The  policy  is  concluded  between  the  insured  and  the 
underwriter under the protection of the doctrine of privity. The rights and liabilities of each 
party are subject to the terms of the policy. Whether the collision falls within the scope of 
the  insured  perils  of  the  policy  determines  the  underwriter’s  liability  of  recovery.  It  is 
impossible to define one collision both to be peril at sea and war risk notwithstanding two 
parties involved. By the same token, a collision cannot be both wilful and negligent to the 
assured. Accordingly, the context of collision between two vessels should not be regarded 
as an example of the allowance of concurrent causes in marine insurance. 
Notwithstanding  the  defect  of  this  collision  case  upon  which  Cairns  L.J.  reached  the 
conclusion that a loss could be proximately attributed to concurrent causes in insurance 
cases, the decision of the Wayne case has been reaffirmed by Midland Mainline Ltd v Eagle 
Star  Insurance  Co  Ltd
138 which  is  in  respect  of  business  interruption  losses  under  an 
insurance  policy  (the  “CGNU”  policy).  In  particular,  the  judge  in  the  Court  of  Appeal,  Sir 
Martin Nourse, contemplated and held that the authorities which provided that there can be 
more than one proximate cause of loss have been already well established by the marine 
cases such as Leyland Shipping and The Miss Jay Jay.
 139 
The  decision  of  The  Miss  Jay  Jay  has  been  recognised  as  the  long-awaited  landmark 
authority of the “concurrent causes” situation under the law of marine insurance. Not only 
the  judgment  holding  that  the  damage  to  the  yacht,  The  Miss  Jay  Jay,  was  proximately 
caused by the concurrent causes, i.e. the ill-designed and ill-constructed hull and actions of 
adverse sea, but also the construction of the exclusion clause as to the norm ‘solely’ have 
taught the marine insurance industry that ‘proximity’ in causation does not always contain 
the  indication  of  being  a  sole  cause.  In  respect  of  the  finding  on  equal  efficiency  of 
unseaworthiness  and  perils  of  sea,  the  judges  relied  radically  upon  the  reasoning  in 
Dudgeon  v  Pembroke,
 140 in  which  it  was  held  that  the  loss  was  recoverable  due  to  the 
immediate cause of perils of sea, though it might not have happened but for the concurrent 
action of some other cause which was not within the policy. The reason for excluding the 
relevancy of the seaworthiness status of the vessel resides in the test of immediate cause in 
time sequence in the 1870s, when Dudgeon v Pembroke was decided. The nearest cause test 
provides the evident grounds to the courts to overlook the possibility of concurrent causes. 
Until The Miss Jay Jay, the judges moved further so as to find the equal efficiency of both 
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causes, but for which the cause would not have occurred to be the proximate causes to the 
loss. Although this decision has been repeatedly followed by cases lately,
 141 per Lord Mance 
in The Cendor Mopu,  
…the  Court  of  Appeal  was  not  presumably  suggesting  that,  where  initial 
unseaworthiness  or  unfitness  and  unfavourable  weather  conditions  beyond  the 
ordinary action of wind and waves have both played a role, the court must always 
treat both as equal or nearly equal proximate causes. 
In  light  of  the  absence  of  a  clear  approach  on  how  to  weigh  and  conclude  the  equal 
efficiency of two separate causes in The Miss Jay Jay, Lord Mance adopted the formulation 
of Lord Diplock in Soya v White
142 regarding the concept of inherent vice instead for his final 
judgment. It has been suggested that such treatment indicates that it could be proximate 
cause only if the loss was attributed to such debility or similar occasions listed in s 55(2)(C)
 
143 of the 1906 Act, without any fortuitous external accident or casualty in compliance to the 
approach by Lord Diplock.  
Interestingly,  although  it  seems  The  Cendor  Mopu  did  not  reverse  back  as  far  as  the 
traditional standpoint of Dudgeon v Pembroke with reference to immediateness, it rejects 
the  concurrency  of  causes  under  the  circumstance  of  The  Miss  Jay  Jay.  It  should  be 
remarked  that  the  formulation  upheld  in  The  Cendor  Mopu  rejects  the  concurrency  of 
inherent  vice  and  perils  of  sea  to  one  loss,  as  if  two  sides  of  a  coin.  Lord  Diplock’s 
formulation  with  reference  to  inherent  vice  complies  with  the  long-established  test  of 
efficiency. An insurance policy does not purport to insure what the vessel or the cargo is in 
itself,  but  to  insure  what  they  are  likely  to  encounter  at  sea.  The  risk  attributed  to  the 
inherent characteristics of any cargo essentially undergoes from the first minute from the 
commencement of the policy to the end. The losses in various levels take place only under 
certain  fortuitous  surrounding  conditions  known  as  causa  sine  qua  non.  Although  it  has 
been  beyond  discussion  that  the  causation  in  the  legal  sense  focuses  on  the  causa 
proxima,
144 provided that the external requisite condition occurs in form of an insured peril, 
it turns to be the proximate cause in efficiency in the legal context as an intervening cause 
against the gradual effect of the inherent characteristics. In  The Cendor Mopu, the efficient 
trigger was the leg-breaking wave which is a peril of sea, though the factor of inherent vice 
increased the adverse condition of the cargo continuously. It is within common sense that 
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the trigger takes the most efficient part in the loss. Accordingly, per Lord Clarke, this policy 
was held to cover the rigs against the leg breaking, but not against every metal crack as a 
result of inherent vice. The two causes operate independently to divergent losses; to each 
loss, there is solely one proximate cause. Therefore, it seems from now on unlikely to find a 
case in which a loss is proximately caused by the equal co-operation of inherent vice and 
perils of the sea.  
Another question has been raised as to whether the decision would be different by holding 
the sole proximate cause of the loss of the yacht to be perils of sea, had the formulation of 
Lord Diplock applied to The Miss Jay Jay. In other words, it becomes doubtful whether The 
Miss Jay Jay would still be good law as to concurrent causes in the law of marine insurance. 
The Cendor Mopu may be deemed as authority to reject concurrency between internal risks 
and  external  ones;  in  the  meantime,  it  warns  about  the  rarity  of  real  concurrency  of 
causation. However, the improbable concurrency of inherent vice and perils of sea is not the 
whole  story  of  the  concurrent  causes  in  the  marine  insurance  context.  Lord  Diplock’s 
approach may apply to every occasion in s 55(2)(C). However, it may be incorrect to extend 
this formulation to a case of seaworthiness. The risk of loss due to unseaworthiness cannot 
expose and take place without the action of seas. That is to say, unseaworthiness cannot 
lead to the loss “without any intervention of any fortuitous external accident or casualty”, 
since unseaworthiness is unfitness “to meet and undergo the perils of the sea and other 
incidental risks to which she must of necessity be exposed in the course of the voyage”.
145 A 
loss of an unseaworthy ship ought to be attributed to both factors. On the contrary, the 
permanently  intrinsic  nature  of  the  cargo  can  independently  cause  loss,  regardless  of 
locations and time. Accordingly, it is apparent that Lord Diplock’s approach is not applicable 
to the case of unseaworthiness and perils of seas. In particular, it is quite reasonable for the 
courts to accept the concurrency of causes when faced with an unusual case, such as The 
Miss  Jay  Jay  where  the  debility  to  encounter  a  certain  peril  at  sea  and  that  peril  at  sea 
cooperated interdependently to the loss.  
On the other hand, The Miss Jay Jay was concerned with the matter of construction, as the 
term  stated  that  “No  claim  should  be  allowed  in  respect  of  (i)  any  loss  or  expenditure 
incurred solely in remedying a fault in design or in the event of damage resulting from faulty 
design  .  .  .”  The  proximate  cause  does  not  have  to  be  the  sole  cause.
146 The  matter  of 
construction in this case indicates that the proximate cause is not a sole cause for granted. 
This proposition can be amplified from two aspects. First, “solely” indicated in the term may 
refer to a more rigorous standard than proximity in efficiency as to the causal relationship, 
which excludes the existence of other contributory factors. This interpretation is in line with 
the narrow formulation of inherent vice, which is determined by the nature of the risk. If a 
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loss  is  exclusively  caused  by  one  risk,  naturally,  that  risk  should  be  regarded  as  the 
proximate cause to the loss. However, the counter proposition does not invariably sustain 
this, since the proximate cause(s) can be selected from a few contributory causes as well. 
On the other hand, since the doctrine of proximity in causation is a statutory rule applied by 
the  courts,  this  term  should  be  construed  as  “any  loss  or  expenditure  incurred  solely 
proximately in …”
147 Logically, the possibility of concurrent proximity in the general meaning 
has been implied in the term by the insertion of “solely”. However, from the perspective of 
the insurer’s intention, what he sought to emphasize was the discharge of his liability where 
one  of  the  listed  causes  contributed  to  the  entire  efficiency  to  the  loss  without  any 
contributory factor, let alone the case of concurrent causes. Therefore, either the loss was 
caused  solely  by  perils  of  sea  or  concurrently  by  unseaworthiness  and perils  of  sea,  the 
result would remain the same that the insurer should cover the loss. The Miss Jay Jay is 
typically in line with Lord Atkinson in Leyland Shipping in finding concurrent causes based 
on the parties’ intention by virtue of construing the clause. It indicates that the proximity 
does not equate with a singular cause, nor contains the element of singularity necessarily. In 
light  of  the complex  practical  occasions  and legal  justifications,  there  should  and  is  the 
room for concurrent causes in marine insurance cases. 
Very  recently,  In  Petroleo  Brasileiro  S.A.  v  E.N.E.  Kos  1  Limited,
148 the Supreme Court 
provided a direct judicial pronouncement on the rights of the owner of a time-chartered ship 
after the ship had been lawfully withdrawn for non -payment of hire for the first time. It is 
noteworthy here that the causation test of the employment and indemnity clause has been 
analysed and highlighted in comparison with the context of marine insurance law. 
The ship owned by E.N.E. Kos 1 was time chartered to Petroleo Brasileiro S.A on the 
Shelltime 3 form.  The time charterparty contained a standard form of indemnity clause 
(clause 13), which read: “charterers hereby indemnify owners against all consequences ... 
that may arise from the master ... complying with charterers' order ...” Due to non-payment 
of hire on 31 May 2008, the owner served a notice of withdrawal three days later when the 
ship had just loaded a cargo on the charterer’s order. The charterer attempted to persuade 
the  owner  to  revoke  the  withdrawal,  but  failed.  Ultimately,  the  charterer  discharged  the 
cargo; however, the ship was detained in the port for 2.64 days during the negotiation and 
discharging  operations.  The  shipowner  claimed  from  the  charterer  for  the  remuneration 
arising from the service of the ship for the 2.64 days at the market rate and the bunkers 
consumed in the same period. The Supreme Court found the owners’ claim was recoverable 
on the basis of the indemnity clause (Lord Mance dissenting) and bailment. 
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It has been affirmed by both courts below that the principle of remoteness and proximity of 
causation apply when determining whether a loss is a consequence of the charterer’s order. 
The  same  principle  was  recognised  by  the  Supreme  Court  as  well.  As  far  as  concurrent 
causes is concerned, having cited numerous cases in marine insurance law (most of them 
have  been  addressed  earlier  in  this  chapter)  and  carriage  of  goods  by  sea,  Lord  Mance 
concluded that the cause should be sought needless of a consideration of concurrent causes. 
However, Lord Clarke articulated: 
It is not I think helpful to use other adjectives to describe the cause. Different 
adjectives  have  been  used  over  the  years,  including  "proximate  cause", 
"dominant cause" and "direct cause". To my mind they are somewhat misleading 
because they tend to suggest that the cause must be the most proximate in time 
or that the search is for the sole cause.  Lord Mance says at para 37  that the 
search  is  for  "the  'proximate'  or  'determining'  cause".  However,  I  respectfully 
disagree because such a formulation suggests that there can be only one such 
cause, whereas there may, depending upon the circumstances, be more than one 
effective cause. 
In his later judgment, he continued: 
However,  in  my  opinion,  they  clearly  show  that  two  effective  causes  can,  in 
principle, exist. To my mind this can be clearly seen from Wayne Tank and Pump 
Co  Ltd  v  Employers  Liability  Assurance  Corpn  Ltd  [1974]  QB  57,  Lloyd  (JJ) 
Instruments Ltd v Northern Star Insurance Co Ltd (The Miss Jay Jay) [1987] 1 
Lloyd's Rep 32 and Midland Mainline Ltd v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd [2004] 
EWCA Civ 1042, [2004] 2 Lloyd's Rep 604. 
As  to  the  academic  view,  the  prevailing  view  admits  to  concurrent  causes  in  marine 
insurance  law.  For  instance,  Arnould’s  approves  of  the  existence  of  the  concurrent 
proximate  causes,
149 and  Halsbury’s  supports  the  existence  of  more  than  one  proximate 
cause as per Lindley L.J, in Reischer v Borwick mentioned above.
150  
2.1.2 The Definition of “Concurrent Causes”  
On the basis of above analysis on the recognition of “concurrent causes” in marine insurance, 
it can be perceived that at present the notion of “concurrent causes” has not been provided 
with a unified definition yet. This notion has been adopted basically in three manners in 
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accordance  with  the  O’May,
151 namely,  (a) the loss could be attributed to any one of the 
combined causes; (b) a single cause which could be described under two different heads of 
perils;  and  (c) concurrent causes of equal efficien cy to t he loss. Similarly, Prof   Hart and 
Honore in Causation in the Law divided concurrent causes into three groups as well, which 
are:  contributory causation, additional causation and alternative causation. Contributory 
causes are the necessary conditions of the  loss but for which the loss would not happen, 
while an additional cause resides where some other independent cause  is sufficient to cause 
the damage, while alternative causation refers to the situation of two or more alternative 
sets of conditions suffici ent to  cause the loss. These categoris ations have covered and 
explained for all the inconsistent understandings and attitudes of the courts towards the 
concurrency of proximate causes for long. It should be noted that divergent understandings 
of this notion are the root of the different attitudes of the court. A clear and uniformed 
definition  of  “concurrent  causes”  seems  to  be  the  most  essential  work  which  requires 
completing in order to resolve the confusion in applying the relevant rules  of concurrent 
causes in the practice of marine insurance. 
(a) A combination of all competing causes in general 
As discussed previously, the causative facts combine and operate as if knots on a net. Every 
knot may have contributory effect on different scales to the occurrence of loss. It is quite 
usual for the courts to select the effective and predominant one from a few co-operating 
causes.  Accordingly,  it  becomes  frequent  that  the  courts,  academics  and  practitioners’ 
works use the notion “concurrent” and similar wordings to describe a mere chaos of factual 
materials. For instance, Parks
152 seems to define a series of relevant causes, i.e. the whole 
net  of  causes  to  be  concurrent  causes  before  the  real  proximate  sole  cause  is  isolated. 
Precisely speaking, the early stage of a rough selection of relevant events before analysing 
and reconsidering can hardly amount to the terminology of concurrent causes in the legal 
sense. The contribution of every element is necessary but not sufficient to constitute one of 
the concurrent proximate causes. Hence, even though a loss would not have happened but 
for a few incidents, it should be noted that it is not accurate to use notions such as multiple 
causes, combined causes or even concurrent causes to describe the co-operation.  
(b) One peril which falls into more than one heading of perils  
There may be the event that a loss is attributed to a single cause proximately, however, that 
cause is capable of being categorised into two headings of perils. Kuwait Airways Corp v 
Kuwait Insurance Co SAK
153 is a case concerned with a single cause which could be described 
in two ways. The Iraqi forces took control of the Kuwait airport in August 1990 while they 
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invaded Kuwait. There were 15 airplanes under the entitlement of the assured KAC, which 
were taken possession of and transited by the forces, away from Kuwait along with KAC’s 
aircraft  spares  stored  on  the  site  of  the  airport.  KAC  had  concluded  and  renewed  the 
aviation hull and spares war risks and allied perils insurance, which covered against all risks 
listed in Section 1 specifically including war, invasion in para. (a) and seizure in para. (e). 
However, the extension clause in respect of the spares merely stated the cover against the 
risks started from letters (b) to (f) apart from (a) as listed in Section 1.  
One of the main issues of the dispute was which perils listed were the aircrafts and spares 
lost, which were directly connected to the scope and amount of the indemnity. The insurer 
argued that par. (a) was excluded perils in the cover as to the spares. With respect to the 
question of causation particularly, the Commercial court held that the loss was only caused 
by the peril in par. (a) so that there was no recovery for the loss of the spares. Whereas, the 
Court  of  Appeal  in  majority  reversed  the  decision  by  holding  the  loss  was  within  both 
categorisations, which was affirmed by the House of Lords. The Lords approved that the 
perils listed in every paragraph are not mutually exclusive, except Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
The Lords found in favour of the assured on the ground that he succeeded in proving the 
loss was proximately caused by any one of the insured perils, but not an excluded one. It is 
interesting that there is, as a matter of fact, only one incident to give rise to the loss. The 
overlap of the connotations of the perils in law creates a situation of concurrency. It is in 
essence  a  question  of  defining  the  risks.  It  is  fairly  controversial  if  the  House  of  Lords 
treated the failure to insert para. (a) as an exclusion, since both the assured and the insurer 
would  succeed  in  proving  this  loss  was  caused  by  a  proximate  cause  both  insured  and 
excluded under the cover respectively. In this case, it seems not a good answer or even 
bizarre to apply the rule where an insured peril is concurrent with an excluded one. Instead, 
critical consideration has to be taken by courts in construing the clauses from the intentions 
of the parties, and they ought to look deep into the natures and concept of the perils. It is 
no longer a question  of causation concerning efficiency to the occurrence of the loss or 
damage, rather, a question of distinguishing the specific risks. 
Similarly, an incident arising from a marine risk under some circumstances may convert into 
the immediate consequence of a war risk.
154 The difficulty in distinguishing the marine risk 
from war operations remains constantly, which is apparently a matter of sole proximate 
cause. In some unusual cases such as Board of Trade v Hain Steamship Co. Ltd, the collision 
happens to be war-like operation which falls into the scope of another type of peril. There 
was only one cause as a matter of fact; however, it overlapped between two scopes of risks 
in the legal sense. From causation in law, such a situation applies to sole-cause rules rather 
than rules as to “concurrent causes”. 
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In essence, concurrent causes literally require at least more than one incident or event in 
fact.  One  peril  which  falls  into  more  than  one  heading  of  perils  is  not  regarded  as  a 
“concurrent causes” situation as well, under the law of marine insurance. 
(c) Two independent perils of equal efficiency  
Viscount  Sumner  in  Board  of  Trade  v  Hain  Steamship  Co.  Ltd  described  the  notion  of 
concurrency to be two causes jointly and simultaneously leading to the loss. In spite of the 
emphasis  on  the  combinations  of  effect  and  timing,  the  description  still  misses  some 
indispensable elements to define a situation of more than one proximate cause. Since the 
efficiency  test  has  been  established  and  recognised  by  English  courts  in  identifying  the 
proximate causative link between the incidents and losses, the test is the sole prime rule to 
be applied as well as to ascertain the possibility of concurrent causes. Slade LJ in The Miss 
Jay Jay and Lord Denning in the Wayne both recognised that “concurrent causes” referred to 
two causes which were equal or nearly equal in their efficiency in bringing about the damage. 
Moreover, Cairns L.J. preferred to say that unless one cause is clearly more decisive than the 
others,  it  should  be  made  to  give  one  of  them  the  quality  of  dominance.  It  should  be 
remarked that the evaluation on the equal efficiency is not a mathematical issue; instead, 
the approach of common sense applies in this regard. The requirement of equal efficiency 
has been demonstrated fully in The Kastor Too.
155 The vessel  Kastor Too was on a voyage 
during which the engine room caught fire. However, it was found that the vessel sunk in 
fifteen hours due to the entry of seawater due to unexplained causes. Although the judge 
was  entitled  to  find there  were two  independent  causes,  namely,  the  fire and ingress  of 
water by unexplained cause, as a matter of fact, since the amount of the seawater for the 
purpose of putting out the fire was far less than the amount sufficient to sink the vessel, the 
fire was not able to contribute equal efficiency in causing the loss of the vessel. Therefore, it 
was held that the entry of water due to unexplained cause was the proximate cause of the 
loss.   
Recently,  Lord  Mance  in  The  Cendor  Mopu  emphasised  the  element  of  independent 
operation to be part of the definition. It is suggested that the real situation of concurrent 
causes refers to two perils operating independently which are able to cause the loss of it 
individuality.
156 How far should the independence in operation be interpreted? Although two 
risks of separate and independent operation may amount to concurrent causes to one loss, 
it would be too far to require each of the co -operating causes to be capable of causing the 
loss by the operation of each alone. As aforementioned, concurrent causes are the causes of 
equal or nearly equal efficiency to the loss. The ‘equal efficiency’ does not mean that either 
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one  of  the concurrent  cause gives  rise to  the loss  with  entire efficiency  literally.  Rather, 
where the causes are independent in that one does not lead to the other, but interdependent 
in  that  neither  would  lead  to  the  loss  but  for  the  other,  such  typical  concurrent  causes 
situations as the Miss Jay Jay and the Wayne case should be and have been well recognised, 
upon which a set of rules related in this regard have been established in the law of marine 
insurance.  
Compared with the definition provided by the US jurisdiction, New Appleman Insurance Law 
Practice  Guide
157 defines  concurrent  factors  as  two  events  of  independent  origin  which 
combine to cause a loss that would not have occurred unless both events had taken place. 
This definition explains the independence and concurrency of two or more causes clearly, 
which is worth considering and introducing into the English law. However, this definition is 
contradictory  to  Lord  Mance’s  view  in  the  way  that  it  emphasises  the  necessity  of 
indepensible contribution of each cause. If each concurrent cause is able to result in the loss 
by itself independently, it means the loss will still occur, but for the other concurrent cause. 
As mentioned in the first chapter, the “but for” test is a necessary but not a sufficient test to 
ascertain a proximate cause, which means the proximate cause should still meet with the 
test primarily, as one of the necessary conditions of the loss. That is to say, in order to 
constitute a concurrent proximate cause, each peril must also be a necessary condition to 
the loss as well.  
Moreover,  if  two  causes  act  independently  in  causing  a  loss,  according  to  the  view  in 
Insurance Disputes,
158 the insured may recover the loss which he can prove was caused by 
the insured one.  For example, taking inherent vice and perils of sea in The Cendor Mopu as 
two completely independent perils causing the loss of the cargo, the assured succeeded in 
establishing that the loss of the broken rig was caused proximately by perils  of the sea, 
accordingly, the Supreme Court  found in  favour of the assured in recovery. By the same 
token,  the  Court  rejected  the  contention  that  the  damage  of  the  metal  cracks  mainly 
resulted from inherent vice. 
Therefore, independence requires each peril having an independent origin and contribution, 
which means one ought not to be an inevitable result of the other and simply passes on its 
causal efficiency; whereas, concurrency indicates a combining and indispensable effect of 
each  cause.  In  one  word,  concurrent  causes  should  operate  independently  and 
concurrently.
159  
(d) Cumulative contributions of two causes 
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Literally, the meaning of “concurrent” may embrace the element of “simultaneous”, which is 
easily assumed to mean that the two causes to the loss  must happen at the same time. 
However,  according  to  the  Black’s  Legal  Dictionary,  “concurrent”  also  means  having  the 
same authority; acting in conjunction, agreeing in the same act and contributing to the same 
event  [emphasis  added].
160  In  the  causation  context ,  the  connotation  of  the  word 
“concurrent”  should  be  interpreted  as  an  equal  contribution  of  the  causal  factors  to  the 
consequence of loss, which emphasizes the same efficiency and operation at the point when 
the loss occurs, rather than the same timing of occurrence of the two risks, which is also in 
line with the genuine test of efficiency in terms of causation in insurance cases.  
Comparatively, it is rare and exceptional that two causal events occur at the same or almost 
at the same time as a matter of fact, and then contribute to the same loss jointly and equally. 
Even if the simultaneous events both contribute to the loss, there is no certainty that both of 
them  can  meet  with  the  test  of  efficiency  to  be  concurrent  proximate  causes.  On  the 
opposite end, it is much more frequent that one risk occurs in the first place and the other 
follows, whether immediately or not. Generally speaking, there may turn out to be three 
kinds of cases. Most frequently, it may be simply a sole proximate circumstance, where only 
one of the causes contributes the prevailing efficiency to the loss. Secondly, the ultimate 
loss cannot accrue without either incident of the causes, which means neither of the causes 
can lead to the loss independently without each other.  
Compared with the former two circumstances, the third situation is much more confusing 
where the later risk exerts a cumulative effect on the loss based upon the earlier one. Under 
such circumstances, Risk A has occurred in the first place and is able to cause the loss alone; 
subsequently, the incident of Risk B has caused the ultimate loss in conjunction with Risk A 
with equal efficiency. Doubts may arise as to whether they can be described as concurrent, 
as well as whether this is in essence a situation of two independent causes giving rise to two 
independent losses of the same kind, yet maintaining a certain link between each other. The 
main difference between the two situations is whether the initial loss caused by the earlier 
risk can be calculable and separable from the cumulative loss. For instance, where a loss 
caused by a fire and explosion, and the “fire” leads to an explosion, and the explosion leads 
to  further  damage.  In  principle,  any  damage  caused  by  that  explosion  will  be  covered, 
unless  cover  for  explosion  is  excluded.  In  Stanley  v  Western  Insurance  Co,
161 the  judges 
unanimously distinguished the loss caused by the following explosion from the loss caused 
by  the  initial  fire,  having  regarded  them  as  two  independent  losses.  Likewise,  a  similar 
situation was confronted with in the recent case which has been mentioned in Chapter One 
in terms of the “but for test”, Orient-Express Hotels Ltd v Assicurazioni General SpA (UK) (t/a 
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162, where Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita led to physical damage 
to the hotel, whilst a subsequent official curfew affected the hotel’s business to a further 
extent.  In  both  cases,  although  the  two  risks  were  closely  connected,  they  occurred  at 
different  times  and  also  contributed  to  a  final  loss  which  consisted  of  two  independent 
losses of the same kind, but occurring at different time. The cumulative effect of the later 
risk is merely quantitative. In contrast, in the case of the aforementioned second type, the 
later concurrent risk works in a qualitative way along with the earlier risk. For example, a 
few employers were all held responsible for their common employee’s industrial disease, 
owing  to  an  unknown  apportion  of  efficiency  to  the  outbreak  of  the  disease.
163 All the 
cumulative and inseparable contributions t ook effect at the same point of time when the 
employee caught the disease. 
Therefore, concurrent causes do not  need to happen at the same time, but are required to 
cause the final loss at the same time with equal effort. In the event of cumulative effects of 
two risks, the test  should be set up as whether the equal efficiency  of both relevant risks 
operates and contributes to the loss at the same time. It is very likely that a mere cumulative 
contribution to the amount of the loss cannot be in line with the refined definition and the 
connotation of “concurrent” in the legal causation context. 
In  summary,  independence  and  concurrency  are  both  part  of  the  real  definition  of 
“concurrent causes” in the context of modern marine insurance law. This concept includes 
the  requirements  and  characteristics  of  contributory  causation  or  additional  causation  in 
terms of Hart and Honore’s categorisation. In one word, concurrent causes under the law of 
marine insurance refer to two or more independent perils of equal or nearly equal efficiency 
to the loss or damage, without either of which the loss would not have happened.  
2.2 Rules Established by the Landmark English Cases 
On  reviewing  the  landmark  cases  in  English  law,  the  rules  of  causation  are  notably 
concerned with the natures of the perils of concurrency, i.e., insured, uninsured or excepted 
perils. Where one proximate cause has been identified, only the insured peril entitles the 
assured to be indemnified. Provided concurrent causes are of the same nature, it would be 
simplified, as the situation can be essentially equated to the sole cause circumstance. In 
contrast,  the  combination  of  two  or  more  causes  of  proximity  requires  further 
contemplation in order to ascertain insurers’ liability, where concurrent causes may belong 
to different kinds categorised by their natures according to the terms in the policy or the 
statutory  provisions  of  the  1906  Act.  Therefore,  purporting  to  cope  with  the  questions 
arising from the different natures, a set of causation rules have been made and followed by 
English courts. 
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2.2.1 Insured Peril Concurrent with Uninsured Peril 
Where the subject-matter insured is encountered with an insured peril concurrently with an 
uninsured peril under the policy, the assured is entitled to recover. This rule was affirmed in 
Halsbury’s Laws,
 164 which provides firm authority for the decision of The Miss Jay Jay. It is 
also suggested that the basis of the rule is that the loss should be regarded as the result of 
the operation of an insured peril.
165 
This rule  is  normally applicable to uninsured perils ,  simply referring to the limit of the 
description concerning the insurer’s liability. It is noteworthy that uninsured perils beyond 
the duration of the policy do not apply in this regard. It is universally accepted that the 
underwriter is merely liable for, unless otherwise agreed, loss occurring within the period of 
the policy and its developed loss subsequently, which is known as “death blow” in property 
insurance.
166 However, insurers will basically reject liability for the events and its losses 
before his cover comes   into effect. The underlying rational e  is that what matters to 
indemnity is the happening of the perils within the policy period, rather than the occurrence 
of the consequences of loss simply.
167 Lately, on the application of  Knight v Faith,
 168 it was 
reaffirmed,  in  Wasa  International  Insurance  Co  Ltd  v  Lexington  Insurance  Co,
169 that  the 
insurer  or  reinsurer  is  liable  to  indemnify  the  insured  or  reinsured  in  respect  of  loss  or 
damage  occurring  during  the policy  period,  but  not  that  discovered due to  earlier perils 
under English law. 
In Kelly v Norwich Union Fire Insurance Ltd,
170 a householder’s policy, which was the first 
one of the assured, was taken out to cover the insured’s home in October 1977. The insurer 
agreed to indemnify the loss or damage caused by the bursting of pipes in a domestic water 
system and landslip or subsidence, not including heave in respect of the events occurring 
during the period of insurance. The court found that the damage occurred as a result of 
heave  in  the  clay  soil  which  had  been  caused  by  two  incursions  of  water,  and  it  was 
impossible to apportion the damage between each of them. The later incursion was insured 
within the cover period, whereas the earlier one which took place in the summer before the 
policy was affected, was not insured. Per Croom-Johnson, “…it might be possible to ask the 
judge  to  apportion  the  blame  between  the  two”,  had  it  been  possible  to  apportion  and 
accordingly  demanded  by  the  assured.  The  expert  evidence  showed  that  it  was  totally 
impossible  to  apportion  the  responsibility  for  the  final  damage  to  whichever  of  the  two 
causes,  which  the  judge  found  were  operative.  Although  the  indispensable  contribution 
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could  be  denoted  from  the  expert  evidence,  the  judgment  never  indicated  that  the  two 
causes were concurrent causes of equal efficiency explicitly, which remains the actual cause 
or causes unascertained. Eventually, the judges in the Court of Appeal held that the loss was 
caused by the incursion outside the period; accordingly, the insurer was not liable. Thus, the 
dispute seems no more than an issue of the cover period. Causation questions should be 
distinct from the problem emphasising the time when the insurance is effective, a problem 
which  is  simply  inquiring  into  the  application  of  the  contract  to  normal  existing 
conditions.
171 Accordingly, the judges regarded the rule of con currency less relevant in 
deciding this case; instead, the insurer’s knowledge and awareness of the risks before the 
commencement  of  the  policy  took  priority  as  the  major  ground  of  their  judgment.  In 
essence,  insured  perils  and  uninsured  perils  are  normally  referred  as  those  simply  with 
reference to the express coverage or not when applying The Miss Jay Jay rule. 
Assuming that the assured enters into multi policies covering different perils, there may be 
an overlap in recovery under the circumstance of concurrent causes, but not an overlap in 
coverage by means of applying The Miss Jay Jay rule. This is distinct from double insurance 
but leads to the same result.  Therefore,  an assured appears to  be in a  more  favourable 
position since the loss may be recovered under both policies. The rule established by case 
law provides a legal authority to extend the coverage to some non-insured perils. However, a 
further operation as to the share of indemnity between the underwriters will arise. The equal 
efficiency also provides the legal ground for the contribution by equal apportion between 
the insurers. However, it is the assured’s choice and right to decide how many policies and 
what the coverage is respectively, subject to compliance with the doctrine of utmost good 
faith. Nevertheless, the overlap of coverage due to concurrent causes enables underwriters 
to reduce the risk and the amount of the indemnity on account of the doctrine of indemnity 
in insurance law. However, in light of the harsh standard of the recognition of concurrent 
causes, it is still plausible for assureds to look for coverage on uninsured perils by another 
policy, if demanded.  
2.2.2 Concurrency between Insured Peril and Excluded Peril 
Where there are two effective causes of the loss, one within the general words of the policy 
and  one  within  an  exception  term,  the  exception  prevails  over  the  insured  peril  and 
discharges the insurer’s liability of indemnity. Per Lord Sumner in Samuel v Dumas,
172 “where 
a loss is caused by two perils operating simultaneously at the time of loss and one is wholly 
excluded because the policy is warranted free of it, the question is whether it can be denied 
that the loss was so caused, for if not the warranty operates”. The essential rationale in law 
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lies in the fact that the exception takes priority  over the general  words.
173 Moreover, the 
exclusion clauses in policies define the extent of the insurer’s liability of indemnity explicitly 
based upon mutual agreement. However, two different situations should be distinguished, 
namely, interdependent concurrent causes and independent combined causes, since it has 
been suggested and discussed that where two causes are independent of each other and 
cause part of the loss without the contribution of the other, the insurer will merely be found 
liable  for  the  insured  part.  In  contrast,  in  the  event  of  real  concurrent  causes  with  an 
interdependent nature, for instance, in the Wayne case, the Judges unanimously agreed that 
the  only  way  to  give  effect  to  the  exclusion  terms  was  by  exempting  the  two  causes 
altogether.
174  
It appears that the judicial inclination of English courts is to protect the expectation  of the 
insurers  in undertaking the liability of indemnity, compared with the court s in California 
where it was held in the case of two proximate causes , where one was insured against, that 
the insurer was liable regardless of the  fact that the policy exclu ded liability for the other 
cause in a liability insurance dispute.
175 However, the rule upheld by English courts  is not to 
be simply read in this manner. Conversely, the rule established in the  Wayne case, although 
a liability insurance case, has provided a better solution for marine insurance cases. 
In  the  first  place,  the  argument  in  the  rule  is  more  connected  to  the  nature  of  liability 
insurance, rather than a general question as to all insurance policies or even the judicial 
intentions.
176 Per  Judge  Lucas,  “Partridge  never  considered  in  what  manner  concurrent 
causation  could  apply  in  the  first  party  property  insurance  context”.  Also,  the  scope  of 
coverage and the operation of the exclusion clauses are to be treated differently in these 
types  of  policies  accordingly,  since  property  insurance  are  unrelated  to  establishing 
negligence for the purpose of assessing tort liability.
177 It is interesting that t he US courts 
have shown reluctance in finding more than one proximate cause under property insurance 
covers as well, for instance, the California Supreme Court has never found  that there can be 
concurrent legally causes of loss in a property insurance case ,
178 which is echoed with the 
standpoint in Parks.
179 Thus, it can be remarked that the argument on the opposite operation 
established by the California courts  should not be considered in  general marine insurance 
cases. Moreover, Judge Clark in  this American case dissented by  taking the view that the 
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excluded cause should stand out according to  the obvious  parties’ expectation  from the 
principle of contract, which agreed with English law’s standpoint.  
In particular, Roskill LJ in Wayne has concluded and emphasised that the law on exception 
clauses  is  the same  both  for  marine  and  non-marine  insurance.  In  the  marine  insurance 
context,  majority  of  the  policies,  including  hull  policies  and  cargo  policies,  are  property 
insurances. The parties’ agreement on coverage and exclusion is crucial in construing the 
policy and defining the insurer’s undertaking. The freedom of contract is the root of the 
policy. Ambiguity may exist where the wording or the definition of the excluded perils is 
unclear. However, whether the underwriter is liable in the event of concurrent causes with 
one excluded is not ambiguous. When the parties’ intention is clear and explicit, the courts 
should respect and comply with it. Accordingly, it is well established by law in the case of 
marine insurance that the exclusionary cause prevails so that the policy will not answer. 
A concern on fallacy has been presented in Colinvaux’s stating that if the excluded element 
discharges the underwriter under one policy, another underwriter based upon a different 
cover may take advantage of the other concurrent cause to defend him against the liability 
by applying this rule. Consequently, there is a gap between the mutually excluding policies, 
despite the fact that the assured attempted to obtain the most sufficient cover the risks. On 
the contrary, as above mentioned, the court concluded in Partridge that the coverage was 
available in both automobile and the homeowners’ policies, in spite of the exclusion against 
each other in policies in concurrent causation. Similarly, in Colinvaux’s,  special attention 
has been drawn  by the decision  of the House  of  Lords in Fairchild v  Glenhaven Funeral 
Services Ltd
180 in respect of causation in tort, where there was no means to determine during 
which employment the employee’s disease was caused on a balance of probability. All the 
employers involved under the employer’s liability insurances were held to be liable for the 
damage.  Although  the  same  risk  has  been  covered  in  all  policies  of  different  periods 
respectively, and it has been ascertained that the insurer was not liable for the loss before 
the commencement of the policy even resulting from the insured risk, immaterial of it being 
uninsured or excluded risk, the Fairchild rule imposes upon the underwriter the obligation 
to undertake his apportion by equal division. The judicial protection of the employees is 
fairly obvious and apparent in this case, which abandons ordinary causation principles.
181  
Generally, damages occurr ing  in tort law is divisible in some cases between different 
tortfeasors or even between the claimant and the defendant in terms of fault, whereas in the 
absence of double insurance,   only the underwriter(s) in the policy undertake s  liability in 
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marine insurance claims on the basis of a single causal link between the proximate cause 
and the loss. Tort law aims to penalise as many tortfeasors as possible so long as they are 
negligent or have fault in causing the damage in order to indemnify the innocent victim to 
the best extent. However, marine insurance seems more like a settlement of loss between 
the two parties. The insurer agrees to cover the entire loss caused by certain perils, and the 
assured agrees to bear the whole loss which he does not insure on his own. Therefore, more 
than  one  causal  link  may  need  to  be  established  concurrently  in  one  tort  claim  for  the 
damage, as the liabilities may be divided and undertaken by more than one tortfeasor, and 
each link is confined to one of the specified defendants’ acts and the damage. However, 
liability  under  a  marine  insurance  claim  is  not  apportionable  between  the  assured  and 
insurer by weighing the insured perils and the others. Concurrent causes do not amount to 
identical meaning and no comparable rules can be borrowed in this respect under the two 
laws. 
Had the Partridge rule or the Fairchild rule applied, the concern over the excessive pressure 
put on the assured would be dispelled,
182 since the insurer could not escape liability  on the 
ground of exclusion . However,  on the contrary , the insured would be encouraged to 
conclude only one policy to covering more risks than agreed dispense with more policies  in 
applying Partridge rule, which is likely to exert more unfavourable impact on the insurance 
industry  both  in  commercial  and  legal  sense.  Moreover,  applying  the  Fairchild  rule  in 
insurance law would increase the communications and disputes between the insurers. Being 
well  established  and  recognised,  the  Fairchild  rule  becomes  highly  important  for 
businessman; the policy, as a type of contract, is subject to the terms mutually agreed by 
the parties. The concern can be perfectly resolved by virtue of freedom of contract, without 
the need for law. Thus, the extent of coverage and exclusion can be delicately phrased and 
worded  in  order  to  fulfil  the  blank  coverage  between  the  policies.  In  particular,  a  term 
dealing with concurrent causes can be introduced into the policy in order to ascertain the 
allocation of the risk and the liability of the insurer. 
2.3 The Significance and Future of “Concurrent Causes” 
The “winner-takes-all-principle” is introduced by Prof Marc A. Huybrechts as a comment on 
the harsh and inconsistent decisions made by English courts as to the assured’s attempt for 
recovery compared with the causation rules of Belgium.
183  From the Belgian position, “theory 
of  the  equivalent  causes”  (equivalence  des  conditions)  requires  the  courts  to  take  into 
account all relevant circumstances, without which the loss would not have occurred. This 
approach  has  similarity  to  the  ‘but  for’  test  under  English  law.  Moreover,  the  Belgian 
position contains a more striking distinction in ascertaining the underwriter’s liability in the 
                                                 
182 John Lowry and Philip Rawlings, “Comment on Proximate Causation in Insurance Law”, 
Modern Law Review 2005, p 316 
183 Prof Rhidian Thomas (ed), Marine Insurance: The Law in Transition (Informa, 2006)  M. SONG 
59 
 
event  of  combined  causes.  The  Belgian  courts  allocate  the  percentage  by  calculating 
apportions of every contributed peril, which allows the apportionment of liability between 
the underwriter and the assured. It is arguable that this approach produce a more equitable 
and flexible resolution of insurance disputes between the underwriter and the assured.
184 
Similarly, the formulation to apportionate the loss can be observed in The Norwegian Marine 
Insurance Plan of 1996, Version 2010:
185 
 § 2-13. Combination of perils  
 If the loss has been caused by a combination of different perils, and one or more 
of these perils are not covered by the insurance, the loss should be apportioned 
over  the  individual  perils  according  to  the  influence  each  of  them  must  be 
assumed to have had on the occurrence and extent of the loss, and the insurer 
should only be liable for that part of the loss which is attributable to the perils 
covered by the insurance….  
Is there a possibility of reconciliation between the assured and the underwriter by splitting 
the  bills  of  indemnity  by  means  of  taking  account  of  all  the  relevant  causative  facts?
186 
Evidently, it should be noted that such reconciliation  is not intended to be availed as a tool 
to blur or ignore the real proximate cause  of  the loss. Nonetheless, as a  means of the 
settlement of disputes and the balancing of interests, is this approach plausible and justified 
in ascertaining the liability of indemnity?  
The mechanism of insurance has been created for risk allocation in the commercial  sense 
between the parties to the policy. From the theoretical view under the contract law, it is hard 
to find justification for splitting the bill. An insurance policy, as a contract in general terms, 
is concluded with the mutual intention  of allocating risks in the manner that the insurer 
undertakes the liability of indemnity on the perils he agrees to insure, while the assured 
bears  the  non -insured  risks  and  the  excluded  ones.  The  essential  intention  of  the 
underwriter is to share certain risks but not to share the loss. It was clearly held by Viscount 
Sumner in Wayne that loss is not apportionable. When the circumstance is consistent with 
the terms agreed in the policy, the contract should be performed accordingly and stringently. 
In contrast, from the tort law theory or liability insurance perspective, it seems easier to 
accept the approach upheld in Belgium. However, so far as marine policies are concerned, 
the express terms prevail over apportion of liability by the degree of negligence between 
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counterparties. Thus, the proximate cause(s), as the only indicator to ascertain the entire 
liability, are of material significance under English law.  
In  spite  of  the  lack  of  legal  grounds  for  apportioning  the  indemnity,  the  notion  of 
“concurrent causes” and its rules in English law is operated as the regime for guaranteeing 
the reasonableness and justification of the seemingly rigorous attitudes of English courts in 
term of ascertaining the liability. On the one hand, the real sole proximate cause depending 
upon the matter of fact and law will be identified on a thorough and concise consideration 
of all contributory factors. On the other hand, it enables courts to avoid arbitrary decision in 
equal efficiency situation so that the courts do not feel obliged to identify one proximate 
cause.  
The  rules  as  to  concurrent  causes  under  insurance  contracts  reflect  the  intention  of  the 
courts to balance the status of insurer and assured, which is common in the UK and the US 
irrespective  of  their  differences  in  this  respect.  English  courts  attempt  to  interpret  the 
exclusionary  clauses  narrowly,  while  they  broadly  interpret  the  coverage  scope,  which  is 
significantly reflected in The Cendor Mopu.
187 Likewise, US courts support the same rules of 
construction.
188 However, it would be partial to maintain that English courts intend to protect 
the insurer’s benefit and expectation more than those of the assured, merely because of the 
Wayne rule in concurrent causation situations. As mentioned above, the rules of concurrent 
causes include both the The Miss Jay Jay rule and the Wayne rule, which should be regarded 
in tandem. As far as the policy is concerned, the insurer will not be liable for the uninsured 
perils or the excluded ones. Under The Miss Jay Jay rule, the insurer has been held to be 
liable for the uninsured risks which he had not expected to cover, although it appears that it 
is the case of the concurrency of an insured peril and an excluded one that reveals more the 
conflict of competing benefits of the insurer and the assured. From the  viewpoint of the 
consequences, however, uninsured perils are equated with excluded perils for avoiding the 
insurer’s  liability.  The  Miss  Jay  Jay  rule  denotes  a  favourable  intention  to  expand  the 
reasonable expectations of the assured on the policy coverage; whereas, when an excluded 
proximate cause operates, English courts choose to take account of the insurer’s benefit 
whether on the grounds of mutual intention or merely based on the insurer’s intention. It is 
true that the English insurance market deals with the policy by focusing on the freedom of 
the contract in the commercial sense, instead of solely paying attention to the individual 
assured  based  on  private  insurance.
189 On the one hand, unlike social insurance, marine 
insurance policies serve commercial functions, essentially. On the other hand, the imbalance 
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of  power  between  the  insurer  and  the  assured  seems  less  severe  in  the  maritime  field. 
Therefore, concurrent causes rules have reached a fairly balanced point by looking into the 
intentions of both parties, rather than imposing more risks and pressure on the side of the 
assured. 
Nonetheless, the concurrent causation in the marine context remains quite a few arguments 
and  leaves  some  important  questions  open  currently,  which  demand  dealing  with  in  the 
future,  for  instance,  perceivable  narrow  acceptance  and  room  for  concurrent  proximate 
causes and the overlap and blank in the coverage of more than one policy. Clarification of 
the concept and nature of every risk is the fundamental basis for the issue of concurrent 
causation in particular. From the legal facet, a definite and clear recognition by case law or 
statutes should be suggested and considered in order to respond to the universal doubt and 
hesitation in finding and applying the set of rules. Upon a legal acceptance and recognition 
of “concurrent causes”, the incorporation of new clauses concerning concurrency turns to be 
justified and helpful in identifying the liability of the underwriters between the policies for 
different coverage.  
The wording and phrasing of such a clause has to be precise and critical, since a third party, 
namely another policy underwriter is likely to be influenced or involved. A typical example is 
where the insurer agrees to undertake more liability on covering the perils in concurrency 
with uninsured or even excluded ones by charging a higher premium, immaterial of whether 
the assured has placed other policies. While, it should be noted, if the insurer agrees with 
‘held cover’ in the Wayne situation, he is quite likely to lack legal grounds to recover his 
payment of indemnity from other insurer.  
In  contrast,  assuming  that  the  insurer  is  aware  of  other  relevant  policies  and  regards  it 
material, if the insurer expressly states that he is not liable for uninsured perils concurrent 
with insured perils which is contrary to the rule established by the courts, he initially has to 
notify the assured explicitly, otherwise, the courts can hardly find in favour of the insurer on 
the  grounds  of  the  basic  principle  of  insurance  law.  However,  despite  the  fact  that  the 
insurer  has  performed  in  compliance  with  the  aforementioned  requirements,  he  is  still 
bound to encounter with the courts’ rigorous construction of contra proferentem if there is 
any ambiguity therein.  
In conclusion, not only can a few legal authorities in the law of marine insurance be found in 
support of room of “concurrent causes”, but it also has substantial commercial and practical 
significance. However, a conservative judicial attitude towards the recognition of causes in 
concurrency is perceptible in English  marine insurance law.  Generally speaking, it  mainly 
arises for two reasons. On the one hand, the incidence that one loss can be proximately 
attributed  by  more  than  one  cause  based  upon  the  complex  and  strict  test  of  equal 
efficiency is rare in practical scenarios. One the other hand, the natures of every risk may M. SONG 
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determine that one cannot jointly contribute to a loss with some other peril for deciding the 
indemnity,  such  as  inherent  vice.  Consequently,  there  underlies  some  logical  fallacies  if 
courts hold them combining as proximate causes to the loss. Therefore, although the test as 
to evaluate equal efficiency in causing the loss seemingly resolves the difficulty to ascertain 
the situation of concurrent causes, the perils and risks have to be taken into account as well, 
before coming to a conclusion. 
Along with the development of the doctrine of proximity and the clarification of the nature 
of the perils, the insurance market in practice will certainly react and reconsider the forms 
and  clauses  accordingly.  Moreover,  the  specific  rules  established  in  terms  of  concurrent 
causes involved with non-insured perils and excluded perils respectively avoid the arbitrary 
judgment based upon a well-balanced judicial consideration  of the sides of both parties. 
Therefore,  a  relative  mature  mechanism  of  causes  in  concurrency  can  be  conceived  in 
English law of marine insurance. M. SONG 
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Chapter 3: Identifying the Causes 
Compared with the pure causation rules as discussed above, much more arguments arise 
from the question in respect of the insured coverage. In general, the more types of marine 
perils that are included, the wider the scope of the insurer’s liability and the more likely the 
underwriter is liable. On the contrary, the more specific and narrow the policy describes, the 
more restricted  the recovery  will  be.  If  one of  the  insured  perils  responds  to  the test  of 
causation, a prima facie liability of indemnity is established subject to the insurer’s contrary 
defences. 
Identifying  the  scope  of  coverage  and  narrowing  the  range  of  competing  causes  are 
preliminary questions before applying the doctrine of proximity in order to isolate the very 
“efficient” cause. It has been shown in The Cendor Mopu
190 that the Supreme Court has taken 
considerable length of pages to explain the meaning of inherent vice and perils of the sea 
before deciding which one was the proximate cause of the broken legs of the insured oil rig. 
It was also indicated in the judgment that the meaning and nature of perils can considerably 
determine and affect the result of applying the test of causation. Presumably, the different 
concepts  of  perils  may  be  the  essential  reason  for  the  inconsistency  of  English  legal 
authorities in this respect.  
Therefore, this chapter primarily aims to explore an explanation for the inconsistency of the 
precedents and to systematise the modern rules of causation through conceptualising the 
term “marine risks” and defining the main forms of perils exemplified in standard policies or 
by statutes. Accordingly, the first section will outline the notion of “marine risks” and specify 
the  relevant  provisions  of  the  main  modern  standard  policies.  The  proceeding  parts  will 
elaborate numerous typical perils, particularly in respect of the meaning and application of 
causation rules.  
3.1 Coverage of Marine Policies  
On the outset, marine perils had been stated and exemplified in the Lloyd’s SG Policy. The 
wordings  have  been  retained  and  codified  in  the  First  Schedule  to  the  English  Marine 
Insurance  Act  1906.  Some  of  these  perils  have  been  retained  in  the  modern  Institute 
Clauses, for example, clause 6 of the Institute Time Clauses -Hulls (1995) and clause 1 of 
the Institute Cargo Clauses (B). Besides, marine policies may also agree to insure some risks 
which lack a marine character in the strict sense. Generally speaking, these clauses provide 
the basis to ascertain the insured scope and exceptions in terms of the insurer’s liability of 
indemnity without prejudice to the statutory stipulations and the fundamental principles and 
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purposes  of  insurance  law.  Various  methods  have  been  adopted  by  courts  in  order  to 
interpret these provisions and to define the relevant perils in the most rational and accurate 
manner in every single dispute. Therefore, before looking at any particular peril, this chapter 
begins with a snapshot on the term “marine risks” and the terms employed in the practical 
field and the courts’ approaches to interpret the ambiguity arises thereof.  
3.1.1 The Scope of Marine Risks 
The statutory definition of the term “marine risks”/”maritime perils” can be found in s 3(2) of 
the 1906 Act, stating that: 
“Maritime perils” means the perils consequent on, or incidental to, the navigation 
of the sea, that is to say, perils of the seas, fire, war perils, pirates, rovers, thieves, 
captures, seisures, restraints, and detainments of princes and peoples, jettisons, 
barratry, and any other perils, either of the like kind or which may be designated 
by the policy. 
This definition provides a series of illustrations as to the forms of maritime perils, which may 
be decisively determined by the SG Form. As evidenced by the words “that is to say”, the 
definition of “maritime perils” is not exhaustive.
191 Ending with the words “and other perils, 
either of the like kind or which may be designated by the policy”, it appears the definition not 
only refers to risks with marine connections but also extends to those designated by the 
policy but lacking this element. However, the final words have been construed by the Court 
as restricted to perils in respect of the navigation of the sea; that is, they should not be read 
widely;
192 and it is not possible, despite the concluding words of the definition, to convert a 
non-marine risk into a marine risk merely by designation.
193  
Usually, the marine -related nature of  the peril determines whether it falls into marine 
category  or  not.  The  various  standards  to  define  the  “marine  element”  lead  to  the 
inconsistent usages of the term. The terminology “marine risks” can be somewhat confused 
when it is used in various contexts. For instance, Arnould’s uses “marine risks” as opposed 
to war risks. Traditionally, war risks were excluded from the cover of an ordinary marine 
policy by way of the “free of capture or seizure” warranty. In the modern context, there are 
express  war  risks  exclusions  in  the standard forms  of  marine policy
194  and war risks are 
ordinarily insured against by virtue of the war and strikes standard clauses exclusively. 
Nevertheless, there has been a great inter relation between these two categories of risks in 
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th century, which has provided a lot of valuable precedents in defining the scope and 
concepts of specific marine perils. 
Alternatively, it may simply refer to all the insured perils in a marine policy in the broad 
sense.
195 In contrast, for convenience, it may designate the perils of strict marine character,
 
196 excluding the Inchmaree Clause and similar contingencies which simply happen on the 
sea. Moreover, it was even held that ‘It was to insure against ‘marine risk’, which cannot be 
better  described  than  as  against  ‘the  hazards  of  the  sea.’”.
197  This  interpretation  simply 
equates marine risks to  perils of  the sea.  In  principle, as  long as  the standard is  clearly 
specified in a certain context and in line with the paramount definition provided by s1 and s 
3 of the 1906 Act, one cannot say the usage of the terminology is simply wrong. 
Moreover, the definition of marine insurance extends the scope of maritime perils to the 
risks  incident  to  the  activities  analogous  to  marine  adventures.
198  For  instance,  a 
shipbuilding insurance contract may be categorised as a marine policy, and the risks defined 
thereunder will be deemed as marine perils.
199 Moreover, a fixed platform standing at sea, 
which is not tech nically navigating at sea, has been assumed to be a marine adventure 
covered  by  a  marine  insurance  contract.
200  Furthermore,  a  contract  insuring  a  pure 
navigation of inland waters has been held to be analogous to a marine adventure in  Gibbs v 
Mercantile Mutual Insurance.
201 Hayne J & Callinan J, having considered that “maritime perils” 
is a wider concept than “perils of the sea”, iterated that: 
What mattered was whether an insured risk had occurred. That did not turn on 
where the event occurred but on what happened and why. Was what happened a 
peril consequent on, or incidental to, the navigation of the sea - a fortuitous or 
unexpected event consequent on, or incidental to, the operation of the vessel? 
Very recently, it was held that marine insurance cover even extends to risks occurred on 
land in a Morocco factory, in which clothes would be manufactured and packed for carriage 
by sea.
202 Non-marine risks were insured under a marine policy; however, the English court 
was not bothered by the question whether the risks  which occurred were maritime perils 
and whether the 1906 Act should be applied at all. It seems that w here the risk happens is 
less  relevant than  the reason and context of the incidence. As concluded in the Law 
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203 it would be open to parties to apply the 1906 Act as if the contract 
were one of marine insurance, as far as it falls within the scope of s 2. 
In this thesis, the term “marine risks” is mainly used for indicating those risks under marine 
policies:  the  insured,  uninsured  or  excluded  perils  enumerated  in  the  policy  and  those 
referred to in the 1906 Act. 
3.1.2 Contractual Coverage of Major Standard Forms 
The old SG Form, which had come into use since 1779 until 1980s, amplified its coverage by 
the following phrase: 
…  they  are  of  the  seas,  men  of  war,  fire,  enemies,  pirates,  rovers,  thieves, 
jettisons,  letters  of  mart  and  countermart,  surprisals,  takings  at  sea,  arrests, 
restraints,  and  detainments  of  all  kings,  princes,  and  people,  of  what  nation, 
condition, or quality soever, barratry of the master and mariners, and of all other 
perils, losses, and misfortunes, that have or should come to the hurt, detriment, or 
damage of the said goods and merchandises, and ship, to the charges whereof… 
 
It seemingly provided the cover against typical marine risks, war risk and all other related 
perils in the absence of an express provision in respect of exclusions. An analogy can be 
drawn between the wordings of the SG Form and the definition of “maritime perils” provided 
by the 1906 Act as above-cited. The open words “all other perils” does not mean the scope 
is as wide as it has appeared to be.
204  In the ancient case of Cullen v Butler,
205 the ship and 
its cargo, which were insured under the common form , were fired upon by another ship by 
mistaking it as an enemy ship and sunk at sea. The question before  the court was whether 
this was a loss covered by the policy, on the count of “perils of the seas,” or under “all other 
perils”. It was held that this particular circumstance fell in the “all other perils” category, but 
not perils of the sea. Although the Court had recognised it was damage at sea by collision, 
the case could not be attributed to the perils of the seas due to its limited construction. In 
terms of “all other perils”, Lord Ellenborough addressed these broad and general words as in 
the following paragraph, which is worthy citing in length: 
 
The extent and meaning of the general words have not yet been the immediate 
subject of any judicial construction in our Courts of Law. As they must, however, 
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be considered as introduced into the policy in furtherance of the objects of marine 
insurance, and may have the effect of extending a reasonable indemnity to many 
cases  not  distinctly  covered  by  the  special  words,  they  are  entitled  to  be 
considered as material and operative words, and to have the due effect assigned to 
them in the construction of this instrument; and which will be done by allowing 
them to comprehend and cover other cases of marine damage of the like kind with 
those which are specially enumerated and occasioned by similar causes. 
 
This statement has in essence adopted a literal and contextual approach, which was also 
known as “noscitur a sociis” and “ejusdem generis”. On the one hand, the other perils should 
embrace  the  circumstances  more/other  than  the  preceding  itemised  ones.  On  the  other 
hand, its meaning is to be confined within the scope of the similar class. This interpretation 
has been followed by numerous leading cases
206 and has even been reflected in the English 
Marine Insurance Act 1906.  In accordance with Sch. 1 r. 12 of the 1906 Act, the open words 
‘all  other  perils’  herein  refers  only  to  perils  similar  in  kind  to  the  perils  specifically 
mentioned in the policy.  
Moreover, although the SG Form did not contain an exclusionary provision in itself, after the 
enactment of the 1906 Act, the insurer’s liability is limited by the exceptions enumerated 
under S 55(2) including wilful misconduct, delay, and internal causes of the subject-matter 
insured. Also, the parties may place an insurance cover in the SG Form in conjunction with 
an agreement particularly excluding certain perils listed in the SG Form such as war risks; 
and this modification prevails over the original clauses in the Form. This operation is quite 
popular  by  virtue  of  a  series  of  standard  terms  established  by  the  Institute  of  London 
Underwriters since 1884. Thus, the coverage of the SG Form used to include marine risks 
and  war  risk  and  their  similar  kind,  subject  to  the  statutory  exceptions  and  the  parties’ 
contrary agreement. 
After  the  old  SG  form  was  replaced  by  the  modern  institute  clauses  in  1980s,  the  basic 
division of these policy forms is between those risks in the basic hull, freight and cargo 
clauses, which are practically known as “marine risks”, and the separated risks relating to 
war and strikes.
207  
Hulls and machinery are usually insured by one of the Hull Clauses including Institute Time 
Clauses  Hull  1982  (Cll  6 –8)  or  1995,  Institute  Voyage  Clauses  Hulls  (Cll  4–8)  and 
International  Hull  Clauses  2003  (Cll  2–6)  with  or  without  amendments  subject  to  the 
assured’s  demand.  The  International  Hull  Clauses  are  divided  into  three  parts:  part  one 
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contains the principal insuring conditions; part two presents a range of additional clauses 
that were frequently required by assureds and added to ITC separately. Part three contains 
provisions for claims handling and sets out the rights and responsibilities of underwriters 
and assureds. These standard forms notably provide cover under four heads, namely, the 
loss  caused  by  traditional  “marine  risks”,  the  Inchmaree  Clause,  liabilities  arising  from 
collision and pollution hazard and aversion and minimisation of loss. 
In  comparison,  the  Institute  Freight  Clauses,  Time  (Cl.  7)  and  Voyage  (Cl.  5)  embrace 
basically the same content as the Hull Clauses with common exclusions of discord (war and 
strike) risks and malicious acts and nuclear explosions. 
In  respect  of  cargo  policies,  there  are  three  forms  with  differentiated  range  of  coverage, 
which are Institute Cargo Clauses A, B and C (1982 or 2009). The Institute Cargo Clauses 
(A),  which  is  also  known  as  “all-risks”  policy,  contains  such  an  extreme  comprehensive 
phrase that the underwriters are basically liable for all fortuitous events except for a few 
named ones. Institute Cargo Clauses (B) and (C) provide covers on a named peril basis, in 
which a list of insured perils are specified in Cl. 1; however, Form (C) contains a narrower 
cover than Form (B).  
It  can  also  be  observed  that  these  modern  forms  of  policy  adopt  two  main  manners  to 
describe the scope of liability: either the insured and excluded perils are both itemised or 
the insured scope is entitled as “all risks” with exceptions itemised. Evidently, it is radically 
simpler  in  ascertaining  the  coverage  in  the  first  occasion  in  comparison  with  the  latter. 
Notwithstanding comprehensive cover, it can still be defined by courts by adopting a sound 
method.   
A few conventional approaches are regularly adopted by English courts in marine insurance 
cases,  which  may  be  in  a  sequential  manner.  Initially,  courts  attempt  to  construe  the 
contract terms in line with the intention of the two parties, which may reflect the commercial 
sense. It should be emphasised that this approach aims not to find the expectation of one 
side with a judicial preference. Moreover, a literal interpretation of the wordings may also be 
pursued. If the terms are provided by the insurers where the conditions are satisfied, a less 
favourable  construction  against  the  insurer  may  occur  by  following  the  principle  contra 
proferentem. Sometimes, as a last resort, the courts may simply conclude and attribute the 
issue to a question of fact in a particular case.  
In  general,  the  UK  courts’  attitude  in  ascertaining  the  proximate  cause  relies  on  an 
indication  of  what  commercial  men  would  have  expected,  notwithstanding  that  the  UK 
courts  seems  to  unsurprisingly  show  a  tendency  to  favour  the  assureds.  In  some  cases 
concerning life insurance as well, some courts when seeking a particular result will resort to M. SONG 
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contra proferentem, which derives from the Latin literally to mean "against (contra) the one 
bringing forth (the proferens)", to take a strict approach against insurers and go so far as to 
interpret terms of the contract in favour of the other party, even where the meaning of a 
term would appear clear and unambiguous on its face. It seems that English courts do not 
equally support that approach in the modern marine insurance context. Freedom of contract 
has consistently been upheld by the English courts, and it has been suggested that English 
courts  have  adhered  to  the  idea  to  construe  the  ambiguous  term  according  to  the 
reasonable  expectations  of  the  assured  and  insurer  in  the  commercial  sense  more  than 
adopting contra proferentem.
208 It is even suggested that the English courts put priority on 
construing the risk coverage in policies by means of the contractual intentions of the parties 
in  particular  with  the  awareness  of  the  insurer.
209  Nevertheless, in principle, both t he 
coverage clause and exception clause are intended to be interpreted in a rational and broad 
way before the courts, no preference is granted to either party.  
The  question  of  construction  merely  arises  where  a  provision  in   the  policy  contains 
ambiguity and the parties in dispute  maintain opposite understandings and explanations. 
For instance, for the doctrine of  contra  proferentem,  as  Lindley  LJ  stated  in  Cornish  v 
Accident Insurance Co,
210 
…in a case of real doubt, the policy ought to be construed most strongly against 
the insurers; they frame the policy and insert the exceptions. But this principle 
ought  only  to  be  applied  for  the  purpose  of  removing  a  doubt,  not  for  the 
purpose  of  creating  a  doubt,  or  magnifying  an  ambiguity,  when  the 
circumstances of the case raise no real difficulty. 
It has been doubtful whether the perils specified in exclusion clauses are ambiguous, as the 
mutual intention of the parties is quite self-evident: NOT COVERED. The exclusions seem 
more concerned  with  the legal  meanings  of  the perils  instead  of  the construction  of  the 
clause itself. There should not be a dispute as to whether such a peril is insured or not, but 
it merely requires a judgment on whether the scenario in question amounts to one of the so-
defined perils.  The process of  classifying  the incident  in  dispute under  a  type of  peril  is 
invariably  tangled  with  definitions  and  interpretations  by  virtue  of  the  approaches 
mentioned above. Therefore, these approaches are important in causation terms in order to 
enlarge  or  narrow  down  the  scope  of  the  covered  situations  and  their  effect  will  be 
demonstrated in the following research on the typical marine perils. 
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3.2 Typical Insured Risks in Marine Policies 
It is noteworthy that basically all of the peril clauses are prefaced by the opening words or 
similar wordings, stating that “the insurance covers loss of or damage to the subject-matter 
insured caused by…” The coverage of the policy along with the legal definition of the perils 
is inextricable when looking into the causation issue. In this section, a few typical insured 
perils will be discussed from the perspective of being a cause of loss in order to envisage the 
application of causation rules under every circumstance respectively. 
3.2.1 All Risks 
Coverage of The Institute Cargo Clauses (ICC) is provided on an A, B, or C basis, A having the 
most extensive coverage and C the most restricted. The mainstream operation in practice is 
to  write  cargo  policies  on  “all  risks”  terms  in  the  form  of  Institute  Cargo  Clauses  (A) 
(1/1/1982). This expression has been introduced for the assured’s demand for a general 
and wide coverage; likewise, it has given rise to many disputes between the two parties as to 
the width of the coverage. 
The  construction  of  “all  risks”  in  English  case  law  can  be  tracked  back  to  the  early  20
th 
century. Jacob v. Gaviller
211 is suggested to be the first dispute arising on “all risks” coverage 
cited  in  English  case  law.  A  clearer  standpoint  has  been  provided  by  Schloss  Brothers  v. 
Stevens,
212  which  has  been  cited  more  frequently.  Having  adopted  the  approach  of  the 
intention of the policy, the court held that that the words “all risks by land and by water” 
must be read literally as meaning all risks whatsoever. The words were intended to cover all 
losses by any accidental cause of any kind, and as the damage to the goods was a  loss 
within  that  category  the  underwriters  were  liable  for  it.  It  can  be  summarised  from  the 
judgment  that  two  elements  must  be  acquired  in  order  to  sustain  a  loss  of  “all  risks”, 
namely, there must be a casualty and the damage is from some accidental cause. 
Such an extensive coverage has largely influenced the decisions in the following cases.
213 It 
is doubtless that the judicial attitude at tha t time towards “all risks” seemed very favourable 
to the side of the assureds. However, after the codification of the 1906 Act, S 55(2) specifies 
a few perils which the insurer should not be liable for statutorily. Also in practice, insurers 
began  to  insert  exclusionary  clauses  into  policies  in  order  to  protect  themselves  from 
unexpected perils. 
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In Tektrol Ltd v. International Insurance Co of Hanover Ltd,
214 concerning the construction of 
an  “all  risks”  business  loss  policy,  Carnwath  LJ  commented  on  the  use  of  extensive 
exclusions in an “all risks” policy that:  
Although it is described as an ‘all risks’ policy, one has to search long and hard, 
through a bewildering and apparently comprehensive list of exclusions, to discover 
the extent to which any risks are in fact covered… I agree with Buxton LJ that the 
exclusions should, where possible, be narrowly construed. One should start from 
the presumption that the parties intended an ‘all risks’ policy to cover all risks, 
except when they are clearly and unambiguously excluded.  
The  judicial  attitude  of  Chinese  maritime  courts  may  worth  mentioning  here  for  a  better 
knowledge of “all risks”. Beginning with a brief history of standard cargo clauses in China, in 
the  1950s  when  the  new  Chinese  government  was  established,  the  insurance  market  in 
China  adopted  the  Lloyd’s  policy  of  the  London  market  until  1963.  Although  a  replacing 
form was created afterwards, the terms and coverage in respect of “all risks” were basically 
identical to the Lloyd’s form. A substantive change in the scope of “all risks” took place in 
1972, as the clause explicitly specified a group of perils under the name of “all risks” and the 
industry and courts seemed to deem it as an exhaustive definition. The Clause stated that, 
besides the coverage of two other basic forms of cover which are equivalent to ICC (B) and 
(C), the “all risks” cover also insures against 15 named losses, including discrepancy, rust, 
mew and heated and etc., caused by external accidents in the voyage. The cargo clauses 
were revised in 1981 and in terms of “all risks” the named forms of losses  were omitted, 
simply saying that the policy covers any total or partial losses caused by external incidents. 
Having  been  influenced  by  the  previous  form’s  wording  and  phrasing,  an  argument  was 
brought up on whether “all risks” is still confined within the scope of the additional specified 
perils, or whether it is an open coverage subject only to certain exclusions as English law 
provides. 
This question has been finally settled by a leading case decided under Chinese insurance law 
known as “M.V. Ramdas”.
215 The case was decided before Guangzhou Maritime Court in 1999 
and the appeal was closed in 2000 by Guangdong (Canton) Provincial High Court. A quantity 
of  soya  was  carried  from  India  to  China  in  M.V.  Ramdas  on  November  1997  and  insured 
under a PICC “all risks” cover (1/1/1981). However, on its arrival, the stevedores found that 
the cargo had turned red and had deteriorated. The assured cargo owner claimed for the 
indemnity  before Guangzhou  Maritime Court.  One of  the three  defences  proposed  by  the 
insurer  was  concerned  with  the  coverage  of  the  “all  risks”  policy.  Having  relied  upon  a 
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restricted  interpretation  made  by  the  People’s  Bank  of  China,  the  central  governing  and 
supervising body of the institutions and organisations of the insurance industry of China, the 
insurer argued, accordingly, that “all risks” are limited to a series of named perils. Therefore, 
the assured ought to that prove the cause of loss fell within the group, which the assured 
failed to do. Meanwhile, the insurer did not contend nor prove that the cause of loss was 
excluded from the policy. 
As to the judgment of the first trial judge, it was held, notwithstanding the interpretation of 
the People’s Bank of China, the “all-risks” term ought to be construed by a conventional and 
common  approach,  taking  account  of  people’s  knowledge,  other  than  insurance 
professionals.  Moreover,  as  People’s  Bank  of  China  lacks  the  judicial  authority  to  provide 
legal  construction,  as  their  opinion  is  only  of  instructive  or  persuasive  effect  within  the 
insurance industry, therefore, it should not be applied in this case. Furthermore, according 
to Article 30 of Chinese Insurance Law
216 regarding the doctrine of  contra proferentem, the 
court found a construction more favourable to the assured on the ambiguity of the coverage 
of “all risks”.  Accordingly, “all risks”  is an expression  for a wide-range  of risks subject  to 
certain exclusions. However, as the insurer did not contend any excluded peril as the cause 
of the loss, and based on the evidence showing a probability of the external source of cause, 
on  balance,  the  insurer  could  not  discharge  his  liability  on  this  ground.  The  High  Court 
dismissed the appeal, sustaining the first judgment. 
The “all risks” cover in China has been somewhat dissimilated from the Llody’s form in the 
process of the evolution, for instance, Chinese policy defines “all risks” from the aspect of an 
“external” cause instead of an “accidental” cause in English law.
217 However, the basic legal 
rules and principles are commonly applied before Chinese courts. Two outstanding issues 
can be extracted from the case in pure causation terms and should be highlighted. 
Although “all risks” has the same effect as if all insurable risks were separately enumerated 
and does not alter the general law,
 218 so comprehensive as it is, “all risks” may require the 
cause of loss simply being a (external) risk subject to the exclusions. Thus, it determines a 
lower threshold of the assured’s burden of proof and more attention is paid to the excluded 
perils. Consequently, the causation rules are applied and examined to the insurers’ defence 
by contending that an uninsured/excluded peril has proximately caused the loss. One of the 
main reasons why The M.V Ramdas did not come to the same conclusion as Soya v white, 
notwithstanding a similar factual basis, was that the insurer did not argue and establish a 
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proximate causal link between an exclusion and the loss. Regardless, the proximity rules still 
apply not only to the “all risks” as the cause of loss, but also to the defences of the insurers.  
As to the other issue, “all risks” ought to be strictly distinguished from “all losses/damage” 
cover, as the former has a narrower scope than the latter.
219 It may worth reiterating that “all 
risks” indicates cover for “all (external) causes” except for a few. A question of proximate 
cause ought to always be looked into, unless otherwise agreed. On the contrary, where a 
policy  covers  all  losses/damage,  the  material  question  to  determine  the  insurer’s  liability 
would simply be whether there is a casualty. If there is one, the policy should respond.  
Taking Lawrence v Aberdein
220 as an example, a policy insured on living animals provided to 
be  warranted  free  from  mortality  and  jettison.  However,  during  the  voyage,  the  living 
animals were killed owing to the storm. The courts held that the underwriter was answerable 
to the total loss by construing the notion “mortality” in this exception clause. The judges 
respectively adopted the approach of common sense and the literal interpretation from the 
entire  contract  and  contra  proferentem.  Nevertheless,  it  seems  that  this  clause  has  an 
inherent mistake rather simply a question of construction on the ambiguity of “mortality”. 
Holroyd J stated in the decision that “death may have been the immediate cause of the loss”. 
However, in this case, death itself is the loss. It is not an unusual mistake in the context of 
the  insurance  law,  whether  marine  or  non-marine,  that  clauses  concerning  perils  are 
confused  with  the  consequences  and  effects.  The  underwriter  purported  to  avoid  some 
circumstances which they refused to cover, however, the circumstances  were not correctly 
described in the terms of the perils, but in the forms of the consequences.    
Likewise, it is perceptible that the 15 perils which used to be enumerated in the Chinese 
standard terms consist of both risks and forms of losses. The ill-drafted wordings may be 
the root cause of the ambiguity of the coverage and confusion of the concepts. To solve the 
causation question, the very first and basic step is to identify what the loss is and what the 
competing causes are. Therefore, it should be clarified by the contract, clearly, whether it 
covers “all risks” or “all losses/damage”. 
3.2.2 Perils of the Sea 
Perils of the sea is the most typical and widely-covered marine peril. There are various forms 
of  perils  of  the  sea,  for  instance,  unordinary  wind  and  wave  including  bad  weather  and 
storms,
 221 incursion of sea water,
 222 collision
223, etc. As summarised by Prof Howard Bennett, 
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the question of the proximate cause has been illustrated in the context of perils of the sea 
in two aspects: the definition of the peril itself and whether the loss was proximately caused 
thereby.
224 Therefore, initially, the legal definition of the peril should be looked into through 
English case law. 
A statutory definition is laid down by the 1906 Act Sch.1 r. 7 . It states “The term ‘perils of 
the seas’ refers only to fortuitous accidents or casualties of the seas. It does not include the 
ordinary  action  of  the  winds  and  waves.”  Undoubtedly,  the  statutory  definition  connotes 
both core characteristics of a marine risk, namely being “of the sea” and being fortuitous.  
The expression “perils of the sea” is sometimes interchangeably addressed as perils at sea 
or perils on the sea. However, they are not the same concept in the law of marine insurance. 
Simply because the peril occurs whilst the vessel is at sea does not mean that it is a peril of 
the sea. Per Lord Ellenborough in Cullen v Butler:
 225 
“If it be a loss by perils of the sea, merely because it is a loss happening upon the 
sea, as has been contended, all the other causes of loss specified in the policy 
are,  upon  that  ground,  equally  entitled  so  to  be  considered;  and  it  would  be 
unnecessary as to them ever to assign any other cause of loss, than a loss by 
perils of the sea.” 
However, on the other side, in Thompson v Whitmore,
226 where a ship hove down on a beach 
within the tide-way and got bilged and damaged, it was held not  to be a loss occasioned by 
the perils of the sea, as the damage happened on land. On balance, ‘perils at sea’ and ‘perils 
of the sea’ share a considerable overlap in the practical scenarios. After all, perils of the sea 
ought to be perils at sea in the first instance. However, a clear distinction in concept ought 
to be and has been drawn between the concepts of perils of the sea and perils at sea. ‘Perils 
at sea’ or ‘perils on the sea’ define the perils from the aspect of the location where the perils 
and losses have occurred. While, “perils of sea” requires the peril to have a closer link to the 
adventure. It may be sensible to read “perils of sea” equivalent as “perils arising of the sea”.  
Notwithstanding  the  obiter  statutory  definition,  it  seems  not  to  have  succeeded  to 
conceptualise the term clearly so as to prevent the unsteady judicial attitudes in defining a 
loss caused by perils of the sea. As to fortuity, the test in relation to perils of the sea has 
been repeatedly varied in the long term before English courts. Case law in this regard has 
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unsurprisingly  flourished,  and  was  well  analysed  in  the  recent  leading  case,  The  Cendor 
Mopu.  
In retrospect, it has long been established in the leading case The Xantho
227 that “perils of 
the sea” has no different meaning in the law of contract of carriage and marine insurance, 
but  the  distinction  lies  in  the  terms  of  causation.  In  a  purely  conceptual  context,  Lord 
Herschell upheld that there must be something which could not be foreseen as one of the 
necessary incidents of the adventure; however, an extraordinary  violence of the winds  or 
waves is too narrow a construction of the words. This view has been complied with by many 
pre-act cases
228 and constantly mentioned by cases thereafter. 
Tucker J in  N.  E.  Neter  &  Co.,  Ltd.  v.  Licenses  &  General  Insurance  Co.,  Ltd
229  read  and 
applied The Xantho as follows: 
I think it is clearly erroneous to say that because the weather was such as might 
reasonably  be  anticipated  there  can  be  no  peril  of  the  seas.  There  must,  of 
course,  be  some  element  of  the  fortuitous  or  unexpected  to  be  found 
somewhere in the facts and circumstances causing the loss… 
The Judge correctly interpreted that Lord Herschell did not intend to set up a test of fortuity 
as to foreseeability, but to emphasise the part of “necessary incidents”. In other words, it is 
the necessary incident to the adventure that fails the test of fortuity without reference to the 
anticipation  to  its  occurrence.  The  Judges  in  the  Court  of  Appeal  of  The  Miss  Jay  Jay 
reaffirmed that: 
The fact that the sea was not exceptional and could have been anticipated did 
not stop the loss being adjudged to have been caused by “external accidental 
means”; it was not caused by “the ordinary action of the wind and waves” but by 
the frequent and violent impacts of a badly designed hull upon an adverse sea. 
Therefore, a conclusion can be drawn that foreseeability and the exceptional condition of 
the sea or weather are not the genuine tests of perils of the sea. Instead, perils of the sea 
may exist in diversified forms, just like the meaning of “marine risks”, it is impossible and 
implausible to provide an exhausted definition in a direct and straight manner. Therefore, 
more attention has been paid to the opposite side, namely, “the ordinary action of the wind 
and waves”. 
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Lord Saville in The Cendor Mopu, contemplated that the word “ordinary” attaches to “action”, 
not to “wind and waves”, so that if the action of the wind or sea is the proximate cause of 
the loss, a claim lies under the policy notwithstanding that the conditions were within the 
range  which  could  reasonably  have  been  anticipated.
230  A prime example of an ordinary 
action of waves can be found in an old case, Magnus v Buttemer,
231 where the vessel insured 
went up the river, and due to the rising and falling of the  tide, it rested upon the river  bed 
and was damaged. The Judges held that there was nothing unusual, no peril, no accident, in 
which case the loss was not caused by perils of the sea. 
Often, the courts intended to connect or even equate the ordinary action to an internal 
cause, such as  wear and tear   or debility of the vessel. In  Grant  Smith  &  Co  v  Seattle 
Construction & Dry Dock Co,
 232 as the harbour was peculiarly quiet, the Court considered 
that it was plain that it was not conditions of wind or wave that caused the dock to capsize. 
Accordingly, it was destroyed because of its own inherent unfitness for the use to which it 
was put. 
Moreover, per Viscount Finlay in Mountain v Whittle,
233 if the water was in a normal condition 
and got into the houseboat simply owing to the defective character of the seams there 
would be no loss by peril of the sea ; instead, the loss would have been by the defective 
condition of the vessel.  It was also articulated in the judgment that a loss caused by the 
ingress  of sea water is not necessar ily a loss by perils of the sea . There must be some 
special circumstance such as heavy waves causing the ingress of the sea water to make it a 
peril of the sea.
234 
This complex question has finally  been settled by The Cendor Mopu and the spectrum of 
perils of the sea has been enlarged obiter in two ways. The phrase “an ordinary action of the 
wind and waves”  has  been  clarified.  It  is  suggested  by  Prof  Rob Merkin  that  an  ordinary 
action of wind and waves is better to be described as an ordinary consequence of wind and 
waves.
235 Attention used to be drawn to the “phenomenon” of the wind and waves in order to 
establish fortuity. This way to define perils of the sea seems to effect a second chance to 
survive  a  requirement  of  fortuity,  which  means  although  the  peril  itself,  it  is  difficult  to 
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remark as a fortuitous incident in an ordinary form, that the unordinary consequence can 
also contribute to the requirement of fortuity. This approach happens to be in line with the 
proposition  of  Prof  Howard  Bennett  in  terms  of  the  doctrine  of  fortuity,  saying  that  “In 
insurance contract law, fortuity is a variable concept that addresses questions of both the 
likelihood of loss and the cause of loss”.
236 
As to the other method, in pure causation terms, it should also be noted that as an external 
cause, perils of the sea cannot legally lead to a loss concurrent with an internal cause, due 
to  the  vessel  or  the  cargo  insured.  In  view  of  The  Cendor  Mopu,  the  defence  as  to  an 
internal-triggered  proximate  cause  should  be  critically  limited  and  excluded  from  the 
existence of  perils  of the sea.  Accordingly,  The  Cendor  Mopu has  reversed  the  Mayban
237 
case as to the rule that if the conditions of sea encountered by the vessel were no more 
severe than  could  reasonably  have  been  expected,  the  inherent  inability  of  the goods  to 
withstand the ordinary incidents of the voyage must outweigh and be the real cause of loss. 
Therefore, the current rule is that an element of external fortuitous accident will enable the 
assured to recover the loss, irrespective of the contribution of some internal factors. 
On balance, it may be a good conclusion on how to define a loss proximately caused by 
perils of the sea by quoting Lord Clarke’s statement in The Cendor Mopu:  
… at any rate in a perils of the seas case, the critical question is whether or not 
the conditions of the sea were such as to give rise to a peril of the seas which 
caused  some  fortuitous  accident  or  casualty.  It  is  important  to  note  that  the 
cases show that it is not the state of the sea itself which must be fortuitous but 
rather the occurrence of some accident or casualty due to the conditions of the 
sea. 
3.2.3 Collisions 
Collision happens in various forms, for instance, two floating or navigable objects coming 
into  contact,  or  extending  to  harbours,  wharves,  piers,  wreck  and  ice  or  the  like.
238 
Determining the cause of loss in the context of one vessel  hit  into a structure or an 
obstruction is self -evident and simple,  viz, the collision; while, the causation question in 
respect of the collision between two vessels is much more complicated. 
Initially, a set of legal rules of the Court of Admiralty has been laid down on a fault-basis 
between the two colliding vessels before resorting to their underwriters respectively.  The 
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239 has been regarded and largely cited as the prime authority in this regard. It 
is worthy of quotation in length here: 
There are four possibilities under which an accident of this sort may occur. In the 
first  place,  it  may  happen  without  blame  being  imputable  to  either  party;  as 
where the loss is occasioned by a storm, or any other vis major : in that case, the 
misfortune must be borne by the party on whom it happens to light; the other 
not being responsible to him in any degree.—Secondly, a misfortune of this kind 
may arise where both parties are to blame; where there has been a want of due 
diligence or of skill on both sides: in such a case, the rule of law is that the loss 
must be apportioned between them, as having been occasioned by the fault of 
both of them.—Thirdly, it may happen by the misconduct of the suffering party 
only; and then the rule is, that the sufferer must bear his own burden. Lastly, it 
may have been the fault of the ship which ran the other down; and in this case 
the injured party would be entitled to an entire compensation from the other.  
This rule was also referred in another leading case De Vaux v Salvador,
240 where the insured 
vessel  “La  Valeur”  came  into  collision  with  a  steam  vessel  called  the  “Forbes”  and  both 
suffered  serious  damage.  The  assured  ship  owner  claimed  for  general  average  and  an 
average loss to his underwriter. Lord Denman C.J. delivered a very interesting judgment on 
the application of the proximity rule: 
…[Sic]“It were infinite” (says Bacon) “for the law to judge the causes of causes, 
and  their  impulsions  one  of  another;  therefore  it  contenteth  itself  with  the 
immediate  cause,  and  judgeth  of  acts  by  that,  without  looking  to  any  farther 
degree.” Such must be understood to be the mutual intention of the parties to 
such  contracts.  Then  how  stands  the  fact?  The  ship  insured  is  driven  against 
another  by  stress  of  weather;  the  injury  she  thus  sustains  is  admitted  to  be 
direct, and the insurers are liable for it. But the collision causes the ship insured 
to do some damage to the other vessel; and, whenever this effect is produced, 
both vessels being in fault, a positive rule of the Court of Admiralty requires the 
damage done to both ships to be added together, and the combined amount to 
be  equally  divided  between  the  owners  of  the  two.  It  turns  out  that  the  ship 
insured has done more damage than she has received, and is obliged to pay the 
owners  of  the  other  ship  to  some  amount,  under  the  rule  of  the  Court  of 
Admiralty. But this is neither a necessary nor a proximate effect of the perils of 
the sea; it grows out of an arbitrary provision in the law of nations from views of 
general  expediency,  not  as  dictated  by  natural  justice,  nor  (possibly)  quite 
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consistent  with  it;  and  can  no  more  be  charged  on  the  underwriters  than  a 
penalty incurred by contravention of the Revenue laws of any particular State, 
which was rendered inevitable by perils insured against.  
Three points are noteworthy from this paragraph. The first one is to define what kind of loss 
that  the insurer  agrees  to  cover  in  the  policy.  As  the judgment  presented,  two  types  of 
losses may occur upon a collision between two vessels, which are the physical loss of its 
own and the loss of the counter vessel incurred by this vessel itself, which is classified as 
damage arising from liability of the said vessel. As a matter of fact, the rules of Admiralty 
provide  an  approach  which  merges  these  two  forms  of  losses  and  apportions  liability 
accordingly between the ship owners. However, how far has the rule of Admiralty affected 
the  operations  and  coverage  of  the  insurance  industry?  Modern  standard  clauses  which 
include ¾  Collision  Liability and Sistership have responded to this question.
241 The terms 
indicate that insurers agree to undertake the liability based  on the decision made by the 
maritime rules with the enumerated exceptions. Nevertheless, it is bel ieved that the force of 
the doctrine of proximity is never diminished even in the cases of collision.
242 
This, therefore, leads   to the second question, is it possible that negligence or fault in 
navigation outweighs the causal effect of  a collision itself? Technically speaking, a collision 
is a form of perils of the sea. It was held once in an old bill of lading case,  Woodley & Co v 
Michell & Co
243 that a collision between two vessels by their respective negligence, without 
the waves or wind or difficulty of navigation contributing to the accident, is not “a peril of 
the sea” within the terms of that exception in a bill of lading. However, a distinction with 
insurance policy was drawn due to the requirement of the doctrine of proximity instead of 
the causa causans in the case of bills of lading. Smith v Scott
244 has established and affirmed 
in the context of marine insurance, that a loss occasioned by another ship running down the 
ship  insured,  through  gross  negligence,  is  a  loss  by  perils  of  the  sea.  Moreover,  the 
aforementioned  bill  of  lading  case  has  been  overruled  by  the  latter  landmark  case,  The 
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Xantho, the House of Lords iterating that foundering caused by collision with another vessel 
is within the exception “dangers and accidents of the sea” in a bill of lading. Therefore, as 
the parties’ fault or negligence will not alter the nature of collision as a form of perils of the 
sea,  it  seems  also  sound  to  venture  that  negligence  is  equally  not  efficient  enough  to 
constitute a competing cause against perils of sea in terms of causal effect. Nevertheless, 
the negligence of the vessels exerts the efficiency in a quantitative manner in applying the 
admiralty  rule.  The  fault  of  the  counter  vessel  has  been  deducted  from  the  measure  of 
indemnity, though not as a causal factor in the insurance claim.  
Moreover, taking account of the counter vessel, are their causal factors relevant to the said 
vessel in determining the cause of loss? A discussion has been undertaken in Chapter Two 
Concurrent Causes arising from the case, Board of Trade v Hain Steamship Co. Ltd.
 245 In this 
case, two vessels ran into each other by negligent navigation during war time. One of the 
vessels,  the  Trevanion  was  under  the  requisition  of  the  Government  and  the  Admiralty 
agreed  to  be  liable  for  the  loss  arising  out  of  warlike  operations.  The  other  vessel  was 
employed by the United States Navy as a mine planter and officered and manned by a crew 
of that Navy. It was disputed whether the latter vessel had undertaken a warlike operation. 
The House of Lords ultimately held that the proximate cause of the loss of the former said 
vessel was a warlike operation; therefore, the admiralty should be liable for the vessel’s loss. 
It is indicated in the decision that the cause of the loss of the counter vessel may be relevant 
and material in the way that it may determine the nature of the collision, either a war risk or 
a marine risk. However, when looking into the claim between the vessel and its insurer, the 
proximate  cause  ought  to  concentrate  on  the  vessel  itself.  That  is  to  say,  the  insurer’s 
defences in terms of the insured coverage and exceptions should be restrictively applied 
without  reference  to  a  third  party.  Therefore,  as  concluded  in  the  previous  chapter,  the 
causal factor of the counter vessel cannot be considered or even amount to a concurrent 
cause to the loss of the said vessel. 
In summary, collision is generally a form of perils of sea in marine insurance law. The rule of 
admiralty  law  has  considerable impact  on  the terms  of  policy  and the  legal  approach  to 
ascertain the insurer’s liability scope and measure in marine insurance cases. Nevertheless, 
the causation rules, in particular the doctrine of proximity, are constantly applied.  
3.2.4 The Inchmaree Clause –“Due Diligence Proviso” 
“Inchmaree clause” includes the risks which have no connection with conventional marine 
characters, but are insured in marine policies, such as clause 6.2 in Institute Time Clauses 
                                                 




 246 It notably consists of two kinds of events: losses caused by machinery 
breakdown,
247 or by the negligence or barr atry
248  of people other than the assureds. This 
clause was designed and inserted into major modern standard forms in response to  Thames 
and Mersey Marine Insurance Co v Hamilton, Fraser & Co (The Inchmaree).
249 The case was 
concerned with a marine time policy in the old SG Form protecting against perils of the sea 
and all other perils under the general words. The donkey-engine of the insured vessel, The 
Inchmaree, was damaged either due to the negligence of one of the engineers or by mere 
accident with reasonable care. It was admitted that the loss was not due to ordinary wear 
and tear. Having realised that the same incident would have happened on land without any 
marine  character,  the  Lords  unanimously  limited  the  perils  ejusdem  generis  by  a  narrow 
interpretation. In particular, Lord Bramwell suggested and found this definition sufficient: 
“All perils, losses and misfortunes of a marine character, or of a character incident to a ship 
as such.” Accordingly, the machinery breakdown did not fall into perils of the sea or any of 
the other perils; the assured was unable to get indemnified under the SG Form. As soon as 
the  judgment  came  out,  the  earliest  form  of  the  Inchmaree  clause  was  inserted  as  an 
additional cover by the Lloyd’s insurance market. 
Besides the Inchmaree clause being featured as non-marine related risks, it is also famous 
for “the due diligence proviso”. Although the negligence and even barratry of the master or 
crew  are  insured  against  under  the  Inchmaree  Clause,  the  negligence  of  the  assured  is 
explicitly excluded herein.  
It has long been held that the negligent navigation of the assured should not release the 
insurer  from  his  liability  to  indemnify  the  loss  caused  by  perils  of  the  sea  in  Trinder, 
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Anderson & co v Thames and Mersey Marine Insurance Company.
 250 In this case, a marine 
freight policy against perils of the sea was effected by the defendant insurer. The master of 
the ship insured happened to be a part owner of the ship. Owing to his negligent navigation, 
the ship stranded upon a reef and the ship and the cargo were wetted and damaged to a 
critical extent. Accordingly, the cargo was sold at once. All the owners including the master 
claimed for total loss of freight against the insurer. In terms of the negligent navigation of 
the assured master, Smith L.J. stated:  
…so  in  a  marine  policy  sea  perils  are  what  are  insured  against.  The  risk 
undertaken by an underwriter upon a policy covering perils of the sea is that, 
if the subject-matter insured is lost or damaged immediately by a peril of the 
sea, he will be responsible, and, in my judgment, it matters not if the loss or 
damage is remotely caused by the negligent navigation of the captain or crew, 
or of the assured himself, always assuming that the loss is not occasioned by 
the wilful act of the assured. 
Moreover, per Collins L.J., “His [Assured’s] negligence does not, any more than that of his 
servants,  alter  the  character  of  the  sea  peril,  which  still  remains  the  causa  proxima,….” 
Thus, it becomes a general rule that the assured’s negligence cannot justify his insurer’s 
defence on this ground, with an exception of the “Inchmaree Clause”. 
Very recently, The Toisa Pisces,
251 addressed an unresolved issue under English law as to the 
exact meaning and test of the “due diligence proviso” in the Inchmaree clause. The insurer 
issued a loss of hire marine policy incorporating Institute Time Clauses Hulls (1/10/83) and 
also insured against breakdown of machinery unless it was not resulted from wear and tear 
or was by want of due diligence by the assured. A propulsion breakdown occurred on 25 
February 2009 and resulted in a loss equivalent to 30 days’ off –hire. A dispute arose as to 
the standard  of  care  and  the  assured  suggested  a  test  equivalent  to  recklessness  which 
could amount to a want of due diligence; whereas, the insurer’s submission rested mainly 
upon the authoritative treatise and stated a lower standard as to negligence, which was a 
lack of reasonable care in this case. 
Blair J noted that it is necessary to read the provision as a whole, in conjunction with the 
terms  relating  to  “negligence”  as  a  matter  of  defining  the  extent  of  the  indemnity. 
Negligence  is  a  covered  peril  in  its  own  right  pursuant  to  the  Inchmaree  clause,  but  is 
limited to the negligence of the person named in the relevant clause. Evidently, the assured 
is not one of them; therefore the negligence of the assured cannot be indemnified under the 
clause. Moreover, a proper definition of “due diligence” in the context of marine insurance 
law  had  been  affirmed  by  a  Canadian  decision,  Secunda  Marine  Services  Ltd.  v.  Liberty 
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252 which was followed by Blair J. As stated by Strathy and Moore:
 
253 
“Due diligence” is a legal term used in a variety of contexts, including  marine 
insurance.  It  essentially  means  “reasonable  care  in  the  circumstances”.  In 
determining  “due  diligence”,  the  court  will  consider  all  the  surrounding 
circumstances, including those known or reasonably to be expected. In setting a 
standard of due diligence, the court will consider the practice of others involved 
in the same industry, although a court may find that the industry practice is itself 
negligent. 
Ultimately, the applicable legal test in English marine insurance law in respect of the “due 
diligence proviso” was established by Blair J, which is that “want of due diligence” is lack of 
reasonable care.  
Regardless of such a clarified test of negligence now, in pure causation terms, a question 
may  remain  as  to  whether  the  “due  diligence  proviso”  expressly  indicates  the  parties’ 
intention to opt out of the application of the doctrine of proximity to a lower benchmark. In 
comparison with the similar term contained in the charterparty or bill of lading, according to 
Article IV- (2) of The Hague Visby Rules, for instance, the carrier or ship will not be liable for 
loss or  damage arising or  resulting  from  “(c) perils,  dangers  and accidents of  the sea  or 
other  navigable  waters”  if  without  the  actual  fault  and  privity  of  the  carrier  and  his 
servants/agents.  Therefore,  in  light  of  the  similar  expression  used  in  the  “due  diligence 
proviso”,  does  it  indicate  that  the  assured’s  negligence  will  debar  himself  from  the 
indemnity as long as the negligence remotely contributes to the loss or damage? 
The tests of causation under the two branches of law have been distinguished in the ancient 
case,  Hamilton,  Fraser  &  Co  v  Pandorf  &Co.
254  This  case was  concerned with rats in the 
context of carriage of goods by sea, the ingress o f water through the hole in a bath pipe 
gnawed by rats was considered  as a case of perils of the sea, whereof the ship -owner was 
not liable for the loss of the cargo spoilt by the sea water in accordance with the exceptions 
in the bill of lading and charterparty. It was unanimously held by the House of Lords that in 
a contract of affreightment, if necessary, the court should go behind the proximate cause of 
damage, for the purpose of ascertaining whether that cause was brought into operation by 
the negligent act or default of the shipowners or of those whom he is responsible; whereas 
in the context of marine insurance, had perils of sea been regarded as the proximate cause 
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of loss, the remote causes, such as the negligence of the assured would be irrelevant  in 
determining the indemnity.  
In principle, the Inchmaree clause should apply the doctrine of proximity unless the policy 
otherwise  explicitly  indicates  in  marine  insurance  law.  It  seems  the  most  plausible 
explanation of such phrasing may be that the parties agree that the “due diligence” proviso 
has a prevailing effect over the enumerated incidents or risks in the clause; therefore, the 
assured’s negligence should be regarded as the proximate cause of loss over, but limited to, 
the enumerated causes. 
3.3 Statutory Exclusions of Coverage 
S 55(2) of the 1906 Act provides that the insurer is not liable for any loss attributable to the 
wilful misconduct of the assured; any loss proximately caused by delay unless the policy 
otherwise provides; any loss resulting from the nature of the subject-matter insured or not 
proximately caused by maritime perils. 
Although it has been stated in The Cendor Mopu, per Lord Clark and Lord Mance, that these 
subsections are merely amplifications of S 55(1) rather than exclusions, the “exclusions” in 
this chapter exclusively refer to the perils not insured as provided by s 55(2) of the Marine 
Insurance Act 1906. Certainly, more perils can be added under this heading by appropriate 
drafting in the policy. This part concentrates on the causal link which ought to be inquired 
invariably in terms of the effect of such an “exception”, without reference to the recognition 
of their legal nature. 
3.3.1 Wilful Misconduct of the Assureds  
Wilful misconduct of the assureds has been put in the first place as an illustration of when 
the insurer will not be liable for the loss. This risk is somewhat peculiar from the perspective 
of  causation.  Before  looking  into  this  point,  it  is  worth  reviewing  the  concept  of  wilful 
misconduct in the marine insurance context briefly.  
Julian  Hill’s  article  “Wilful  Misconduct”
255  has  unequivocally  analysed  the  concept  of  wilful 
misconduct; in particular, two basic yet essential questions have been clarified in terms of 
its legal meaning. One question focuses on the forms and definition of “wilful misconduct” 
and  the  other  question  purports  to  define  who  the  “Assureds”  are.  The  most  popular 
occasions  involving  wilful  misconduct  are  fraudulent  claims,  particularly  in  the  form  of 
scuttling  and breaches  of  safety  regulations.  Arnould’s  classifies  two  types  of  courses  of 
actions as a wilful misconduct, namely, the assured deliberately or recklessly undertaking a 
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256 The authors have quoted a case of carriage by air
257 and one of carriage 
by road,
258  which are equally applicable to marine insurance cases, to define and explain 
wilful misconduct. The most material question in ascertaining such as case, as concluded by 
the authors from the cited judgments is that “Has the owner deliberately taken a risk of loss 
or  damage  of  which  he  is  aware  when  it  is  unreasonable  to  do  so?”  If  the  answer  is 
affirmative, it is very likely to constitute a case of wilful misconduct subject to other factual 
basis.  
Wilful  misconduct  is  exclusively  limited  to  the  “Assureds”  by  the  wordings  of  S  55(2)(a). 
Taking account of insurable interest, S 23 provides that “a marine policy must specify the 
name of the assured, or of some person who effects the insurance on his behalf. In this 
case,  it  is  quite  straightforward  and  obvious  to  recognise  the  assureds.  However,  there 
remain two problems. Firstly, not every party named in the policy may be subjected to the 
defence  and  the  consequence  of  wilful  misconduct.  Technically  speaking,  “Assureds” 
includes only the particular assured who made the claim, those with true joint interest in the 
property insured,
259  as opposed to the co -assureds with separate insurable interest s, and 
their alter egos.
260 Therefore, extra attention ought to be paid when ascertaining who are the 
real assureds in question. The other concern might appear in light of the Insurance Law 
Reform  Proposals  of  the  Law  Commi ssions.  The  Law  Commissions  in  their   recent 
Consultation Papers
261 which was published on 20 December 2011 have concluded that S 22 
regarding the formality of marine policy should be repealed, and that would also entail the 
repeal of S 23 and S  24. A marine insurance contract may be enforced  although it is not 
embodied in a formal policy document, and the legislatio n should not require a marine 
insurance contract to be in any particular form. However, even if it becomes good law in 
future, it may not give rise to any difficulty in identifying the assured, where the policy does 
not specify the assureds. Other contract ual documents, such as slips, will  normally contain 
the names of the assureds as well. Otherwise, the person who brings up the claim is always 
a good indicator to target the “assured” in the dispute. Therefore, reform in this regard will 
not directly affect identifying the assured in the case of wilful misconduct. 
One unique characteristic of S 55(2)(a) is that the stipulation regarding wilful misconduct of 
the assured has to be applied without room for contractual variations. Compared with all the 
other  subsections  of  S  55,  the  phrase  “unless  the  policy  otherwise  provides”  is  missing, 
which means this risk is strictly uninsurable by statute. Two reasons have been given in the 
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old leading case of Trinder Anderson & Co v Thames and Mersey Marine Insurance Co,
262 
which is worth quoting in length: 
The wilful default of the owner inducing the loss will debar him from suing on 
the policy in respect of it on two grounds, either of which would suffice to defeat 
his right: first, because no one can t ake advantage of his own wrong, using the 
word in  its true  sense which  does  not embrace  mere negligence  (see  per 
Bramwell B. in Thompson v. Hopper); secondly, because the wilful act takes from 
the catastrophe the accidental character which is essential to constitute a peril of 
the sea. 
In pure causation terms, wilful misconduct is also special as the mainstream view  is that it 
can discharge the insurer’s liability needless of a proximate causal link to the loss.
263 In the 
afore-cited case, Smith L.J. contemplated that the doctrine of proximity does not apply in the 
case of wilful misconduct,  because  not only does  proximity,  in this case,  contravene the 
principles of insurance law  and the manifest intentions of the parties, but is qualified by 
another  legal  maxim,  “Dolus  circuitu  non  purgatur”.  Furthermore,  the  Article  “Wilful 
Misconduct” concludes that a “but for” test would seem to be the most appropriate test in 
determining  the  causal  effect  of  wilful  misconduct.  This  proposition  indicates  that  wilful 
misconduct  must  be  at  least  one  of  the  competing  causes,  but  need  not  be  the  (most) 
efficient one. 
Literally speaking, the phrase of “attributable to” does not aggregate the argument whether 
wilful  misconduct  applies  a  different  standard  from  the  rest  of  the  named  statutory 
exclusions.  As  addressed  in  Chapter  One,  the  precedents  in  case  law  support  that  the 
“attributable to” indicates the application of the doctrine of proximity without more. In the 
legal sense, wilful misconduct seems to still be in line with the test of proximity instead of 
the “but for” test, which can be explained as follows: 
For  one  aspect,  no  strong  authority  in  case  law  can  be  dependent  upon  modern  law  to 
support the “but for” test instead of the test of proximity. It is suggested in Arnould’s that 
per A.L. Smith L. J. in the aforementioned Trinder case,  the proximate rule does not apply 
to  a  loss  occasioned  by  the  wilful  misconduct  of  the  assureds.  This  case  is  a  classic 
demonstration of the pre-Act judicial attitude towards the wilful misconduct of the assured. 
The predominant method to determine the relevant cause of loss in the pre-Act times is the 
last event  before the loss.  Apparently, the wilful misconduct  of  the assured  cannot  meet 
with  this  test,  as  it  requires  a  certain  form  of  consequent  operation.  Accordingly,  wilful 
misconduct of the assured could not amount to the proximate cause at that time. Therefore, 
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the judgment found the wilful misconduct of the assured did not apply to the proximate 
rule. As a different test of rule has been established and applied in modern law, the main 
consideration  and  rationale  of  this  statement  seems  unnecessary.  Accordingly,  it  is 
questionable whether this decision should be relied upon as authority for the notion that the 
wilful misconduct of the assured does not follow the test of proximity. 
Moreover, the learned Author of “Wilful Misconduct” cited and relied upon the judgment of 
Netherlands  v  Youell,
264  where the Dutch navy purchased two submarines which were 
insured under separate policies, and in the course of their construction and trials the 
submarines suffered debonding and  cracking in their paintwork. Precisely speaking, this 
judgment focused on the negligence and misconduct of the agents, which is the second part 
of the subsection. Unlike the wilful misconduct of the assureds, these occasions will not 
debar the assured’s claim. Per Phillips L.J.: 
I do not believe it is normally helpful, when considering the effect of negligence 
or  misconduct  on  the  cover  afforded  by  a  policy  of  marine  insurance,  to  ask 
whether  or  not  the  negligence  or  misconduct  is  the  “proximate  cause”  of  the 
loss.  Negligence  and  misconduct  are  generic  terms  that  apply  to  acts  or 
omissions that are coupled with a particular mental element. Where such an act 
or omission results in loss or damage to property insured, this will be because 
the  act  or  omission  causes  or  permits  a  more  direct  physical  cause  of  loss  or 
damage  to  occur.  …  A  policy  of  marine  insurance  can  provide  cover  against 
“negligence”  or  “misconduct”  (other  than  of  the  assured)  or  exclude  cover  for 
losses attributable to such causes. In either case the cover or exclusion will apply 
whether or not the negligence or misconduct is the proximate cause of the loss. 
There  was  a  time  when  it  was  not  clear  that  a  policy  of  marine  insurance 
provided cover where loss was attributable to the negligence or misconduct of an 
agent  of  the  assured.  Section  55(2)(a)  demonstrates  that  by  1906  it  was 
established  that  where  such  negligence  or  misconduct  caused  or  permitted  a 
peril  insured  against  to  impact  on  the  property  insured,  the  negligence  or 
misconduct in question would not be a bar to a claim. …. [Emphasis added] 
It is doubtful whether the wilful misconduct of the assured should apply this decision, as the 
issue in  dispute  surrounded the  wilful  misconduct  of  the  agent  rather  than  the  assured. 
Furthermore, the cited judgment seems to indicate that the physical cause of loss driven by 
the mental factor intervenes and it determines the latter cannot amount to the proximate 
cause of the loss. Therefore, negligence and wilful misconduct can only be “but for” causes 
which is one of the necessary causal factors to the loss. However, this should not be a sound 
presumption, at least in the context of wilful misconduct of the assureds, as the effect of 
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this  element  is  undoubtedly  overridden  any  other  causal  factor.  It  was  said  in  Samuel  v 
Dumas
265 that the possibility of scuttling makes the peril of the wickedness of man instead 
of perils of the sea. It fundamentally challenges the basis of the insurance policy. Although 
the final physical act appears to be more direct and nearer to the loss in time order, it is not 
efficient enough to cut down the proximate causal link between wilful misconduct and the 
loss, especially the wilful misconduct of the assured.  
On the basis of above grounds, wilful misconduct of the assureds should still apply and be 
deemed as in line with the test of proximity when determining the cause of loss. Therefore, 
it seems more appropriate to consider that the overriding effect of wilful misconduct of the 
assureds  makes  it  the  proximate  cause,  rather  than  to  say  “wilful  misconduct  overrides 
considerations of proximate cause”. 
3.3.2 Delay 
Delay was not an insured peril in the old Lloyd’s SG Form. S 55(2) of the 1906 Act stipulates 
that delay discharges the underwriter’s liability on the loss arising thereof proximately. It 
can unequivocally read from the phrase “the insurer on ship or goods” that this provision is 
applicable to hull and cargo policies but  freight policies. Therefore, delay remains out  of 
coverage in modern cargo clauses as an affirmation and emphasis of this statutory rule; a 
standard  hull  policy  is  also  bound  by  this  stipulation  unless  it  is  otherwise  altered 
particularly.  
Virtually,  delay  is  not  a  welcoming  issue  before  English  courts  and  the  decisions  in  this 
regard are not as flourished as other perils in the same kind in cargo and hull cases. A few 
historic judgments have provided limited authorities in terms of delay as a cause of loss. In 
Taylor v Dunbar,
266 the vessel carrying meat from Hamburg to London was encountered with 
tempestuous weather. As a result, the meat became putrid and was thrown overboard at sea 
in necessity. The judges unanimously agreed that the loss was solely caused by the 
retardation  and  delay,  although  such  delay  was  occ asioned  by  the  adverse  weather 
condition. The decision was reaffirmed by  Pink v Fleming
267 where a portion of goods had 
gone bad on arrival after the vessel collided with another one. The court held that the loss 
was due to the handling which took place in discharging and re-shipment for repairs and 
delay consequent on collision accordingly. 
Moreover, it is explicitly demonstrated in Shelbourne & Co. v Law Investment and Insurance 
Corporation
268 how delay could result in the remoteness between an insured peril and the 
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loss. Two barges insured by river insurance collided and led to damage of each barge. The 
insured claimed damages for loss in consequence of detention for repair after the collision. 
The Judge  followed  the  well-known  principles  of  marine  insurance that  “no  allowance  for 
time is recoverable” and concluded that the claim was too remote from the insured perils 
and unrecoverable accordingly. It may be observed from these decisions that delay entitles 
underwriters to a powerful defence to exclude their liability. 
A typical scenario can be drawn in these cargo cases: the adventure designated for carrying 
the cargo insured meets with adverse sea conditions, which leads to unreasonable delay and 
causes a physical loss of the cargo ultimately. In pure causation terms, a causation chain 
may  be  established  starting  from  perils  of  sea  to  delay  to  inherent  vice  sometimes  and 
finally  to  the  physical  loss  of  the  cargo.  So  far,  dependent  upon  The  Cendor  Mopu,  if 
inherent vice, as a risk form, is triggered by an external source, the case cannot be regarded 
as  a  loss  proximately  caused  by  inherent  vice.  Therefore,  the  competing  causes  remain 
perils of the sea and delay. Which one contributes more efficiency to the loss? The literal 
reading of S 55(2)(b), “although the delay be caused by a peril insured against”, seems to 
provide an answer that delay overrides the perils of the sea in the chain and courts should 
pay more attention to the result of delay. English courts have basically complied with this 
reading and have not looked to a further degree beyond delay itself. Technically speaking, it 
is not a product of the obsolete test “nearest cause in time”; rather, it is in line with the 
efficiency standard. Physical loss is mainly and directly caused by loss of time, instead, perils 
of the sea only affects the adventure but not to the extent as serious as to endanger the 
physical safety of the hull and cargo. Accordingly, delay succeeds in interrupting and cutting 
the causal link between perils of sea and the physical loss of cargo. However, if delay is no 
more than a consequential one and has no independent contribution to the loss, there is 
hardly an efficient causal link between such delay and the loss. In particular, in a case where 
a  peril  by  definition  includes  loss  of  time,  such  as  captures,  seizures  and detention,  the 
effect of such delay should be absorbed by the initial risk.
269 
Besides the physical loss or damage of the subject -matter insured, a policyholder often 
claims for financial loss in the form of loss of market value due to delay, in addition. One of 
the unresolved issues in the decision of  Masefield v Amlin
270 relates to the loss of market 
value resulting from delay in causation terms. The Somalia pirates took possession of the 
vessel and cargo on board for the purpose of ransom in this case. The assured cargo owner 
claimed for an actual total loss, alternatively a constructive total loss. The Court of Appeal 
held that the assured’s claim in either form was defeated based on the fact that the vessel 
was released after the payment of ransom. No physical loss of the cargo had been incurred. 
Additionally,  the  assured  contended  that  the  biodiesel  cargo  had  dramatically  lost  its 
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economic value due to the delay caused by the piratical seizure and had taken this part into 
the sum of claim. However, the court did not respond to this issue, as it became irrelevant 
as the claim lacked a fundamental ground-a factual loss-in the first place. Nonetheless, it 
was  held  in  Federation  Insurance  Company  of  Canada  v  Coret  Accessories  Ltd
271  that  the 
assured only insured goods by an ordinary form of open cargo policy against a permanent 
loss; it did not insure any goods which were delayed in transit or temporarily lost but which 
were subsequently delivered to the owner. On balance, unless the policy clearly indicates to 
the contrary, the physical loss as well as a financial loss directly attributable to the loss of 
time will not be recovered in hull policies and cargo policies.  
In relation to freight policy, a freight policy is designed to insure the loss of freight when the 
adventure is frustrated, interrupted or delayed as the result of insured perils. In this context, 
delay is treated more as a form of consequence than acting as a cause of loss, as the loss in 
this type  of case  is ascertained,  i.e. loss  of freight.  It is  suggested in  Arnould’s that  the 
problem with this type of dispute is mostly in determining whether the proximate cause of 
the loss of freight is the initial operation of an insured peril or the decision of the charterer 
in cancelling the charter.
272  
However, it is also maintained that  a  “Time  Charter”  Clause  or  a  “Loss  of  Time”  Clause 
containing in a freight policy and a “Frustration” Clause contained in a war risks policy may 
debar the claim “consequent on the loss of time, whether arising from a peril of the sea or 
otherwise”.
273 The authoritative construction of these clauses has been given by the House of 
Lords in the leading case, The Playa de Las Nieves.
274 The question for the House of Lords 
was “Does the time charter clause in the Institute Time Clauses: Freight excludes a claim by 
the assured for chartered freight lost under the off-hire clause in his time charter?” Per Lord 
Diplock, this Clause does not concern the question of the “proximate cause” at all by using 
the phrase “consequent on”: 
It  contemplates  a  chain  of  events  expressed  to  be  either  "consequent  on"  or 
"arising  from"  one  another.  It  expressly  makes  the  operation  of  the  clause 
dependent upon the presence in the chain of an intermediate event (viz. "loss of 
time") between the loss for which the claim is made (viz. loss of freight) and the 
event which in insurance law is the "proximate cause" of that loss (viz. a peril 
insured  against).  The  intermediate  event,  "loss  of  time",  is  not  itself  a  peril 
though it may be the result of a peril. That is why the words "whether arising 
from a peril of the sea or otherwise" are not mere surplusage as was suggested 
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obiter  by  Mr.  Justice  Bailhache  in  Russian  Bank  for  Foreign  Trade  v.  Excess 
Insurance Co. Ltd., [1918] 2 K.B. 123 at p. 127. They are there to make it plain 
that the clause is concerned with an intermediate event between the occurrence 
of  a  peril  insured  against  and  the  loss  of  freight  of  which  the  peril  was,  in 
insurance law, the proximate cause. 
The true interpretation of Lord Diplock’s judgment is  the need to distinguish the loss of 
freight  proximately  caused  by  an  insured  peril  from  those  relating  to  delay.  It  can  be 
understood from two aspects: on the one hand, the purpose of the underwriters inserting 
such a clause is literally to exclude any liability connected to the loss of time. The way Lord 
Diplock to interpret is in line with the insurer’s intention. On the other hand, although Lord 
Diplock  has  described  the  loss  of  time  as  an  intermediate  event  and  intended  to  rule  a 
tenuous  causation  test  in  this  regard,  the  phrase  “consequent  on”  does  not  provide  any 
contrary  agreement  than  the  doctrine  of  proximity  and  it  essentially  comes  to  the  same 
conclusion as S 55(2)(b). This clause will not allow the insurer to abuse his exemption as 
long as a minor delay occurs or where a peril by definition includes a loss of time. In contrast, 
as aforementioned, the effect of a significant delay with independent causal effect normally 
overrides  the efficiency  of  its  earlier insured  peril.  Lord Diplock’s  judgment  supports  the 
view  that the loss  of  freight  arising  from  delay  will  not  be  recovered  in  compliance  with 
“Time Charter Clause” and S 55(2)(b), on the condition that delay efficiently contributes to 
the frustration of the voyage or loss of freight. In one word, under the freight policy, the 
insurer’s liability is equally restricted within the scope of the insured perils in the case of 
delay. 
3.3.3 Nature of the Subject-matter Insured 
S 55(2)(c) notably refers to a group of internal causes arising from the nature of the insured 
property, which retains no feature of being “marine related”. As the most typical example of 
internal causal factors, the definition of inherent vice has been conclusively provided by the 
Supreme Court’s judgment on The Cendor Mopu in 2011. Thereupon, the marine insurance 
market should now see fewer coverage disputes on inherent vice issues.
275 Inherent vice will 
be addressed in detail in the next chapter, taken as the most typical example of this kind. 
It is worth citing in length from The Cendor Mopu in this regard that, per Lord Mance: 
In the scheme of the 1906 Act, that would not appear to me surprising, bearing 
in mind the case law against the background of which the Act was enacted and 
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the  juxtaposition  in  section  55(2)  (c)  of  “ordinary  wear  and  tear,  ordinary 
leakage  and  breakage”  with  “inherent  vice  or  nature  of  the  subject  matter 
insured”  as  well  as  with  “any  injury  to  machinery  not  proximately  caused  by 
maritime  perils”.  While  not  myself  attempting  any  exact  definition,  ordinary 
wear  and  tear  and  ordinary  leakage  and  breakage  would  thus  cover  loss  or 
damage resulting from the normal vicissitudes of use in the case of a vessel, or 
of handling and carriage in the case of cargo, while inherent vice would cover 
inherent characteristics of or defects in a hull or cargo leading to it causing loss 
or damage to itself — in each case without any fortuitous external accident or 
casualty. 
Shortly  after  the  decision  of  The  Cendor  Mopu,  the  Supreme  Court  of  Victoria,  Australia, 
similarly provided a clear definition of “wear and tear” in JSM Management Pty Ltd v QBE 
Insurance  (Australia)  Ltd.
276  In  this  case, QBE issued an industrial special risks insurance 
policy on JSM’s trucking depot. JSM leased it to GLP and the hardstand was damaged  by 
improper usage by GLP. The assured (JSM) claimed for the damage but got rejected by the 
insurer by reason of the exclusion clause including wear and tear. In the first trial, the court 
reasoned the case constituted wear and tear; therefore, the insurer should not be liable. The 
assured appealed and raised a substantive point of law: what was the meaning of “wear and 
tear”? The Supreme Court of Victoria reversed the earlier decision, which had defined the 
phrase in a narrow manner, referring merely to losses which are the ordinary results of use 
or natural forces. On the contrary, extraordinary losses are not within the scope of cover.
277  
In comparison, the aforementioned Australian decision is in line with the English judgment in 
The Cendor Mopu; moreover, an analogy can also be found between the interpretations of an 
internal cause due to the nature of subject-matter insured. At present, the mainstream view 
is that the risks provided in s 55(2)(c) ought to be given a narrow meaning, which must be 
confined within the “ordinary” scope. That is to say, as long as  the consequences of  loss 
surpass the extraordinary extent, the proximate cause must be something more than a mere 
internal factor, such as perils of the sea. In this case, the underwriters’ defence in this regard 
should not be sustained by courts.  
On  balance,  the  internal  risks  have  gradually  become  an  important  group  of  competing 
causes which leads to disputes between insurers and assureds. Therefore, the next Chapter 
will  specifically  look  into  the  internal  causes,  taking  inherent  vice  as  the  example,  in 
causation terms. 
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3.4 Apprehension of Peril and Mitigation Measures 
When a voyage is under the threat of perils, measures are ordinarily taken in order to avoid 
or reduce the extent of the loss or damage, which is also a statutory duty under s 78 of the 
1906 Act. The measures are sometimes ineffective or even contribute to new losses or more 
severe losses. In terms of the timing of the actions, apprehension of perils may stimulate 
the  crew  on  board  to  conduct  themselves  proactively  before  the  actual  peril  effects;  in 
contrast, mitigation measures take place in the process of the occurrence of the peril and 
onwards. The courts have completely opposite attitudes towards identifying the proximate 
cause in such “state of affairs”
278 under the two different situations. 
Apprehension of a peril cannot be regarded as the peril itself in terms of the causal link to 
the loss which has occurred. Unless otherwise provided in the policy, the mere apprehension 
of a peril is not sufficient for the assured to obtain recovery.
279 The peril merely induces the 
assured to alter his conduct which new peril inserts under such apprehension. Normally, the 
peril occurring subsequent to the apprehension is deemed as the proximate cause, but not 
the one which the assured attempts to escape from. In  Becker, Gray and Company v London 
Assurance  Corporation,
  280  the  assured  insured  his  cargo  for  a  carriage  from  Calcutta  to 
Hamburg against perils of the sea and men of war, restraints of princes by a consideration 
of a higher premium. During the voyage, war broke out between Britain and Germany. The 
captain feared the vessel would be captured by the British Authorities due to its destination 
being a German port. Consequently, he voluntarily deviated to a neutral port in Italy in order 
to avoid the potential risk of capture, which led to the failure of the designated voyage. The 
cargo owner accordingly claimed for constructive total loss against his insurer on delivering 
a notice of abandonment, which was declined by the insurer. The House of Lords affirmed 
the decisions of the Court of Appeal and the Commercial Court by holding that there is a 
definite distinction between losses by an insured peril and turning aside to avoid the peril. A 
certainty in existence or at least being imminent is necessary in establishing the causal link 
between  the  peril  and  the  loss.  Hence,  the  apprehension  of  a  peril  prior  to  the  actual 
incident  of  the  risk  is  not  within  the  scope  of  cover  in  principle,  owing  to  its  efficient 
contribution in creating a new state of affairs and perils. 
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In contrast, according to Arnould’s, losses caused by measures taken to avert or minimise 
the effect of an insured peril should be distinguished from the case of the apprehension of 
an uninsured peril. In general, a better view is maintained by the Editors to regard the cases 
of loss as proximately caused by the peril which is attempted to be averted.
281 As a matter of 
fact, there is merely one line between the apprehension of a peril a nd the averting measure. 
The line is whether the peril has been ascertained or is pre-existing. In particular, a statutory 
duty to avert and minimis e the loss arises after an insured peril struck.
282 Accordingly, the 
underwriter is normally liable for losses including those proximately caused by the averting 
measure.  Taking  the  leading  case   of  Canada  Rice  Mills  v  Union  Marine  and  General 
Insurance  Company,
  283  as  an  example  it  was  held  that  the  heated  cargo  of  rice  was 
recoverable within the insured scope of the policy including perils of the sea, as the loss was 
proximately caused by closing of ventilators in order to prevent the ingress of seawater. In 
this case, the action was deemed as necessarily and reasonably taken to prevent the peril of 
the  sea.  Therefore,  it  is  less  doubtful  that  the  losses  occurring  owing  to  the  mitigating 
conduct of the assured or those of people acting on behalf of the assured are recoverable. 
However, it is also frequent that the loss has happened or is aggravated as the master and 
crew failed to take any proper measure on the occurrence of the perils. Such negligence may 
trigger an adverse effect against the assured in compliance with the duty to “sue and labour” 
provided by s 78(4) of the 1906 Act.
284 There used to be interactions between the legal effect 
of  breaching  the  duty  and  the  insurer’s  liability  of  indemnity  under  S  55(2)(a),  which  is 
demonstrated  in  the  decisions  of  National  Oilwell  (UK)  Ltd  v  Davy  Offshore  Ltd
285  and 
Netherlands  v  Youell  &  Others.  In  the  first  case,  Colman  J  contemplated  his  view  on  the 
effect of breaching the duty that the failure to do so would lead to the assured’s inability to 
establish that the loss was proximately caused by an insured peril rather than by his own 
wilful  misconduct;  in  other  words,  the  insurer  will  undertake  the  indemnity  only  if  such 
breach of duty does not proximately contribute to the loss in accordance with S 55(2)(a). 
Consequently, the Judge resolved the alleged conflict between the two provisions by treating 
the misconduct or negligence as an issue of causation which is addressed in the 16
th edition 
of  Arnould’s.
286  In summary, the main question is whether the breach of the duty is so 
serious as to break the chain of causation of the insured peril itself. If the failure  of taking 
measures is not the proximate cause, the underwriter does not have the defence and  should 
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be liable. On the contrary, if the breach proximately causes the entire or part of the loss, the 
underwriter is not liable for the respective loss pursuant to S 55(2)(a). 
This approach has been reaffirmed in the subsequent case Netherlands v Youell & Others. 
Philip LJ concluded that: 
the principle embodied in s. 55(2)(a) applied before and after a casualty and the 
duty referred to in s. 78(4) would only have significance in the rare case where 
breach of that duty was so significant as to be held to displace the prior insured 
peril as the proximate cause of the loss; even in that rare case the breach of s. 
78(4) was  unlikely  in  practice to  afford a  defence to  underwriters  because such 
breach was unlikely to constitute a separate insured peril under the express cover 
that had been given by the standard form of policies of marine insurance against 
negligence of the masters, officers and crew. [Emphasis added] 
Most recently, the afore-cited judgment in respect of “the rare case where breach of that 
duty was so significant as to be held to displace the prior insured peril as the proximate 
cause of the loss” has been reviewed and applied in Clothing Management Technology Ltd v 
Beazley Solutions Ltd (t/a Beazley Marine UK).
287 In this case, the assured brought a claim 
against his insurer for the invoice value of garments which were manufactured in a factory in 
Morocco. The factory owner disappeared leaving the worker unpaid there. As a result, the 
workers occupied the factory and refused to finish the work.  The assured paid the workers 
directly in order to resume the work. More fabric was sent into, and some garments were 
shipped back to the UK. A second demand for an immediate payment equivalent to some 
£80,000 was made by the workers, but this time the assured re fused. The assured entered 
into  a marine policy in terms of the Institute Cargo Clauses (A) (1982) and the Institute 
Strikes Clauses (Cargo) (1982). The policy covered finished and semi -finished garments 
while in store and it was agreed that the provisions of the Marine Insurance Act  1906 would 
apply, even though the policy covered some non-marine risks. 
The Court felt that it might have been unwise to send more fabric into a factory as part of a 
strategy whose purpose was to get fabric out of it. That was  in hindsight a mistake but a t 
the time it was a step taken as the result of a reasonable and informed judgment by the 
assured who was trying to deal with unusual circumstances. Therefore, there was no failure 
to take measures to avert or minimise loss as required by section 78(4) of  the 1906 Act; 
moreover, the loss was not proximately caused by assured's failure to take reasonable 
steps. 
However, whether that principle can be extended to contractual suing and labouring clauses 
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remains  obscure.  This  issue  has  been  proposed  in  a  recent  well-known  case  Melinda  v 
Hellenic.
288 The assured’s vessel, The Silva, got arrested in Egypt for an unpaid judgment and 
court  dues  in  previous  proceedings  relating  to  another  vessel,  The  Safir,  which  had 
grounded off the coast of Egypt causing environmental damage. In fact, the assured is not 
related in any respect to the grounded vessel and the debtors of the Egyptian judgment, 
which had been approved by Burton J in the Commercial Court. The assured had challenged 
the  arrest  but  those  proceedings  had  been  dismissed  and  the  arrest  upheld.  An  appeal 
against that decision was pending. As The Silva had been detained for more than two years 
in Egypt, the assured made a constructive total loss claim on its war risks insurance against 
the insurer. However, the insurer contended that the loss was excluded under its rules as it 
was a claim arising out of ordinary judicial process or because there had been a breach of 
the “sue and labour” clause.  
Burton J made a brief comment on the interplay between the proximate cause rule and suing 
and labouring, as he found there were no breach and no need to elaborate. The principle 
held  in  Netherlands  v  Youell  was  reaffirmed  by  Burton  J  that  the  “sue  and  labour”  duty 
imposed by the S 78(4) of the 1906 Act requires the breach to be the proximate cause of 
loss. In comparison, however, Burton J pointed out a controversial situation in the case of a 
contractual provision in respect of “sue and labour”. It is undoubted that the obiter principle 
can be extended to cover a contractual provision in very similar terms to the statutory duty 
in The Aliza Glacial.
289 However, shortly before  The Aliza Glacial was decided, Colman J in 
The Grecia Express
290 expressed a more open view on interpreting a contractual “sue and 
labour” clause: 
That [the obiter principle] would be the position under s. 78(4), but r. 3.14 is not 
the 1906 Act, but a contractual condition. As such its construction is at large and 
does not need to be identical to that of similar words in the statute unless there 
is some compelling reason for the meanings to coincide…. That being so, I see 
no reason why the contractual condition should not bear that meaning which is 
what the words suggest when they are taken out of the intricate context of the 
1906 Act. [Brackets added] 
It is far from  easy to conclude  that Colman J was  holding an opposite view to  The  Aliza 
Glacial, although Burton J regarded it so. For one reason, the expression in the paragraph is 
somewhat subtle and it did not firmly iterate that the contractual term must not apply for 
the principle. Moreover, as Burton J observed, Colman J did not provide any justification in 
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support of why the principle should not be applicable. What the paragraph simply delivered 
and emphasised is the contractual nature of the condition, which may provide an different 
test or operation by unequivocal wordings. It is just in line with the doctrine of proximity, 
which is also subject to otherwise indication in the policy. Whether contractual expression is 
able  to  replace  the  proximate  cause  test  is  determined  by  the  court’s  interpretation. 
Nevertheless, Burton J in Melinda v Hellenic refused to give a clear answer in this respect, as 
it  was  unnecessary  to  do  so.  Therefore,  The  Grecia  Express  may  continue  to  be  taken 
advantage of as support for an automatic rejection to apply the proximate cause rule in the 
case of a contractual “sue and labour” clause. 
Therefore, in principle, losses arising from the reasonable and necessary measures taken for 
avoiding an insured peril or its further loss are recoverable. Likewise, failure to perform the 
duty of “sue and labour” will not protect the underwriter against the liability of indemnity 
unless, in exceptional occasions, such breach contributed significantly to the loss in rare 
cases which breaks the causal link between the insured peril and the loss. In contrast, the 
apprehension of an insured peril creates new perils which are not within the scope of the 
cover. Consequently, the underwriter is discharged from liability. Noting that there is only a 
narrow gap in time between the measures taken owing to the apprehension of an insured 
peril and to avert or minimise the loss, it is for the assured’s benefit not to take actions 
proactively. Instead, the decision of taking actions should be made after the insured peril is 
imminent or ascertained.  M. SONG 
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Chapter 4 Inherent Vice 
 
Inherent  vice  is  a  complex  yet  crucial  concept  in  the  law  of  marine  insurance.  Under  s 
55(2)(c) of the 1906 Act, an insurer is not liable to indemnify the loss proximately caused by 
inherent vice. Modern standard cargo policies also display inherent vice in the exclusionary 
clauses. In insurance claims, it is not unusual for insurers to attempt to take advantage of 
the  cargo’s  internal  risks,  particularly  in  form  of  inherent  vice,  for  the  purpose  of 
discharging indemnity liability. Therefore, various arguments concerning the legal meaning 
and effect of inherent vice have been commonly raised, which are normally formulated as 
questions of causation between the perils and the consequence of loss.  
Till recently,  Lord Clarke expressed that The Cendor Mopu, being an unusual case on the 
facts,  dealt  with  and  contemplated  the  issue  of  inherent  vice  in  the  context  of  marine 
insurance. Based upon this judgment, this chapter will present a research on inherent vice 
on  the  basis  of  numerous  English  precedents,  in  conjunction  with  a  few  cases  of  other 
jurisdictions for comparison. Specifically, the definition provided by the English cases will 
first be reviewed and then followed by some specified forms of inherent vice. The question 
that  whether  inherent  vice  is  an  uninsured  peril  or  an  excluded  one,  owing  divergent 
understanding  and  interpretations  of  the  1906  Act,  will  be  addressed.  The  second  part 
comes to the insurability of inherent vice as a peril in marine insurance law, which will be 
reaffirmed in order to criticise the wrongly-recognised test of inevitability. In the end, the 
test  to  ascertain  the  proximate  efficiency  of  inherent  vice  in  terms  of  causation  will  be 
analysed and concluded. In particular, room  for concurrent causes involved with  inherent 
vice and external causes such as perils of sea will be reviewed from historic and current 
judicial views. 
4.1 Overview of Inherent Vice 
In English law, the recognition of inherent vice has derived from late 18
th century. The cases 
decided at this early stage were basically relied upon observations of factual phenomenon 
and  common  sense  without  specific  reasoning  processes.  There  was  no  proper  legal 
definition provided either by precedents or by the 1906 Act until that the House of Lords 
has provided a benchmark definition in Soya v White.
291 This descriptive definition has been 
widely cited by the subsequent cases. However, it still contained ambiguity which has led to 
dissenting  interpretations  and  understandings.   As  i mplied  in  The  Cendor  Mopu,  the 
causation issue regarding inherent vice in essence turns out to be a matter of definition in 
law.  Therefore,  the  meaning  of  inherent  vice  in  the  law  of  marine  insurance  should  be 
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thoroughly clarified in the first place in order to unveil its application of the legal test of 
causation. 
4.1.1 The Meaning of Inherent Vice 
As the modern insurance regime is strikingly different from what it used to be two centuries 
ago, English  courts  hold completely  divergent  attitudes  in  identifying  and construing  the 
cover scope than they used to do. Although some ancient cases are poorly reconciled with 
the modern law, they may be still worth mentioning, as they show the historical view that an 
internal cause could outweigh perils of sea as the proximate cause. In particular, in an old 
case
292, the insured cargo consisting chiefly of slaves was insured against perils  of sea. The 
voyage was prolonged due to tempestuous weather and the slaves died d uring the delay 
resulting from lack of provision .  In  1796,  an  Act  of  Parliament  stated  that  “no  loss  or 
damage  should  be  recoverable  on  account  of  the  mortality  of  slaves  by  natural  death”. 
[Emphasis added] The court recognised this was a case due to natural death as a form of 
inherent vice but not perils of sea. On the one hand, the judgment aimed to discourage the 
ship from being equipped with insufficient and low quality provisions. On the other hand, 
the internal unfitness of the “cargo” was deemed to be a more effective cause in order to 
narrow down the insurers’ scope of liability. 
In terms of conventional goods, it was held in Boyd v Dubois
293 that the insurer was not liable 
for the loss caused by the damaged quality of the goods itself.  Furthermore, in Koebel v 
Saunders,
294 Byles J. declared that a loss of goods which perish by some inherent vice or 
weakness, as in this case tender animals unfit to bear the agitation of the sea, or in the 
more ordinary cases of fruit, flour or rice damaged by heat or perish is not an insured loss 
as caused by perils of sea. It is also worth mentioning that both cases have provided that the 
assured should not be required to warrant that the goods are able to withstand the ordinary 
course of the designated voyage. It is such a long term that unfitness or unseaworthiness of 
cargo has been differentiated from the concept of inherent vice. Furthermore, in Blower v 
The  Great  Western  Railway  Company,
295  a  carriage  by  rail  case,  Willes  J  interpreted  the 
expression of “vice” in the manner that: 
By the expression “vice” is  meant only that sort of  vice which by its  internal 
development tends to the destruction or the injury of the animal or thing to be 
carried. 
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These statements have built a basis upon which to conclude a general legal definition by 
having exemplified the forms of a loss which might be caused by inherent vice. 
A  development  was  achieved  in  the  early  editions  of  Arnould’s,  which  broadly  defined 
inherent vice as a 
…source of decay or corruption inherent in the subject matter, or, as the phrase 
is, from its proper vice; as when food becomes rotten, or flour heats, or wine 
turns  sour,  not  from  external  damage,  but  entirely  from  internal 
decomposition.
296 
The latest edition of  Arnould’s
297 retains these lines but regards them as no more than a 
description of or an introduction to inherent vice. Nevertheless, in the modern view, this 
“definition” has at least succeeded in presenting and emphasising two important elements 
of this concept. Either the cause of loss is utterly internal and permanently attached to the 
cargo  as  part  of  its  nature,  or  the  goods  are  damaged  to  a  certain  extent,  which  has 
amounted to a primary “vice” condition. In the first instance, the risk of being deteriorated is 
not a risk exclusively to the marine context. It is a permanent and essential risk arising from 
the nature of the subject-matter insured. That is to say, the effect of inherent vice is not 
because of the ship or the sea.
298 On the other hand, the goods on board do not have to be 
in a perceptible bad state or quality initially, even though inherent vice is by definition a risk 
that the goods are of lower quality than otherwise identical property without such defect.
299 
If a cargo was shipped in a good quality of the kind by evidence,  courts seems to exclude 
the possibility of inherent vice as the cause to the loss or damage.
300 On the contrary, if the 
cargo had been shipped in bad order, it may provide  prima facie evidence for finding in 
favour of the insurer’s contention of inherent vice.
301 
Subsequently, in early 20
th when the Marine Insurance Act 1906 was codified and came into 
effect, however, the Act paid no concern to providing a statutory definition of inherent vice. 
On the contrary, “perils of sea” has been clarified as the most important insured risk, which 
has assisted the judiciary to ascertain a case of perils  of sea and somewhat reduced the 
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number of arguments on inherent vice. The prevailing view at that time is Lord Sumner’s 
judgment in British and Foreign Marine Insurance Company Ltd. v Gaunt, 
302 
There are, of course, limits to “all risks.” They are risks and risks insured against. 
Accordingly the expression does not cover inherent vice or mere wear and tear or 
British capture. It covers a risk, not a certainty; it is something, which happens to 
the  subject-matter  from  without,  not  the  natural  behaviour  of  that  subject-
matter, being what it is, in the circumstances under which it is carried. … 
Accordingly,  inherent  vice  has  been  regarded  as  something  happening  from  “the  natural 
behaviour of  that  subject-matter,  being what  it  is  in  the circumstances  under  which  it  is 
carried” and some lack of fortuity. 
E.D.  Sassoon  &  Co.,  Ltd.  v  Yorkshire  Insurance  Company
303  is  the  case  most  worth 
mentioning  case  to  illustrate  the  judicial  trends  and  the  application  of  Lord  Sumner’s 
formulation. A quantity of cigarettes was insured upon a marine insurance policy against the 
perils including damage by fresh water, mould and mildew, but excluding inherent vice. The 
assured found the goods damaged by mildew on arrival after a considerable delay. It was 
decided that the insurer’s contention regarding inherent vice was not sound and justifiable; 
therefore, the loss was recoverable. Having relied upon Lord Sumner’s  judgment as cited 
above, Bankes LJ found the loss was contingent on account of the evidence as to the good 
quality and packing. Any external factor or contingency would deny the insurer’s defence by 
virtue of inherent vice. Therefore, the damage was not caused by its natural behaviour or the 
circumstance of carriage. However, Scutton LJ declined to follow the Gaunt’s case as a direct 
authority, since it was a case regarding “all risks” coverage, which was not the same position 
in this case where a specific risk was involved and insured against. So long as the assured 
was able to prove the loss was caused by an external reason under an “all risks” cover, the 
claim should be responded. Nevertheless, the Judge was still inclined to find in favour of the 
assured  in  the  end  after  weighing  the  evidence.  Moreover,  the  carriage  conditions  and 
manners also needed to be considered in order to introduce a possibility of inherent vice. 
Therefore, it seems it used to be difficult to establish a case of inherent vice as it had a 
comparatively narrower scope than perils of sea by the influence of Gaunt’s case. 
Ultimately, a thorough and authoritative definition of inherent vice was provided in the case 
Soya v White by Lord Diplock:  
This phrase (generally shortened to "inherent vice") where it is used in s. 55 (2) 
(c) refers to a peril by which a loss is proximately caused; it is not descriptive of 
the loss  itself.  It  means  the risk  of  deterioration  of  the goods  shipped  as  a 
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result  of  their  natural  behaviour  in  the  ordinary  course  of  the  contemplated 
voyage without the intervention of any fortuitous external accident or casualty.  
In  this  case,  the  cargo  owner  took  place  a  cover  against  heat,  sweat  and  spontaneous 
combustion on his large quantity of soya beans. The cargo arrived at the discharging port in 
a heated and deteriorated condition which amounted to a partial depreciation. One of the 
grounds upon which the insurer sought to deny the liability was that the proximate cause of 
the damage was inherent vice, as the soya beans were not shipped in a condition to enable 
them  to  withstand  the  ordinary  incidents  of  the  designated  voyage.  The  Court  of  first 
instance  held  the  insurer  was  liable  for  the  loss  which  was  not  proximately  caused  by 
inherent vice. The Court of Appeal
304 sustained the conclusion; however, relying on different 
grounds, despite the fact that that the proximate cause of the loss was not unanimously 
agreed. Donaldson LJ remarked that “a loss was proximately caused by inherent vice if the 
natural behaviour of the goods was such that they suffered a loss in the circumstances in 
which they were expected to be carried”. He held that the proximate cause in this case was 
the condition under which the soya beans were carried and he followed the definition and 
test  of  contract  of  affreightment.  This  is  an  external  factor  as  opposed  to  the  moisture 
content of the cargo itself which was considered to be the proximate cause by Waller LJ. The 
House of Lords left the question of proximate cause untouched but concluded that in either 
case  the  insurer  should  be  liable  as  a  matter  of  construction.  Consequently,  the  obiter 
definition given by Lord Diplock becomes a landmark precedent in law of marine insurance. 
However, the relationship between the ordinary course of voyage and the cargo’s inherent 
unfitness has remained unclear. 
Regardless, this definition was adopted and reaffirmed in a later case, Noten v Harding.
305 
Four shipments of leather gloves were made and insured on the terms of the Institute Cargo 
Clauses (all risks) with an  excluded peril of inherent vice. In each shipment on arrival, the 
gloves were found on overturn wet, stained, mouldy and discoloured. Both the first trial and 
the appeal found that the gloves were damaged by excessive moisture contained inside of 
them.  How ever,  the  judge  at  first  instance  paid  more  attention  to  the  process  of 
condemnation and attributed the damage to the dropping of water from container roofs as 
an external source. Therefore, the Judge found in favour of the assured by considering that 
despite the fact that the cargo’s characteristics have assisted in producing the final damage, 
the situation in question still failed to meet with Lord Diplock’s definition in Soya v White. In 
contrast, the Court of Appeal recognised that it was inconsistent with the common sense of 
business or seafaring man to think the moisture was from an external source. Per Bingham 
L.J., the distinction between the intermediate migration of moisture to and condensation of 
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moisture on the roofs of the containers was suggested owing more to the subtlety of the 
legal mind than to the common sense of the mercantile. 
Noten  v  Harding  has  changed the  older  judicial  attitudes  towards  inherent  vice  to  some 
extent. For instance in Whiting v New Zealand Insurance Co Ltd
306, it was used to reject the 
insurer’s contention of inherent vice on the ground that  
There were too many sound shipments not only in that autumn but over a large 
period of time,  20  years and more,  in  which these hats have been good, to 
admit of the conclusion that it was something wrong with the manufacture or 
something  inherent  in  the  goods  themselves.  The  occurrence  of  mould  is  a 
matter of extreme rareness. It is a rare exception to the rule of soundness. 
It has been clearly indicated in Noten v Harding that fortuitous accidents cannot be certainly 
inferred  from  the  fact  that  only  a  minority  of  a  numerous  consignments  in  comparable 
conditions suffered such damage. Moreover, Noten v Harding has reaffirmed the standpoint 
in Arnould’s and Soya v White that inherent vice may cause loss or damage without being 
inevitable. This conclusion has directly rebutted the formulation established in  The Gaunt 
and the cases following it, which sought for a certainty to prove the causal effect of inherent 
vice. However, this decision mainly concerned the matter whether the moisture was internal 
or  external,  but  still  addressed  nothing  in  respect  of  unfitness to  withstand the ordinary 
journey. 
In addition to Lord Diplock’s formulation, Donaldson LJ’s statement in the Court of Appeal 
judgment of Soya v White was considered and followed by Moore-Bick J in The Mayban.
307 A 
large electrical transformer was shipped on board at Ellesmere Port to Rotterdam; on its 
transit at Rotterdam to Malaysia, it was transferred to a container vessel. When it arrived at 
the discharging  port,  it  was  discovered that the transformer  was seriously damaged and 
required repairs at an expense of more than £1 million. A project policy had been taken out 
containing a clause that the underwriter would not be liable for the loss proximately caused 
by inherent vice and also incorporated the Institute Cargo Clauses (A) (1982) with the same 
clause  as  well.  The  assured  and  insurer  had  opposing  views  on  whether  the  loss  was 
proximately caused by unusual events in the voyage or by inherent vice. As held by Moore-
Bick J, it can be assumed that if “the conditions encountered by the vessel no more severe 
than could reasonably have been expected, the conclusion had to be that the real cause of 
the loss was the inherent inability of the goods to withstand the ordinary incidents of the 
voyage”.  
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This approach went too far in the sense of finding a wider scope of inherent vice. In the first 
place,  the  judge  erred  in  holding  that  if  the  conditions  are  not  exceptional  to  an 
unpredictable extent, there is no peril at sea. Since there are various forms of peril at sea 
which are hardly able to be enumerated in an exhausting manner such as the “maritime 
perils” defined under s 3(2)(c) in the 1906 Act,
308 inherent vice and  perils of sea can hardly 
constitute a “one or the other” situation in the absence of a test of causation. It is evident 
and  doubtless  that  perils  of  sea  in  extreme  forms,  such  as  storms  and  collisions,  will 
assume  the  position  of  proximate  cause  as  they  fundamentally  change  the  ordinary 
condition requisite to the effect of inherent vice. However, as a matter of fact, some forms 
of perils of sea which are less unusual and exceptional still exist and affect a voyage. Under 
such circumstances, it is crucial yet perplexing to distinguish whether the voyage is in an 
ordinary course beyond the coverage or in fact an occasion of perils of sea.  
Furthermore, it is wrong to presume that in the absence of “perils of sea”, the proximate 
cause must be inherent vice, as this misses the requirement of an independent causal link of 
“sufficiency” between inherent vice and the loss. It should be noted that “ordinary course of 
voyage” ”, as part of Lord Diplock’s definition, is merely a necessary element of inherent vice. 
It does not imply that it would be a case of inherent vice as long as the voyage appears 
ordinary and normal even without relevant and sufficient proof. In essence, it is a matter of 
burden of proof. It should be correct to say that the insurer will not be liable on the grounds 
that the assured fails to undertake the primary burden to prove that the loss is proximately 
caused by an insured peril in spite of not specifying and proving an exact form of cause. 
However, it seems erroneous to say that as the assured fails to prove the loss is caused by 
perils  of sea, the proximate cause is inherent vice naturally. It can be observed that the 
judgment was also based upon one presumption that inherent vice and perils of sea are two 
sides of coin, which means if the peril at sea is not satisfied with the test of causation, and 
then it must be the other one, i.e. inherent vice. 
In one word, the Mayban test has wrongly widened the scope of inherent vice by excluding 
the opposite contribution of perils of sea by applying an incorrect rule for recognising perils 
at sea. Consequently, the requirement of an unexpected element on perils of sea, which has 
been overruled by the Supreme Court decision of The Cendor Mopu, is no longer good law, 
nonetheless, the view that inherent vice and perils of sea are opposite as two sides of a coin 
was sustained in the same case. 
In The Cendor Mopu, the legs of the insured Oil rigs which were insured under a voyage 
policy incorporating the Institute Cargo Clauses (A) broke off due to fatigue cracking on a 
barge.  The  first  instance  Judge  considered  it  to  be  a  case  of  inherent  vice  which  was 
considerably affected by the decision of The Mayban; while the Court of Appeal disapproved 
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of  this  decision  and  held  that  the  proximate  cause  was  perils  of  sea,  and  therefore  the 
insurer was liable. The Supreme Court sustained the judgment of the Court of Appeal and 
undertook  a  detailed  comparison  between  inherent  vice  and  perils  of  sea  in  the  area  of 
marine cargo insurance. It has given a most thorough analysis so far on the term “inherent 
vice” in the process of identifying the proximate cause of loss. 
Two points should be emphasised in the Supreme Court’s decision of The Cendor Mopu in 
respect  of  the  meaning  of  inherent  vice.  Per  Lord  Clarke,  the  proposition  maintained  by 
Donaldson LJ should not be deemed as an inconsistent definition from Lord Diplock’s, as he 
had no intention to provide a definition at all.
309 Therefore, when looking into the meaning 
of inherent vice, Lord Diplock’s formulation should be the sole authority without more. It 
has been reaffirmed that inherent vice is not identical to the cargo’s unfitness. The other 
point is that inherent vice can be the proximate case only if the loss or damage is solely and 
entirely  caused  by  it.  The scope  of  inherent  vice has  been  confined and narrowed  down 
again,  however,  compared  with  the era  of  The  Gaunt,  the loss  by  inherent  vice  is  not  a 
certainty but must be purely internally caused. 
In light of the absence of a definition provided in the 1906 Act, Lord Diplock’s definition has 
been  considered  and  followed  by  several  influential  cases.  The  submission  of  the 
underwriter in The Cendor Mopu stated that it is a well-known danger to treat judicial dictum, 
in this case the definition provided by Lord Diplock in case law, as if a statutory definition, 
therefore, a possibility of an intermediate situation may be neglected by solely applying this 
definition
310 Nonetheless, the judicial effect of this de finition remains unaffected. This  
alleged possibility has been rejected by the Supreme Cou rt by comparing and interpreting 
the definition in question and the statutory definition of “perils of sea” on the basis of case 
law  and  the  1906  Act.  Hence,  this  definition  can  be  recognised to  be  good  authority  in 
identifying the case of inherent vice in marine insurance cases.   
4.1.2 Illustrations of Inherent vice 
Inherent  vice  does  not  only  refer  to  the  natural  deterioration  of  the  defective  goods 
themselves as exemplified by above cited cases (such as decay, heating, rotten and internal 
combustion), but also include inadequate or bad packaging of cargo. For example, in Gee & 
Garnham, Ltd v Whittall,
311 the assured bought and insured a large quantity of aluminium 
kettles which were carried in numerous consignments from Hamburg to the United Kingdom. 
The policies covered against all risks except for inherent vice. A proportion of the kettles 
were found dented and/or water-stained at discharging port. The insurers rejected liability 
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for damage owing to inherent vice in the form of inadequate method of packing. The court 
approved the submission of the underwriters in respect of inherent vice on the basis of a 
handful  of  scientific  evidence,  demonstrating  the  defective  method  of  packaging  and 
excluding bad weathers, moving of cargo and other external causes. The judge reasoned 
that “inadequate packing, of course, brings the case under the plea of inherent vice in the 
goods.” [Emphasis added] 
By the same token, the American Maritime Cases included a case report concerning inherent 
vice, which was decided by the court of South Africa.
312  In the absence of South African 
authority relating directly to the issues in the claim, the Judge made the decision based 
upon numerous English cases of persuasive authority. The assured purchased a second -
hand printing machine and insured it against all risks with an exception of inherent vice. 
The machine was transported and shipped from Norway to South Africa. On arrival it  was 
found that it was unpacked and extensively damaged. It turned out the proximate cause of 
the damage was “the movement of various parts of the machine in the containers and crate 
occasioned  by reason  of defective packing”. In  answering the question  whether defective 
package is within the meaning of inherent vice, the Judge agreed with the view of Donaldson, 
L.J. in Soya v White: 
… I also disagree with their view that to regard the unfitness of the packing of 
goods as constituting inherent vice is an unjustifiable extension of the concept. 
The subject-matter of the insurance includes the materials in which the goods 
are packed. A bagged cargo is wholly different from a bulk cargo, and it would 
be absurd to contend that where a bagged cargo ends the voyage as a bulk cargo, 
the subject-matter insured has suffered no loss. 
Consequently,  the  Judge  declared  that  defective  packing  of  the  machine  amounted  to 
inherent  vice,  upon  which  the  underwriters  were  not  liable.  Therefore,  from  the  English 
judicial view in the marine insurance law, the concept of inherent vice also embraces the 
inadequate or defective package of the goods insured. Nonetheless, it should be noted that 
the  Institute  Cargo  Clauses  (A)  both  1982  and  2009  versions  separate  the  defence  of 
insufficient packing from inherent vice in Clause 4.3 and 4.4 respectively. It indicates to the 
Courts that they should be treated separately and therefore that insurers could not avail 
themselves of inherent vice to avoid a claim where any insufficiency of packing lay outside 
the scope of Clause 4.3.
 313 
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Moreover, compared with insufficient packing or coverage of goods, it may go further to the 
extent that the condition and method to carry the cargo, for instance, containerization, on-
deck  and  refrigeration,  may  not  be  as  seriously  defective  as  unseaworthiness 
(uncargoworthiness)  which  constitutes  an  implied  warranty  under  cargo  policies  in 
accordance with s 40(2) in the Act, but is remarkably inappropriate so as to facilitate the 
effect  of  its  natural  defects.  Often,  the  underwriters  may  allege  it  is  the  manner  of 
transportation that leads proximately to the result of loss or damage for which they should 
not be liable, as it is suggested that 
What  the  underwriter  in  a  policy  of  this  sort  insures  against  is  the  physical 
happening. He is not insuring against the risk of a shipper miscalculating the 
degree of safety which he should exact in the goods, or the degree of their 
adaptability to the adventure on which he is embarking them, still less would he 
be  insuring  the  shipper  against  a  conscious  shipment  of  goods  which  were 
unfit.
314  
From the perspective of construction of intention of underwriters, there may be a sound 
reason for explaining their unwillingness to cover certain types of incidents or risks. So far 
as  causation  is  concerned,  the  underwriters  are  required  to  identify  an  uninsured  or 
excepted peril and establish its proximate causal link to the loss in order to discharge their 
indemnity liability. Thus, in the case of the inappropriate methods of transport of certain 
types of cargo, the prevailing view of English courts seems to recognise the peril as inherent 
vice unless  there  is  intervention  of  fortuitous  external  causes  such  as perils  of  sea,  and 
without reference to the assured’s fault or negligence. It is worth mentioning in particular 
that Donaldson LJ in the Court  of  Appeal  of Soya v White  distinguished the condition in 
which the cargo has been carried as an external cause from inherent vice. This conclusion 
was  not  affirmed  when  the  case  came  to  the  House  of  Lords.  In  contrast,  the  case  was 
eventually considered as a leading authority of the loss caused by inherent vice. The current 
position  in  the  law  of  marine  insurance  in  respect  of  an  improper  choice  of  manner  of 
transport is not regarded as a prevailing external cause over the efficiency of inherent vice. 
This view leads to a result which is essentially in line with the underwriters’ intention not to 
insure against the loss purely arising from what the cargo is in essence.  
4.1.3 Uninsured Peril or Excluded Peril or Something Else? 
Sub-section (2) of s 55 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906, which is entitled as “excluded 
losses”, includes inherent vice. Chalmers’ states that s 55(2) embodies the deductions of the 
general rule established in sub-section (1).
315 It has been followed and contemplated in  Soya 
v White that the sub-section, which is introduced by “in particular”, aims to set out examples 
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of  the  application  of  the  sub-section  (1)  which  is  the  general  rule  for  ascertaining  the 
underwriter’s liability. The aim is to clarify the scope of cover rather than import exclusions. 
That is to say, the risks itemised in sub-section (2) are uninsured circumstances under for 
which the underwriter is not liable, provided that the risk is determined to be the proximate 
cause. However, a particular rule of construction was laid out by virtue of the clause “unless 
the policy otherwise provides”, which leaves room to alter the scope of coverage. According 
to Lord Diplock in this regard, “The question whether particular kinds of inherent vice are 
covered is simply one of construction of the policy concerned.”
316 Therefore, pursuant to this 
provision, inherent vice is not an insured peril but subject to otherwise agreement. 
The same position can be found in the jurisdiction of Australia. In HIH Casualty and General 
Insurance Limited v Waterwell Shipping  Inc  and Anor,
317 a fishing vessel sank at berth in 
Kenya as a consequence of incursion of sea water during the o peration of fumigation. It 
turned out that the starboard sea water suction valves were left open due to  the negligence 
of the master and his crew and the wall of strainer box failed to prevent the sea water due 
to corrosion. The assureds claimed for a cons tructive total loss, which had been approved 
by the initial trial judge on the ground that the loss was proximately caused by an insured 
peril, namely, the master and the crew’s negligence. However, the underwriter appealed by 
alleging that he was not liable as the proximate cause of the sink was wear and tear which is 
excluded pursuant to s 61(2) of the Marine Insurance Act 1909,
318 alternatively, wear and 
tear and negligence. The Supreme Court of New South Wales excluded   the situation of 
competing/concurrent causes in this case and affirmed that the proximate cause was the 
insured peril of negligence. Therefore, the Court dismissed the appeal.  
With the construction of s 61, the Court emphasised  in particular that those itemised risks 
are not excluded perils but uninsured ones, which is in line with the preva iling opinion in 
English courts:  
Section 61(1) describes the ambit of the insurer's liability by reference to a 
particular loss, namely one "proximately caused by a peril insured" and goes on 
to describe a loss for which the insurer is not liable, namely one "which is not 
proximately caused by a peril insured against". One limb is the converse of the 
other; neither intrudes upon the other. 
Section 61(2) begins with the  words "In particular". Those words suggest that 
what follows in subs (2) does not add to or detract from the ambit of the 
insurer's liability described in subs (1). Rather, it exemplifies losses for which, 
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in accordance with subs (1), the insurer is or is not liable. Paragraphs (a) and (b) 
speak  of  liability  for  loss.  Paragraph  (c)  speaks  also  of  liability  "for  ordinary 
wear and tear, ordinary leakage and breakage, inherent vice or nature of the 
subject matter insured." 
The court held that the expression in Sub-section 2 including inherent vice and wear and 
tear not only includes the loss in itself, in this case the loss due to wear and tear, but also 
extends to the loss caused by those perils. Therefore, an underwriter is not liable for the 
loss proximately arising therefrom “unless the policy otherwise provides”.  
An interesting question is how to interpret the word “otherwise” in this provision. Evidently, 
if the clause expressly states that inherent vice is within coverage, notwithstanding subject 
to a restrictive construction on such terms,
 319 the underwriter will be liable for the losses 
proximately caused by inherent vice in this regard. For instance, the “latent defect” afforded 
by  the  Inchmaree  Clause  is  such  an  agreement  to  cover  loss  caused  by  inherent  vice
320. 
Similarly, an insurance against loss by “heating or sweating” may be sufficient to displace 
the “inherent vice” exception.
321 However, besides insured perils and uninsured perils, there 
is also a third type of excluded perils in marine insurance. In the event that inherent vice is 
listed under “exclusions” in the policy, such as Institute Cargo Clauses, does the provision 
mean to clarify the liability scope of the insurers in an “otherwise” manner? In other words, 
does  this  clause  have  the  effect  of  altering  the  insurer’s  liability  of  indemnity  by  the 
expression of “exclusions” relying on the condition that the policy “otherwise” indicates? 
Before  answering  this  critical  question,  it  is  worth  reiterating  the  distinction  between 
uninsured  perils  and  excluded  perils  and  emphasizing  the  legal  significance  of  such 
distinction. The loss proximately arising solely from a peril of either category will not be 
recoverable by the insurers, while under the circumstances of concurrent causes, the rules 
and legal consequences are different as discussed in the Chapter 2. The insurer will be liable 
if the loss is concurrently caused by an insured peril and an uninsured peril. In contrast, the 
insurer will not liable in the situation of a concurrency of an insured peril and an excluded 
peril. It is not rare in practice that the counsel’s submissions on both sides may address a 
situation of concurrent causes in respect of inherent vice or wear and tear. Accordingly, it is 
important to identify the effect of such a clause in order to ascertain the insurer’s liability 
when the concurrent causality issue has been raised. Although it may be unnecessary to 
distinguish whether inherent vice is uninsured or excluded peril in the context of marine 
insurance law, as it has been ascertained by the Supreme Court that it cannot be one of the 
concurrent proximate causes, this question is concerned with the legal nature of all the risks 
listed  under  s  55(2)  as  a  matter  of  interpretation  of  the  statute.  Therefore,  it  is  still  of 
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significant importance to identify the legal nature of these perils and to find out the proper 
construction of s 55(2) by taking inherent vice as an example. 
Returning to the question proposed above, if inherent vice, etc. are listed as exclusions in 
the policy, on the grounds of the general rules which take account of the legal connotation, 
viz., intention of parties and commercial sense and the purpose of the policy to construe the 
contract terms, there is no doubt that the word “exclusion” articulates the insurer does not 
insure against those perils and, in the literal manner, the risks should be excluded as they 
are entitled. However, in the current judicial view, the effect of such a clause is no more than 
a provision of uninsured perils, which means “exclusion” is not an otherwise agreement. It 
has been clarified in the judgment of The Cendor Mopu by the Supreme Court: Lord Clarke 
considered that the exclusion of inherent vice by s 55(2)(c) was not exclusion at all. It is 
merely  an  amplification  of  the  proximate  cause  rule  and  thus  is  an  example  of  a 
circumstance of a loss not proximately caused by a peril insured against. Also, Lord Mance 
added that the exclusion of inherent vice in the contract ought not to alter its status as 
merely an uninsured peril under section 55(2)(c) of the 1906 Act.  
Therefore, it seems that, taking Institute Cargo Clauses (B) as an example, inherent vice is 
equivalent to the unmentioned risks in the “Risks Covered” Clause, even though it is listed in 
the Exclusions. Even though the Institute Cargo Clause (A) 2009 has replaced the wording 
“except as provided in Clauses 4, 5 6 and 7 below” used in 1982 version with “except as 
excluded by the provisions of Clauses 4, 5 6 and 7 below” in the risk clause in order to give 
a clearer indication that the clauses referred to are exclusions, it may still be faced with the 
same  obstacle  in  attempting  to  make  inherent  vice  as  an  exclusion  on  account  of  The 
Cendor Mopu. As a result, if an underwriter genuinely intends to escape from such risks 
under this provision, an exclusion clause may be not sufficient and requires more explicit 
emphasis. Alternatively, he may resort to warranty clauses in order to avoid the legal effect 
of inherent vice as uninsured peril or avoid alleging a case of concurrent causes in terms of 
causation.  
4.2 Insurability of Inherent Vice 
Inherent vice has been historically mismatched with the events of certainty when it comes to 
the identification of the proximate cause. It is even suggested that the provision in the 1906 
Act  also  in  general  reflects  the  position  under  American  law  and  all  the  “amplifications” 
therein losses which are inevitable and not fortuitous in nature.
322  
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However, an analogy can be drawn between inherent vice of ordinary goods and the risk 
insured against under a life insurance policy from these cases. Under life insurance, it is 
without  any  doubt  that  the  assured  will  be  sick  and  pass  away  ultimately;  however,  the 
timing of death and the external impact on the consequence of death  are uncertain and 
fortuitous.  Similarly,  nature  determines  that  a  cargo  will  be  inevitably  deteriorated  or 
consumed, the timing and triggering of inherent vice is unlikely to be accurately measured 
and under control. In this regard, although the insurance market rarely covers inherent vice 
of the goods, however, the insurability of inherent vice as a cause of loss  should not be 
challenged or denied upon any ground, notably, lack of fortuity or pre-existence before the 
cover commences. 
4.2.1 Inherent vice and Fortuity  
Fortuity  is  one  of  the  classic  characteristics  of  a  valid  and  effective  marine  insurance 
contract. It has been long held that the creation of insurance “is to afford protection against 
contingencies and dangers which may or may not occur; it cannot properly apply to a case 
where the loss or injury must inevitably take place in the ordinary course of things.”
323 The 
purpose  has  been  reflected  by  the  definition  provided  in  s  1  of  the  1906  Act.
324  The 
requirement of fortuity has been addressed in a leading life insurance case, stating that “the 
event  should  be  one  which  involves  some  amount  of  uncertainty.  There  must  be  either 
uncertainty whether the event will ever happen or not, or if the event is one which must 
happen at some time there must be uncertainty as to the time at which it will happen.”
325 
It  has  been  suggested  that  in  insurance  contract  law,  fortuity  is  a  variable  concept  that 
addresses questions of both the likelihood of consequence of loss and the cause of loss.
326 
As a result, fortuity may be challenged in either aspect. This proposition has been affirmed 
in the case of  CA  Blackwell  (Contracts)  Ltd  v  Gerling  Allegemeine  Versicherungs  AG
327  in 
which  the  concept  of  fortuity  was  recently  revisited.  The  insured  contractor  claimed  for 
damage to road construction works caused by heavy rainfall. The insurer argued that he was 
not  liable  because  the  losses  claimed  were  inevitable  and  the  loss  was  owing  to  the 
assured’s wilful misconduct and the defective condition of the property arising from such 
wilful misconduct was excluded from the cover. Although the Blackwell case was on appeal, 
the Court of Appeal did not overrule the judgment in respect of fortuity but only construed 
the exclusion term in dispute. The case affirms that, for a loss to be recoverable under an all 
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risks  policy,  the  following  factors  should  be  present  in  terms  of  fortuity:  i)  that  loss  or 
damage  should  be  accidental;  and  ii)  the  accident  must  be  fortuitous  and  unexpected. 
Marine insurance is not unique in this regard so that fortuity is a fundamental principle and 
the  issue  of  fortuity/  certainty  should  be  addressed  from  both  aspects  of  causes  and 
consequences. 
It used to be the mainstream view of English courts that inherent vice was certainty, which 
were not within the scope of the underwriter’s undertake. For example, in The Gaunt,
328 Lord 
Sumner iterated, which is worth quoting in length again, that: 
There  are,  of  course,  limits  to  “all  risks.”  They  are  risks  and  risks  insured 
against. Accordingly the expression does not cover inherent vice or mere wear 
and tear  or British capture. It  covers a risk, not a certainty; it is something, 
which happens to the subject-matter from without, not the natural behaviour of 
that  subject-matter,  being  what  it  is,  in  the  circumstances  under  which  it  is 
carried. … 
Even in a recent Australian case in respect of an industrial special risks insurance policy, the 
Supreme Court of Victoria has relied upon these lines and recognised that the concept of 
risk is indicated in contradistinction to inherent vice and wear and tear.
329 
According to Arnould’s, although several cases have been suggested that the underwriters 
were not liable for certainty in the form of inherent vice, no case has been in fact decided on 
this ground.
330 It is difficult or even unpractical to determine whether some event is bound to 
happen in all senses  of the word. In the context of marine insurance,  the purpose behind 
the underwriters’ attempts to equate inherent vice with inevitable events is to prevent them 
from being liable for the loss to an extreme degree. Nevertheless, the confusion does not 
overdue the modern awareness that inherent vice is a peril in insurance and losses caused 
by inherent vice in a designated voyage at sea are not inevitable losses.
331  
Before illustrating and rationalizing the differentiation between the two concepts in the legal 
sense, it has to be clarified whether there is an overlap between inherent vice and inevitable 
occurrences as a matter of fact. If the answer is affirmative, it may be sound and reasonable 
to test inevitability  in order to affirm the proximate efficiency of inherent vice in terms of 
causation. Otherwise, it seems appropriate to define inherent vice as a peril in the insurance 
mechanism. Therefore ,  not only  is  this question the origin of the confusion but also 
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considerably affects the legal rules in respect to inherent vice. Reviewing a few landmark 
decisions
332 concerning inherent vice, a factual model can be inferred that there is normally a 
technical indicator involved which plays a key role in determining the proximate cause  in 
calculating  the possibility of the occurrence of the damage or loss. If the data of the 
indicator is below a certain standard, it will be suggested by  the experts that the goods are 
safe for transport in the ordinary course. In these cases, the quality of the goods is at or 
above an average standard, which is in line with the underwriter’s expectation in selecting 
the  cargo  insured.  It  normally  means  no  certain  internal  defect  creates  the  risk  of 
deterioration without external intervention. Therefore, technically, this should not be case 
concerning  inherent  vice.  In  contrast,  if  the  indicator  shows  otherwise,  a  (extreme)  high 
probability  may  be  inferred  relying  upon  such  observations,  which  means  the goods  are 
already in a defective or even damaged order. Based upon common sense, the scientific high 
probability may be recognised as a certain event.
333 Prof Malcolm Clarke in his book, “The 
Law of Insurance Contracts”, indicated that the loss due to inherent vice is always going to 
happen,  sooner  or  later,  during  the  period  of  cover  in  a  particular  case.  Prof  Clarke  is 
perfectly correct to say that fortuity should be examined in a particular case rather than the 
carriage of a kind. However, the loss to which he referred belongs to this kind of event. 
Furthermore, besides the two situations, the data may fall into a grey area which is at the 
border of the standard. Under such circumstances, legal disputes regarding whether the loss 
is fortuitous or inevitable arise and directly increase the difficulty in making decisions about 
the proximate cause.  
Although Arnould’s indicates that there is an overlap in some cases, it may be better to 
confine such a possibility to facts and technical abstracts rather than expand it to a legal 
concept. On the one hand, Lord Diplock’s definition has emphasised that inherent vice is “a 
risk of deterioration” owing to the natural characteristics. Risk and certainty have no overlap 
whatsoever like two sides of a coin. When it is defined as a risk, it is reasonably excluded 
from certainty. On the other hand, where the vice is beyond the standard level, a vice or 
damage  may  be  irreversible  and  evident  to  the  extent  of  certainty  before  the 
commencement of the policy. Given that the policy agrees to cover the loss arising from 
inherent vice as an insured peril by virtue of express terms, the insurer is still not liable on 
the ground of doctrine of fortuity. In light of the above analysis, it seems more accurate and 
convenient  to  remove  the  possibility  of  an  overlap  between  inherent  vice  and  inevitable 
occurrences which relieve the insurers of liability on either ground, at least in respect of 
indemnity insurance.  
                                                 
332 E.D. Sassoon & CO., LTD. v Yorkshire Insurance Company; Soya v White; Noten v Harding; 
The Cendor Mopu, etc.  
333 Supra 236, p 331 M. SONG 
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In English case law, it has been held in Soya v White that inherent vice is itself a risk and its 
test has no reference to the inevitability of the consequence of damage or loss. In the initial 
judgment,
334  it  was  held  that  as  the  loss  of  deterioration  was  not  i nevitable,  the 
underwriters’  plea  in  respect  of  inherent  vice,  therefore,  failed.  This  conclusion  was  not 
sustained by the Court of Appeal in this regard; on the contrary, the Court reasoned that 
both parties had to be taken to have regarded inherent vice as a risk under the policies. 
When the case came to the House of Lords, a more explicit explanation and construction 
was given to ascertaining the underwriter’s liability. It should be stressed that the House of 
Lords reaffirmed the Court of Appeal’s view that inherent vice was a risk rather than an 
inevitable  event  based  upon  a  thorough  analysis  on  inherent  vice  in  length.  It  can  be 
inferred from the decision that the main purpose of mentioning the issue of inevitability was 
to prove the fundamental requirement of fortuity by taking account of the moisture content 
of the soya beans. Whether the proximate cause was inherent vice and whether inherent vice 
was within the underwriter’s liability were questions on a deeper level based upon fortuity. 
Therefore, it is determined that inherent vice is a risk and inevitability is not even part of the 
definition of inherent vice. 
In line with the legal nature of inherent vice in the law of marine insurance, Lord Saville 
stated in The Cendor Mopu that  
By inherent vice, insurers do not mean some characteristic of the rig which was 
bound to lead to the loss of its legs. Inevitability is not the test of inherent vice, 
just  as  lack  of  inevitability  is  no  proof  of  a  fortuitous  external  accident  or 
casualty.  
Likewise, an inevitable loss is by no means the correct test for determining inherent vice as 
the  proximate  cause.  In  contrast,  a  lower  standard  of  proof  on  the  side  of  underwriters 
should be imposed. In an “all risks” cargo policy with an exception for inherent vice, the 
onus is on the insured to establish that the loss occurred accidentally; once he had done so, 
the burden of proof was on the insurers to bring themselves within any exception in the 
policy.
335 It is logical and  straightforward to require the underwriters to prove that the loss 
occurred inevitably in order to challenge assureds’ primary burden of proof and deny their 
liabilities. However, it is an extremely high standard, even more restrictive than the one of 
criminal law, i.e. beyond reasonable doubt.  
Furthermore, with respect to the connection between the doctrine of fortuity and exclusions, 
it  has  been  suggested  that  the  peril-based  regime  is  one  of  the  reasons  to  introduce 
excluded  perils  into  insurance;  however,  exclusions  are  not  directly  affected  by  this 
doctrine.  This  doctrine  of  fortuity  does  not  and  cannot  provide  a  rationale  for  a  precise 
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dividing line between insured loss by insured perils and excluded loss by excluded perils.
336 
A fortuitous loss caused  by accidents does not necessarily and conclusively  determine the 
insurer’s liability; it is subject to the insurer’s defence in respect of exclusions. Also, being 
an  excluded  peril  does  not  imply  that  this  cause  itself  lacks  fortuity,  nor  does  the  loss 
arising therefrom.  
Overall, the excessive concern  about the purpose of cargo insurance makes the scope of 
inherent  vice  narrower
337  and basically confined to the cases which are almost  certain  to 
happen. It leads us to misjudge that the losses lack of fortuity as part of inherent vice, which 
has  overlooked  its  nature  being  a  risk.  This  decision  may  be  understood  as  having 
established a presumption that the situation in  a grey area is a case of perils  of sea, as it is 
always subject to some fortuitous external f actors, and the  loss is fortuitous. It should be 
emphasised again that the final loss of deterioration due to inherent vice in various forms is 
unavoidable; however, there is no necessary overlap between the risk of inherent vice and 
inevitable  events  in  the  context  of  insurance  law.  The  real  distinction  is  drawn  between 
damage caused by an external fortuity or resulting solely from the internal factors of the 
insured cargo.
338  
In the light of such a judicial attitude, as Lord Mance suggested, insurers may s eek 
alternative resorts such as special provisions or amendments of standard conditions in order 
not to expose themselves to their unexpected and unaccepted risks.
339 For instance, at the 
time of placing the policy, the underwriter may require the assured to   warrant that the 
relevant indicator regarding inherent vice should be at a relatively safe point under the grey 
area. In this case, it would prevent the insurer from insuring low quality goods and choosing 
an inappropriate method of transport for the purpose of saving freight. 
In conclusion, the doctrine of fortuity is the foundation of insurance regime not only in the 
commercial sense but also a matter of public policy. Inherent vice has been questioned as 
an event lacking fortuity in the long term. However, a conceptual distinction has to be made 
in the first place that inherent vice is not a loss itself which cannot be avoided ultimately; 
instead, it is a peril which may cause certain loss in the context of insurance, not limited  to 
marine insurance. As an uninsured peril provided in the Marine Insurance Act 1906, inherent 
vice is a risk that the natural characteristics of the goods  has the effect of causing damage 
in  the  ordinary  and  general  condition,  rather  than  in  marine  conditions  specifically. 
Accordingly, underwriters do not have to prove a loss  to a standard   as stringent as 
inevitability in order to establish inherent vice  as the proximate cause. In one word, there is 
a hierarchy in the legal sense that the doctrine of fortuity  is fundamental, while where a loss 
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is proximately caused by inherent vice, it is pursuant to the statuary provision and policy 
terms upon that  statute, which shares  the common  legal ground with  insured perils  and 
other uninsured perils.
340    
4.2.2 Inherent Vice and the Risks that Attach before the Policy Effects 
Every insurance policy has a point at which the coverage begins to insure against the agreed 
risks, no matter whether it is a voyage policy or a time policy or cargo policy.
 341 A  well-
known  principle  is  that  an  insurer  will  not  be  liable  when  a  peril  occurs  before 
commencement of the policy and the loss occurs during that period of the policy.
342 A policy 
aims to limit its coverage to certain events taking place during an agreed period of time. 
The conventional construction of this requirement is that the peril must occur during the 
insurance  period  even  though  it  may  occur  without  anyone’s  knowledge.
343  For  example, 
although underwriters normally are concerned with whether the loss occurs within the cover 
period, a policy may contain a clause stating that in addition to or instead of the loss having 
to  be  suffered  within  the  period  of  the  policy,  the  cause  must  have  occurred  within  the 
policy period.
344 
This is in essence an issue of attachment of risk and duration of cover. The effect is not only 
to exclude the loss suffered before the date at which the element of risk is assessed, but 
also to exclude the loss directly caused thereby at that date, though it has not actually 
occurred yet.
345  However, given that inherent vice is  recognised as a risk in insurance, 
inherent as it is, unlike most of the perils, it is a risk that attaches before the policy 
commences to be effective and continuously endangers the goods  thereafter at sea. It is 
probably one of the reasons that contribute t o the mistaken understanding that the peril of 
inherent vice is an event of certainty. Indeed, the underwriters do not favour a pre -existing 
risk as it significantly increases the risk of loss and liability.  
It is worth mentioning here that Insurance Cont racts Act 1984 of Australia, s 46
346  has 
provided a rule on pre -existing defect. This Act covers the field of insurance generally but 
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does not apply to marine insurance, such that the Marine Insurance Act 1909 continues to 
operate  in  that  field,  which  is  essentially  modelled  on  the  English  Marine  Insurance  Act 
1906.
347 Regardless, the provision referred has no parallel in English law and lays down the 
principle that an insurer may not rely upon exclusion for loss caused by a  hidden defect 
which existed before the policy was entered into and of which the assured was not, and a 
reasonable person in his position would not have been aware.
348  This provision pays 
considerable attention to the assured’s awareness of the risks, which is somewhat similar to 
considerations  as  to  the  “lost  or  not  lost”  clause
349  contained  in  the  old  SG  form  under 
English law. It seems that an uninsured occurrence became an acceptable insured risk to the 
insurers,  provided  that  the  assured  lacks  of  knowledge.  Nevertheless,  in  respect  to  the 
reliance on hidden defect or inherent vice, the fact that the assured is unknown about their 
existence is still not sound legal grounds on which deprive the insurer of such defence in 
the context of marine insurance law under both jurisdictions. 
Although inherent vice is an evident risk attaching to the subject-matter insured before the 
commencement of the cover normally, it simply rationalizes why the underwriters intend to 
exclude such a peril based upon the consideration of the high likelihood of occurring a loss. 
Regardless, the attachment of inherent vice as a peril seems to be generally a question of 
agreement. Lack of insurability cannot prevent the parties from agreeing on insuring against 
inherent vice, either on the ground of fortuity or time of attachment 
4.3 Inherent Vice as the Proximate Cause 
Although  it  should  doubtlessly  comply  with  its  legal  definition  when  sustaining  a  case 
proximately caused by inherent vice, inherent vice is not self-evident in terms of causation 
issue.  It  has  been  discussed  above that  the test  of  certainty  is  by  no  means  the test  of 
inherent vice. Whereas, it has been suggested that the real question is whether the loss was 
the result of external forces or whether it was caused by the nature of the subject matter.
350 
                                                                                                                                                        
defect or imperfection, the insurer may not rely on a provision included in the contract that 
has the effect of limiting or excluding the insurer’s liability under the contract by reference 
to the condition, at a time before the contract was entered into, of the thing. 
347 Rob Merkin,  “Reforming  Insurance  Law:  Is  there  a  Case  for  Reverse  Transportation?” 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/lawcommission/areas/insurance-contract-law.htm  (last  time 
access 03/11/11) The Author undertook this legal and practical analysis for the reference of 
insurance contract law reform to The Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission. 
348 Rob Merkin, “Australia: Still a Nation of Chalmers?” (2011) 30(2) UQLJ 189. This paper is 
based upon the author’s Richard Cooper Memorial Lecture, sponsored by the University of 
Queensland and delivered at the Federal Court of Brisbane on 13 October 2011. 
349 The Marine Insurance Act 1906- Rules For Construction Of Policy  
1. Where the subject-matter is insured ‘lost or not lost’, and the loss has occurred before the 
contract is concluded, the risk attaches unless, at such time the assured was aware of the 
loss, and the insurer was not. 
350 Supra 173, p 78 M. SONG 
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This question is always concerning incompatibility and joint contribution of inherent vice 
and other risks.   
The  term  “perils  of  sea”  is  the  typical  kind  of  insured  risks  in  marine  insurance  covers. 
Compared with inherent vice, there is no  doubt that perils at sea are fortuitous  external 
causes  if  any  loss  or  damage  arises  due  to  them.  Until  recently,  the  issue  concerning 
whether  inherent  vice  and  perils  of  sea  can  constitute  concurrent  causes  has  been 
increasingly  heated.  In  retrospect  of  English  cases,  one  cannot  absolutely  say  that  there 
could be  no  possibility  that  inherent  vice and perils  of  sea  concurrently  and proximately 
cause losses or damage until The Cendor Mopu in 2011 provided a conclusive authority for 
objecting this possibility in the legal sense.  
At  an  early  stage  after  the  enactment  of  the  1906  Act,  as  revealed  by  Bird’s  Cigarette 
Manufacturing  Co  Ltd  v  Rouse,
351  English  courts  did  not  have  much  difficulty  at  least  in 
recognising the interaction between inherent vice and perils of sea as co-causal factors to 
the loss. In this case, the assured claimant took out several marine insurance policies and a 
warehouse policy after the expiration of those marine policies. Some of the cigarettes were 
found being soaking wet by salt water and part of the cigarettes suffered mildew after the 
goods were stored in warehouse for a period of time. In terms of mildew, which was covered 
against under the warehouse policy, the underwriter alleged that the damage was caused 
before the duration of his policy and it was due to inherent vice if any damage accrued. In 
determining the proximate cause of mildew was by the excessive moisture in the cigarettes, 
Bailhache J accepted that the goods were damaged by both internal and external causes and 
rendered that “there is no doubt that the sea water damage accelerate the destruction of 
these cigarettes as well as  caused the destruction of  the cigarettes which contained  less 
than there proportion of water”. In consequence, it was held that due to the time of damage, 
the warehouse policy was not effected to recover the loss without reference to the defence 
of  inherent  vice.  In  contrast,  all  the  underwriters  under  marine  insurance  contracts  were 
liable  for  the  sea-water  damage  at  a  rate  of  80%  reduced  on  equitable  grounds.  It  is 
interesting that Bailhache J granted such an apportionment of loss, not on the ground of 
concurrent causes, but the insurer succeeded in establishing a portion of loss purely due to 
its internal cause.
352 Therefore, this decision is not an authority of concurrent causality of 
inherent vice and perils of sea to a loss, nor  does it change the rule that no apportionment 
is permitted in the case of concurrent proximate causes in marine cases. However, the joint 
contributions in causing a loss has been considered and addressed in this case. 
Subsequently, the  “sole  effect”  of  inherent  vice  as  a  proximate  cause  in  the  context  of 
marine insurance is discussed in CT Bowring & Co Ltd v Amsterdam London Insurance Co 
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353  In this case, a series of shipments carrying ground nut kernels from China to various 
destinations in Europe. All the goods were found damaged in a state of fermentation on 
delivery in every shipment. The goods were insured by the defendant underwriters under 
policies of marine insurance covering against “average and/or damage from sweating and/or 
heating when resulted from external”. Based upon scientific evidence on the cause of the 
damage, Wright J found that the goods, being damp, mouldy and excessively moist, were 
not fit for the shipping voyage, and therefore, the damage was caused by inherent vice for 
which the underwriter was not liable, apart from a minor damage proximately caused by 
sweating due to external factors. Three conditions had enabled the Judge to conclude that 
the  damage  arose  from  the  nature  of  the  cargo.  First,  all  the  voyages  were  basically 
performed  in  ordinary  circumstances  except  for  a  short-term  strike  occurred  during  the 
transit of one voyage, which was irrelevant to the cargo fermentation. Secondly, the holds 
were kept with constant ventilation and there was no other moist cargo in the same holds. 
Thirdly, substantial scientific  evidence showed  the crop in question, grown in  1926,  was 
excessively  moist  than  other  time  due  to  the  extraordinary  rainfall  in  its  country  of 
production, China. Also, as the severest part of damage by heating was in the centre of the 
goods and expanding to the sides, moisture, which is one of the prerequisites of the heating 
damage, was highly probable from the cargo itself. Accordingly, Wright J found no difficulty 
finally in holding the heating damage was caused by inherent vice. 
It is noteworthy in this case that the Judge found the damage was “solely” and entirely due 
to  the  condition  in  which  the  goods  were  shipped  apart  from  the  minor  part  of  sweat 
damage  caused  by  the  moisture  from  external  source  such  as  air,  even  though  it  was 
impossible to trace its specific origin. In respect of the loss due to inherent vice, the Judge 
stated: 
Now,  that  is  all  very  problematical,  and  even  if  there  were  such  causes  in 
operation, and effective operation, the degree of their operation would be quite 
incalculable. I very much doubt whether any such effect is even theoretically 
possible, because if you have two wet parcels, both heating, both sending out 
heat and moisture, each would contribute its part to the result, but it is not at 
all  clear  to  me  that  you  would  get  in  the  resultant  atmosphere  a  source  of 
damage to the plaintiffs' parcel beyond what would be caused to it by the effect 
of its own operations…So far as the question of the extra heating of the hold is 
concerned,  it  would  be  negligible  in  its  effect  unless  there  were  sufficient 
moisture in the plaintiffs' parcel. 
It seems that the Judge inferred that as long as the cargo itself contained sufficient moisture, 
the damage should be attributed to its inherent vice in spite of an incalculable effect of the 
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outside  factors.  As  the  scientific  evidence narrowed  down  the  focus  to  the origin  of  the 
moisture, the material question was whether inherent vice provided sufficient moisture on 
its own, notwithstanding the fact that external surroundings might in the meantime provide 
an equally sufficient condition for triggering the inherent defect to the same type of loss of 
a certain extent.  
The step of excluding the effect of relevant fortuitous external facts is indispensable in the 
process of proving the proximate efficiency of inherent vice in general. According to the 
findings in the contract of affreightment, where the carriers seek to discharge his liability, 
“proof of the existence of the excepted peril or cause may and often will involve disproof of 
the possibility of the operation of other and unexcepted perils and causes.”
354 Also, there is 
no doubt the intervention of fortuitous external accidents has to be excluded as a major 
requirement  in  establishing  the  proximate  status  of  inherent  vice  in  the  law  of  marine 
insurance. It is noteworthy here that in the process of excluding all the other explanations 
on the cause of the damage from the scientific view, Wright J mentioned an assumption or 
hypothesis about whether a concurrent operation of other cargo’s moisture would aggravate 
the  heating  damage  would  be  considered  an  external  cause.  As  a  matter  of  fact  and 
scientific  theory,  the  possibility  of  actual  concurrent  operations  was  not  within  the 
consideration  of  the  Judge  in  his  final  decision.  Although  this  decision  provides  little 
authoritative support in respect of concurrent causal contributions between inherent vice 
and another external cause, a more valuable proposition that may be concluded from the 
few  lines  of  reasoning,  as  quoted  above,  is  that  inherent  vice  should  at  least  have 
sufficiently  and  efficiently  resulted  in  the  loss  without  greater  intervention  or  assistance 
from the external factors, if it is impossible to prove inherent vice is absolutely the sole 
source in fact. 
How  to  distinguish  internal  factors  and  external  ones  has  been  further  clarified  and 
exemplified by the landmark case Noten v Harding. It can be concluded from this precedent 
that the test of inherent vice should not be overly restrictive to the extent beyond common 
sense. Inherent vice does not necessitate providing all the conditions by the goods itself. 
Therefore, it has been accepted that some external factors invariably exist in any event; the 
evaluation on the causal links to the loss  should at least be in line with common sense, 
instead of seeking a situation strictly free from external factors.  
Inthe  decision  of  a  non-marine  insurance,  Wayne  Tank  and  Pump  Co.  Ltd.  v  Employers 
Liability  Assurance  Corporation  Ltd,
355 where  a  fire  broke  out  and  ruined  the  property 
insured, Cairns L.J concluded the loss was proximately due to the nature or the condition of 
goods  and  the  negligence  of  the  assured’s  servants  concurrently.  On  the  basis  of  this 
                                                 
354 Jahn (t/a CF Otto Weber) v Turnbull Scott Shipping Co Ltd (The Flowergate) [1967] 1 
Lloyd's Rep. 1, citing Albacora SRL v Westcott & Laurance Line Ltd [1966] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 53 
355 Supra 4 M. SONG 
121 
 
proposition,  The  Miss  Jay  Jay,
 356 albeit  a  case  of  a  marine  hull  policy,  has  introduced  a 
similar precedent into the law of marine insurance. The policy was covering loss or damage 
“directly caused by external accidental means” and excluding “any part condemned solely in 
consequence of a latent defect or fault or error in design or construction”. The Court of 
Appeal  held  that  the debility  of  the  vessel,  whether referred to  as  “faulty  design  and/or 
construction” or as “unseaworthiness”, was one of the concurrent causes in conjunction with 
perils of sea to the loss of the vessel. It has been widely recognised that latent defect is a 
form of inherent vice.
357 This case has been extensively cited as it has established a rule that 
where two causes concurrently contributed to the loss, one is insured and the other is not 
insured, the insurer should be liable. Apart from this rule, this case has explicitly shown that 
inherent vice and perils  of sea could be concurrent causes, which has been questioned by 
the Supreme Court in The Cendor Mopu in this regard.
358  
A conclusion has been drawn ultimately in The Cendor Mopu, per Lord Clarke: 
In referring to “any fortuitous accident or casualty”, Lord Diplock must I think 
have had in mind the definition of perils of the seas in schedule 1 to the Act 
which I have quoted above, namely that it refers “only to fortuitous accidents or 
casualties  of  the  seas”.  …  As  I  see  it,  by  in  effect  invoking  the  statutory 
definition of perils of the seas, he was defining “inherent vice” in opposition to 
perils of the seas, thereby avoiding any overlap between the insured risk and 
the excluded risk. Thus where, as here, a proximate cause of the loss was perils 
of the seas, there was no room for the conclusion that the loss was caused by 
inherent vice.
359 
Lord  Clarke  has  focused  on  the  term  “any”,  but  rejected  the  Insurer’s  emphasis  on 
“intervention”.  However,  “intervention”  is  still  worth  mentioning  as  a  key  word  in  the 
definition, which should not be overlooked. It should fall back to the essential question of 
the principle of proximity. It is always a battle between the internal and the external causes. 
Which one is the most efficient cause to the loss? Have the external causal factors taken 
over the internal ones to be the primary contribution to the loss? Has an alleged intervening 
cause succeeded in breaking the initial chain of causation? These are the real questions to 
measure  the  remoteness  of  various  causal  links,  rather  than  to  pursue  for  a  mutually 
immune condition. “Intervention” should not be equated with “existence”. So far as causation 
is concerned, “intervention” should be interpreted to be a more efficient effect in causality 
which is much more than a mere fact of “existence”. 
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In  line  with  the  principle  of  proximity  in  Chapter  1,  “the  intervention  of  any  fortuitous 
external accidents or casualty” should terminate the efficiency chain in respect of inherent 
vice and replace it as the proximate cause. Since inherent vice is a complete and relatively 
independent  process  of  natural  internal  change,  it  is  natural  that  a  single  effect  of  a 
fortuitous external accident will directly exert a substantial influence on the inner activities 
and final consequences. It should be noted that this standpoint is strikingly different from 
the early  cases when  the internal  causes  were more  often blamed  and the insurers  were 
more  often  protected.  Therefore,  nowadays,  it  is  more  logical  to  assume  that  the  new 
external  event  will  efficiently  affect  and change  the loss  or  damage.  Also,  Lord Clarke  is 
accurate to perceive that there is no room for both perils to be concurrent proximate causes 
in the legal sense by virtue of a comparison of the statutory definition of perils of sea and 
Lord Diplock’s definition of inherent vice.  
Despite the recognition of the English courts in The Cendor Mopu in this respect at present, 
it  is  unsatisfactory  that  Popplewell  J  recently  justified  such  elimination  of  the  room  of 
concurrency as being a lack of fortuity in the case of inherent vice and the fortuity of an 
external cause in European Group v Chartis.
360 It is noteworthy that it is not the fortuitous 
element that makes the two causes impos sible to be equally efficient in causation terms. 
Rather, the doctrine of proximity determines internal causes can only be proximate when 
they independently result in the loss. C oncern should be paid  to whether there is external 
cause and whether the external cause is fortuitous. 
Being typical internal causes as well, in light of the discussion on inherent vice as an 
example, the other risks named in s 55(2)(c) seem to be unable to prevail over the efficiency 
of perils of sea in causing the  eventual loss by the same token. Lord Mance has suggested 
that ordinary wear and tear, ordinary leakage and breakage and the nature of goods would 
also  be not covered provided without any fortuitous external accident or casualty. In 
particular with ordinary wear and tear, it is noteworthy that in  JSM v QBE,
361 the Australian 
case mentioned above, has affirmed that: 
 …the words ‘wear and tear’ mean simply and solely that ordinary and natural 
deterioration or abrasion which an object experiences by its expected contacts 
between  its  component  parts  and  outside  objects  during  the  period  of  its 
natural life expectancy.  
This definition is of great similarity with Lord Diplock’s definition of inherent vice, both of 
which have stressed their sole internal efficiency to the change of the subject-matter insured 
respectively.  Under  the  law  of  marine  insurance,  it  seems  that  inherent  vice  and  other 
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internal  causes  provided  cannot  be  concurrent  causes  along  with  perils  of  sea  for  the 
purpose to ascertain insurers’ liability of indemnity.  
As cited above, in one of the earliest editions of Arnould’s, it has already been indicated that 
the risk of inherent vice should be entirely attributed to.
362 In its phrase, damage owing to 
inherent vice should be solely from the nature of the thing itself, which means inherent vice 
cannot be concurrent with any other external perils under marine cargo and hull policies. 
However, Lord Clarke,  in  The  Cendor  Mopu,  criticised  the  latest  edition  of  Arnould’s  has 
wrongly  maintained  that  there  may  be  a  combination  of  causes  of  approximate  equal 
efficiency  between  inherent  vice  and  some  fortuitous  external  accidents,  which  has  been 
affected by the decision of The Miss Jay Jay.
363  
In conclusion,  in  light  of  the  current  interpretation  and  explanation  of  Lord  Diplock’s 
definition  on  inherent  vice,  room  for  a  combination  of  inherent  vice  and  other  efficient 
external  causes  seems  marginally  possible  under  marine  insurance.  The  reason  why  The 
Cendor Mopu has been regarded as an unusual and difficult case can be explained in this 
way. The oil rig insured was made in metal and was carried on the barge. The law requires 
that  inherent  vice  of  the  oil  rig,  being  a  cargo,  should  be  the  sole  cause  without  the 
intervention of fortuitous external cause in order to constitute the proximate cause. While 
this cargo shared some common natural characteristics and defects with ships in terms of 
withstanding  sea  conditions,  which  makes  the  loss  cannot  occur  but  for  either  cause,  in 
particular taking account of The Miss Jay Jay.  Nevertheless, as “but for” test is not the real 
test and now that The Miss Jay Jay has been overruled in respect of finding a situation of 
concurrent causes involved with inherent vice and perils of sea, it is determined and evident 
that under marine policies, the real legal test of causation regarding an internal cause is 
whether it is the sole cause to the loss or damage.  
                                                 
362 Supra 296 
363 Supra 7, p 586. Also see Arnould’s , 17
th ed., para 22-26 M. SONG 
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Chapter 5 Seaworthiness 
Two typical methods are widely employed by underwriters in order to define and limit the 
scope of risks. One has been discussed in the previous two chapters regarding the insured 
and uninsured perils in the statutes and policies. The other is known as a warranty. The 
main difference between the two methods lies in the legal effect as an insurer’s defence. An 
excepted  risk  for  the  cause  of  loss  may  discharge  the  insurer  from  the  liability  to  the 
particular loss, whereas, a warranty is a more serious and strict device, the breach of which 
may release the insurer from this loss and any further liabilities. 
Seaworthiness is a very important concept in maritime law, notably in the field of carriage by 
sea and marine insurance. Unseaworthiness is a frequently triggered by the insurer in the 
law  of  marine  insurance  based  upon  either  of  the  two  aforementioned  legal  devices. 
Pursuant to the English Marine Insurance Act 1906, seaworthiness is an implied warranty in 
a  voyage  policy,  whereas  in  a  time  policy,  it  is  not  considered  to  be  a  warranty  but  an 
uninsured circumstance where the loss is caused by unseaworthiness if the assured is privy 
to such unseaworthiness. 
Based on an analysis of the concept of seaworthiness, this chapter will first review and give 
a  critical  analysis  of  warranty.  In  particular,  insurance  law  reform  proposals  regarding  a 
causal  link  between  breach  and  loss  will  be  examined  in  order  to  assess  whether  the 
approach would be appropriate and effective. In the section thereafter, the causation rules 
of unseaworthiness as a mere cause of loss will be addressed and concluded. This chapter 
primarily  aims  to  draw  clear  lines  between  seaworthiness  and  a  few  confusing  terms  in 
causing  the  loss.  Moreover,  the  study  on  the  causal  link  between  the  risk  and  loss  is 
expected to assist the determination of the causal link between the breach of warranty and 
loss. 
5.1 Seaworthiness in Maritime Law 
The law on seaworthiness can be traced back 2,500 years ago,
364 and gradually became a 
crucial concept in maritime law. The requirement of a vessel being seaworthy  occupies is 
put in a special position in both marine insurance law and carriage of goods by sea. It is an 
implied warranty in a voyage policy in marine insurance and an implied   and paramount 
obligation in  a  contract of affreightment. In a marine time policy, seaworthiness is an 
important factor in determining the proximate cause of loss. 
                                                 
364 A thorough history of the development of the concept of seaworthiness has been sorted 
and presented in the celebrated book of Dr Baris Soyer, “Warranties in Marine Insurance”, 
(2
nd ed, London: Cavendish, 2005) pp 47-49 M. SONG 
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Seaworthiness means precisely the same thing in both marine insurance law and carriage of 
goods by sea,
365 despite differing linguistic formulae. Thus, some dicta in the law of carriage 
by sea can be relied upon for a better understanding of the meaning and nature of 
seaworthiness. 
It is well recognised that seaworthiness is a fairly comprehensive and extensive concept; this 
section has no intention of delivering a sweeping concise definition, nor to demonstrate all 
various scenarios of unseaworthiness. Instead, this section will be more concentrated on the 
interactions between seaworthiness and   other perils in  causation of loss , following an 
overview of the definition of seaworthiness.  
5.1.1 The definition of seaworthiness 
A  seaworthy  vessel  in  a  contract  of  affreightment  implies  the  vessel  is  “fit  to  meet  and 
undergo the perils of the sea and other incidental risks to which of necessity she must be 
exposed in the course of voyage.”
366 This renowned definition happens to be in conformity 
with  s  39(4)  of  the  Marine  Insurance  Act  1906,  providing  that  “A  ship  is  deemed  to  be 
seaworthy when she is reasonably fit in all respects to encounter the ordinary perils of the 
seas  of  the  adventure  insured.”  Sir  Chalmers  relied  upon  was  the  ancient  case,  Dixon  v 
Sadler,
367 when codifying s 39 of the 1906 Act. Moreover, the ninth edition of Black’s Law 
Dictionary  defines  seaworthy  as  describing  a  vessel  which  is  “properly  equipped  and 
sufficiently strong and tight to resist the perils reasonably incident to the voyage for which 
the vessel is insured [emphasis added].” The only perceptible difference may be the usage of 
“perils  of the sea  of  necessity” and  “ordinary  perils  of sea” and even  “reasonably” in the 
literal sense.  
These  expressions  indicate  that  seaworthiness  is  a  matter  of  defining  the  scope  of 
“necessity”,  “ordinary”  and  “reasonably”.  They  all  implicate  a  variable  standard  in 
determining whether the vessel is seaworthy or not on a case-by-case basis. After all, the law 
does  not  require  an  absolutely  perfect  vessel.
368  In  the  light  of  numerous  cases  of 
seaworthiness in maritime law, a few factors related to seaworthiness  were summarised and 
classified  in  The  Eurasian  Dream,
369  including  the  conditions  of  the  vessel  itself, 
portworthiness, cargoworthiness,  etc. These factors provide a reference and basis  upon 
                                                 
365 Ibid, relying upon Fireman's Fund Insurance Co Ltd v Western Australian Insurance Co Ltd 
(1927) 28 Ll. L. Rep. 243 
366 Field J in Kopitoff v Wilson (1876) 1 QBD 377 at p 380 
367 (1839) 5 M.& W. at P 414, citing from Mackenzie Chalmers, A Digest of the Law Relating 
to  Marine Insurance, Chalmers  (1901) p 48 and also Chalmers’ Marine Insurance Act 1906, 
3
rd ed (1907), p 54 
368 President of India v West Coast Steamship [1964] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 443, per District Judge 
Kilkenny 
369 [2002] EWHC 118 (Comm) . The cases decided under each head have been provided in 
details in Prof Rob Merkin, Marine Insurance Legislation, 4
th ed, p 52-53 M. SONG 
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which to conclude the particular standard of “necessity” in a case. Certainly, seaworthiness 
is also contingent on the demands of the designated voyage.
370 
Moreover, these definitions commonly implicate a relation to “perils of the sea”. An inherent 
link between perils of the sea and seaworthiness is reflected not only in the definition, but 
also by the arguments in cases, such as The Cendor Mopu, regarding whether the vessel was 
fit to carry the oil rig insured against ordinary perils of the sea and caused the relevant loss. 
The legal relationship between seaworthiness and perils of the sea is of supreme importance 
in ascertaining the proximate cause of loss, especially under a time policy. Therefore, this 
issue will be discussed in details in the last subsection of this chapter. 
5.1.2 Seaworthiness, Inherent Vice and Latent Defect 
The Arnould’s suggests that an analogy can be drawn between the principles of the cases 
arguing that unseaworthiness is the proximate cause under hull policies and those on the 
ground  of  inherent  vice  and  wear  and  tear,  and  that  there  is  no  need  to  draw  any 
distinction.
371 Seaworthiness and inherent vice can be both categori sed as causes due to the 
internal characteristics or conditions of the subject -matter insured,  in contrast to  external 
causes, such as perils of the sea. Due to the  similarities between the two notions, confusion 
may arise in the cases involving, inter alia, unseaworthiness, inherent vice and latent defect.  
Although the legal principles may be virtually identical, an effort to distinguish the concepts 
is  of  some  value  in  order  to  making  sure  the  principles  are  applied  under  the  correct 
heading of defence. Moreover, a snapshot on the concepts will enable us to have a better 
understanding of the rationale behind the similarity of the principles. 
Goods’  seaworthiness  is  different  from  inherent  vice.  S  40(1)  provides  that  there  is  no 
implied warranty that goods are seaworthy. In contrast, the duty is imposed upon the ship’s 
side, which requires the vessel to be cargoworthy. On the other hand, inherent vice is an 
important  concept  in  both  the  law  of  carriage  of  goods  by  sea  and  the  law  of  marine 
insurance.  Specifically,  under  the  carriage  scope,  the  carrier  is  immune  from  liability 
resulting  from  “inherent  defect,  quality  or  vice of  the goods”  according  The Hague  Visby 
Rules Article IV-2-(m), while under the 1906 Act s 55(2), the underwriter is not liable for the 
loss  proximately  caused  by  inherent  vice  unless  otherwise  provided  for.  So  far  as  the 
definition is concerned, in the carriage of goods by sea, inherent vice means “the unfitness 
of the goods to withstand the ordinary incidents of the voyage, given the degree of care 
which the shipowner is by contract to exercise in relation to the goods”.
 372 Literally, this 
definition  in  the  carriage  context  can  be  also  regarded  as  “goods’  unseaworthiness” 
                                                 
370  These factors are all clearly stated in s 39(1) to (4) of the 1906 Act 
371 Supra 13, p 950 
372  Steward C. Boyd et al., Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of Lading (21
st ed. London 
Sweet & Maxwell 2008) 216 M. SONG 
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comparable to the definition of “unseaworthiness” in terms of vessels. Therefore, it might 
appear sound to say inherent vice is equivalent to the notion of “cargo’s unseaworthiness”; 
however, this is false for the following reasons. 
Firstly,  inherent  vice  in  the  law  of  carriage  and  in  marine  insurance  are  not  completely 
identical.  It  has  to  be  admitted  that  to  a  substantial  extent,  the  work  on  definition  and 
application are interchangeable in both branches of law. It was even affirmed by Walker LJ in 
The Cendor Mopu in its Court of Appeal judgment
373 that the exception of inherent vice is 
the same in both scopes. However, it has been indicated by Prof Tetley that it will be risky to 
apply identical definitions in the two contexts  considering the differences between the two 
sets of rules respectively.
374  
Donaldson LJ’s statement, which appeared to be a definiton of inherent vice in the Court of 
Appeal of Soya v White,
375 was actually describing a case of cargo’s seaworthiness, as viewed 
from the law of carriage. In the Supreme Court in The Cendor Mopu, per Lord Clarke, the 
proposition  maintained  by  Donaldson  LJ  should  not  be  deemed  inconsistent  from  Lord 
Diplock’s, as he had no intention to provide a definition at all.
376 Therefore, when referring 
to the meaning of inherent vice in marine insurance, Lord Diplock’s formulation should be 
taken as the sole authority.  
Secondly, cargo’s seaworthiness is strictly connected to the marine context, while inherent 
vice is a basic and permanent risk of the subject-matters insured irrespective of whether the 
vessel is  at  sea.  Cargo’s  seaworthiness  is  considerably  dependent  upon  the ordinary  sea 
conditions,  whereas  the  sea  condition  is  not  necessarily  important  to  inherent  vice. 
However,  it  does  not  mean  inherent  vice  “pays  scant  regard  as  to  how  and  in  what 
circumstances  the  loss  occurred”.
377  The  consideration  of  circumstantial  conditions  is 
necessary  in  determining  the  causal  efficiency  of  inherent  vice.  In  essence,  the  risk  of 
inherent vice in insurance should be recognised as one of many insurable risks triggering 
the  eventual  damage  with  the  assistance  of  all  the  basic  circumstantial  conditions.  Such 
external factors are different from the external accidents mentioned in the Lord Diplock’s 
definition. As distinguished by Roche J, “Moist Atmosphere is not an accident or incident 
that is covered. It is more or less a natural test or incident which the goods have to suffer 
and which the underwriter has not insured against.”
378 Those “accidents” are intervening in 
that  they  change  an  ordinary  voyage  at  sea  into  a  higher  risk  status.  While  the  general 
                                                 
373 [2009] 2 C.L.C. 1056 
374 William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, (4th edn, Cowansville 2007) 1144 
375 [1982] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 136 
376 Supra 7, p 585 
377 Per Lord Saville in The Cendor Mopu, his opinion is “such a definition [of Lord Diplock] 
pays scant regard as to how and in what circumstances the loss occurred.” Whereas, Lord 
Clarke stated that external factors are not entirely irrelevant in consideration 
378 Whiting v New Zealand Insurance Co Ltd (1932) 44 Ll. L. Rep. 179  M. SONG 
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external  factors  for  inherent  vice  are  the  ordinary  conditions  under  which  the  cargo  is 
carried, the same as those with which the defective cargo may be confronted on land. For 
instance, without the temperature discrepancy between Calcutta and Rotterdam, the process 
of water condemnation in container could not happen or be completed. Therefore, inherent 
vice and cargo’s seaworthiness concern divergent external conditions. 
Thirdly, consideration of cargo’s seaworthiness and inherent vice are provided in different 
sections in  the 1906  Act. Cargo’s  seaworthiness is  referred in  s 40(1)  of the 1906  Act
379 
which states that there is no implied warranty requiring cargo to be seaworthy. The absence 
of such warranty deprives the underwriter of the ability to terminate liabilities automatically. 
The test of causation, therefore, has to be examined in order to establish the causal link 
between the cargo’s seaworthiness and the consequence of damage or loss.
380 In this regard, 
underwriters attempt to attribute this sort of unsuitableness to inherent vice  for which they 
are not liable according to the 1906 Act and the policies. 
Although both cargo’s seaworthiness and inherent vice involve a causal link, the legal effect 
remains different. As for the most essential point, unlike inherent vice s 55, s 40(1) merely 
indicates  that  no  such  warranty  is  implied  by  statutes,  it  does  not  infer  that  cargo’s 
unseaworthiness  is  excluded  from  recovery.  Notwithstanding  an  established  causal  link 
between cargo’s seaworthiness and loss, the insurer must also rely upon a risk clause which 
explicitly  excludes  the  loss  arising  from  “cargo’s  seaworthiness”  in  order  discharge  his 
liability  of  indemnity,  especially  under  an  “all-risks”  policy.  Such  phrasing  is  rarely 
perceptible  among  cases  so  far.  Accordingly,  the  insurers  frequently  attempt  to  presume 
cargo’s unseaworthiness to be inherent vice in order to disentitle the assured’s recovery, 
which is, however, entirely  a different legal  ground. As concluded by Prof Bennett,
381  and 
approved in The Cendor Mopu,  
If, however, goods have to be fit to withstand reasonably foreseeable perils or 
the loss will be considered to be proximately caused by the inherent vice of the 
goods, or at least not by a “risk” within the meaning of the “all risks” insuring 
clause, much of the point of cargo insurance disappears. 
In light of the comparison above, inherent vice and cargo’s unseaworthiness under the law 
of  marine  insurance  law  are  two  entirely  different  concepts  and  apply  to  different  rules. 
Additionally, it seems that inherent vice does not denote the same meaning under the law of 
marine insurance and the law of carriage of goods by sea. 
                                                 
379 Seaworthiness in s 40 bears the same meaning as s 39, according to ED Sassoon & Co v 
Western Assurance Co. [1912] A.C. 561 
380 Per Willes J in  Koebel v Saunders (1864) 17 CB(NS)71,77-78, “in the case of an insurance 
on goods, it is no answer to say that they were in an unfit condition to be shipped, unless it 
is shewn that the loss arose from that unfitness.” 
381 Supra 13, p 348 M. SONG 
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A further question  may be  raised  in  respect of  hull  policies.  As  Lord Diplock’s  definition 
simply describes the situation of cargo without mentioning the subject-matter of a vessel, 
does this mean that inherent vice exclusively applies to cargo losses? It is suggested in The 
Colinvaux and Merkin’s that a vessel is also capable of being lost due to its inherent vice.
382 
In  contrast,  Bennett’s  Law  of  Marine  Insurance  draws  the  distinction  that  seaworthiness 
relates to the vessel, while inherent vice concerns the goods. Moreover, in the view of Tetley 
regarding The Hague Visby Rules in carriage, the exception of inherent vice concerns the 
goods  and  latent  defects  relates  to  ships,  drawing  a  sharp  distinction.
383  Assuming that 
latent defect is a concept in hull policies equivalent to the risk of loss due to the physical or 
internal  condition of a  vessel,
384  latent defect has been  suggested to be one of  the 
“categories of matters to which seaworthiness extends”.
385 It means a latent defect in hull 
and machinery  would render  a  vessel  unseaworthy  if  it  effectively  affects  her  capacity  to 
endure the ordinary perils of the sea in a designated voyage.  
Unlike inherent vice, latent defect is an insured risk in a marine insurance policy under the 
heading of the Inchmaree clause. A conflict may arise between the insured coverage on the 
loss arising from latent defect and the implied warranty of seaworthiness in a voyage policy 
as provided in s 39.
386 Prof Bennett intended to give priority to latent defect based upon a 
commercially sensible interpretation. In contrast, in the context of a time policy, the conflict 
is  unlikely  to  occur.  Even  if  the  vessel  is  unseaworthy  in  a  time  policy,  the  assured’s 
knowledge of unseaworthiness implies the defect is not latent and in both cases the insurer 
should not be liable. By the same token, if the unseaworthiness is due to its severe latent 
defect, the assured is supposed to be unaware of the defect.  
A defect is latent if the defect is not discoverable upon an examination which a reasonably 
careful skilled person would make.
387 The reasonableness here may well be equivalent to the 
“due  diligence”  which  the  assured  must  exercise  in  order  to  ensure  his  insurance  is  not 
prejudiced.
388  
The determination of seaworthiness limits to a standard of “due diligence” of the shipowner 
or carrier in the law of carriage by sea. The celebrated standard of due diligence at common 
law  was  provided  in  McFadden  v  Blue  Star  Line,
389  which referred to a degree of fitness 
                                                 
382 Supra 82, vol 2, p 20520 
383 Supra 375, p 1141 
384 Promet Engineering (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Sturge (The Nukila) [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep 146, 
151 
385 Supra 365, p 59. Also see The Miss Jay Jay [1987] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 32 in terms of a defect 
in design. However, it has been not fully ascertained that whether latent defect extends to 
the design. See The Caribbean Sea [1980] 1 Lloyd's Rep 338, 345-347. 
386 Supra 134, p 587 
387 The Caribbean Sea [1980] 1 Lloyd's Rep 338, 348 
388 Charles Brown & Co Ltd v Nitrate Producers’ Steamship Co Ltd (1937) 58 Ll L Rep 188 
389 [1905] 1 KB 697,  706 M. SONG 
130 
 
required by an ordinary careful and prudent owner, although seaworthiness is an absolute 
obligation.  In  contrast,  under  a  contract  of  affreightment  governed  by  The  Hague  Visby 
Rules, the test is known as “due diligence” of the owner.
390 This test is hardly an effective 
approach to determine seaworthiness, but refers to the heaviness of an owner’s obligation 
to provide a seaworthy vessel for ascertaining his liability. In particular, it is noteworthy that 
in a carriage case, The Hellenic Dolphin
391, the court held that if the defect existed before the 
ship  was  loaded,  it  was  a  true  latent  defect,  and  shipowner  had  discharged  the  burden 
imposed on them by Art. IV, r.1 of The Hague Visby Rules which describes a standard of due 
diligence. 
Returning to the context of marine insurance law, s 39(1) does not refer to any limitation to 
the  degree  of  the  claim.  Furthermore,  it  has  been  ascertained  that  the  ignorance  of  the 
assured is immaterial in triggering the provisions of the 1906 Act.
392 Therefore, it is clear 
that marine insurance law and the contract of affreightment are different in this regard,
 393 
and the implied warranty of seaworthiness imposes a stricter degree of obligation on the 
assured in a voyage policy. 
In addition to the commercially sensible interpretation, the determination of the coverage 
may be based on whether the assured or the shipowner has performed his duties carefully 
and prudently. If the answer is affirmative, the risk is transferred to the insured in the head 
of “latent defect” as  agreed in the  Inchmaree clause. It fulfils  the purpose of  introducing 
“latent”  defect  into  the  scope  of  coverage,  which  ameliorates  the  injustice  due  to  the 
absolute  obligation  of  seaworthiness  without  reference  to  the  assured’s  intentions  and 
capacity. On the other hand, if the assured or shipowner did not exercise due diligence and 
if the defect is also serious enough to constitute unseaworthiness, it becomes self-evident 
that  the  definition  of  latent  defect  is  not  satisfied,  and  the  insurer  can  rely  upon  the 
principles of warranty.  
In The Lydia Flag,
394 a time policy contained an express warranty of seaworthiness at the 
inception of t he policy and  a warranty that  the owner should exercise due diligence  in 
maintaining  seaworthiness  thereafter.  The  policy  also  insured  against  loss  caused  by 
                                                 
390 Art III- (1). Also see Riverstone Meat Co Pty Ltd v Lancashire Shipping Co Ltd (The 
Muncaster Castle) [1961] A.C. 807 
391 [1978] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 336 
392 Supra 13, p 830-831, Lord Elson in Douglas v Scougall (1816) 4 Dow 269 was cited and 
relied upon. 
393 In the carriage case, Smith, Hogg and Company v Black Sea and Baltic General Insurance 
Company  [1940]  A.C.  997,  Lord  Wright  mentioned  and  did  not  deny  the  first  instance 
decision  in  the  sense  that  “The  unseaworthiness,  constituted  as  it  was  by  loading  an 
excessive deck cargo, was obviously only consistent with want of due diligence on the part of 
the  shipowner  to  make  her  seaworthy.  Hence  the  qualified  exception  of  unseaworthiness 
does not protect the shipowner. In effect such an exception can only excuse against latent 
defects.”  
394 Martin Maritime Ltd v Provident Capital Indemnity Fund Ltd [1998] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 652 M. SONG 
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negligence of the ship repairers and by latent defects. The ship in question lost her rudder 
and suffered damage. In terms of reconciling the conflicts between these terms, Moore-Bick 
J found the only sensible way to read these terms is that the loss should remain recoverable 
where the vessel might be unseaworthy at the inception of the policy as a result of latent 
defect  or  negligence  of  the  ship  repairers  provided  that  the  unseaworthiness  had  not 
resulted for want of due diligence on the part of the assured. 
5.2 Seaworthiness as a Warranty 
The  first  few  marine  insurance  warranty  cases  appeared  in  late  seventeenth  century, 
concerning “warranty of convoy”.
395 However, the principle of warranty was not established 
and formed until the era of Lord Mansfield. His lordship gave a set of definitive analysis of 
the  law  of  warranty  in  the  law  of  marine  insurance,  which  substantively  affected  Sir 
Chalmers’ work on the 1906 Act in this regard.
396 Mansfield’s doctrines still remain effective, 
despite a heated discussion of reform.  
According to s 33(1), warranty means “a promissory warranty, that is to say, a warranty by 
which the assured undertakes that some particular thing should or should not be done, or 
that some condition should be fulfilled, or whereby he affirms or negatives the existence of 
a particular state of facts”. A warranty can be either express or implied. Regarding express 
warranties, it is a matter of construction, whether a term amounts to a warranty, and the 
wording “warranty” or “warranted” is not conclusive.
397 Implied warranties were recognised 
and stipulated by the 1906 Act, including seaworthiness, portworthiness, cargoworthiness 
and legality. 
LC Consultation Paper 2007 summarizes the purposes of using an warranty: “to provide an 
additional  remedy  if  information  given  by  the  proposer  was  incorrect;  as  an  alternative 
method of defining the risk; to  require the insured to take specified precautions; and to 
allow the insurer to escape from the contract should there be a change in the risk”. 
398 
As  a  popular  form  of  policy  defence,  warranty  has  recently  become  a  heated  issue  in 
insurance law, especially in the marine insurance context due to its long-term unique and 
strict tradition. In England, the rule of law that had been developed in relation to marine 
                                                 
395 Jeffries v Legandra 91 E.R. 384; (1690) 2 Salk. 443, Lethulier's Case 91 E.R. 384; (1692) 2 
Salk. 443 
396 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, “Warranties in the Law of Marine Insurance: Some Suggestions for 
Reform of English and American Law”, 1998-1999, 23 Tul. Mar L.J. 267, p277-279 
397 HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd v New Hampshire Insurance Co [2001] EWCA Civ 
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398Law Commission, Misrepresentation, Non-disclosure and Breach of Warranty by the 
Insured (Consultation Paper No. 182, 2007), available at 
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insurance was applied in its full extent to property and life insurance.
399 Therefore, the legal 
effect  of warranties  and  the modification of the law of warranties   ought to be critically 
reviewed, taking seaworthiness as an example in this section. 
5.2.1 Seaworthiness in Voyage Hull Policies  
S 39(1) of the 1906 Act indicates an implied warranty of seaworthiness in a voyage policy. 
There  are  various  reasons  for  stipulating  seaworthiness  to  be  an  implied  warranty  by 
statute.  For  one  reason,  seaworthiness  is  a  condition  precedent  upon  which  the  insurer 
relies to assess the risk and premium. Moreover, consideration of the safety of the crew, 
ship and cargo on board demands that the shipowner affirms that the vessel is seaworthy, 
no matter whether the shipowner can directly control the vessel. Furthermore, in relation to 
the  causation  rules  in  marine  insurance  the  test  adopted  during  the  Victorian  era  to 
determine the real and immediate cause of loss was the event that occurred last in a time 
sequence. S 39 was created in order to stop the clock running from time of the breach of a 
warranty regardless of what happened during the voyage.
400 
The Institute Time Clauses (Hull) 1983 expresses the warranty of seaworthiness in its Cl. 11. 
Although there is no equivalent clause in  the  2003 clauses, the implied warranty of 
seaworthiness is not excluded or mitigated unless lan guage used clearly  indicates this.
401 
The duty is restricted in that it must be fulfilled at the commencement of the voyage, which 
implies that the duty  does not continue throughout the whole voyage.
 402 Moreover, if the 
voyage  can  and  should  be  divided  into  a  few  stages,  according  to  s  39(3),  at  the 
commencement of each stage, an implied warranty of seaworthiness is imposed on the ship. 
It has  been  well  recognised that  legitimate call  at intervening  ports  does  not  necessarily 
justify a voyage in stages.
403 A voyage can be recognised in law as being completed in a few 
legs in law in tow instances, due to physical factors
404 and for commercial need
405.
406  
The most significant feature of warrant y  distinguished from other principles is the legal 
effect when a warranty is breached. Since the first warranty case decided by Lord Mansfield, 
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407 where Lord Mansfield held that the policy was unenforceable due to 
the breach of neutrality, a strict attitude to breaches of warranties had been expressed.
408 
The same  judgment  had been reproduced in the landmark case  De  Hahn  v  Hartley,
409  a 
vessel was insured for the voyage from Africa to West Indies, warranted that it would sail 
from  Liverpool  with  50  hands  or  upwards;  however,  the  vessel  was  with  46  hands  when 
sailed from Liverpool, although  six additional men  were picked up after  a mere 6  hours. 
Lord Mansfield reiterated: 
A warranty in a policy of insurance is a condition or a contingency, and unless 
that  be  performed,  there  is  no  contract.  It  is  perfectly  immaterial  for  what 
purpose a warranty is introduced; but, being inserted, the contract does not exist 
unless it be literally complied with. Now in the present case, the condition was 
the sailing of the ship with a certain number of men; which not being complied 
with, the policy is void.  
At that stage, the breach of warranty was able to render the policy void or even void ab 
initio. However, this standpoint was not wholly introduced in the 1906 Act. Although it is 
affirmed that warranty should be strictly applied, Sir Chalmers preferred the American rule 
in terms of the effect of breach; thus s 33(3) provides “subject to any express provision in 
the policy, the insurer is discharged from liability as from the date of the breach of warranty, 
but without prejudice to any liability incurred by him before that date.” He commented that 
“It is often said that breach of a warranty makes the policy void. But this is not so. A void 
contract cannot be ratified, but a breach of warranty may be waived.”
410 
Therefore, according to s 33(3), underwriters are entitled to reject all the claims occurred 
since  the  date  of  the  breach.  In  more  recent  times,  the  effect  of  warranty  in  marine 
insurance  law  has  been  reviewed  and  clarified  in  the  leading  case  The  Good  Luck,
411  the 
assured Bank had taken out mortgagee's interest insurance with the insurer over ships, 
including The Good Luck, purchased by the Good Faith Group (the owners). Having noted 
that the owners were chartering ships in a "sp ecial risks area" without notifying  them as 
required by the policy, the insurer rejected the constructive total loss of The Good Luck after 
it was damaged in such an area. The Bank brought the claim against the insurer, alleged 
that the insurer was in breach of a letter of undertaking which stated that H agreed to advise 
B "promptly" if they ceased to insure. The Court of Appeal reverted to the avoidance rule and 
interpreted s 33(3) in such a way that a breach by an insured party of a promissory warranty 
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did not automatically bring a contract to an end but gave the insurer the option to avoid the 
contract.
412  However, the House of Lords reversed the decision and p ronounced that the 
liability had been automatically discharged at the date of breach; the breach did not concern 
with the effect of the policy, as the promissory warranty was a condition precedent of the 
insurer's liability. Although this case was related to an express warranty in the policy, the 
decision as to effect of breach is universally applicabl e to both express warranties and 
implied warranties. 
In the light of The Good Luck, more recently, The Copa Casino
413 has addressed the issue of 
waiver of breach provided in s 34. A floating casino was insured for a voyage from Alabama 
to India and sank in the Caribbean Sea. The marine policy contained a number of warranties, 
including  a  “Hold  Harmless  Warranty”  under  which  the  assured,  “warranted  no  release, 
waivers  or  ‘hold  harmless’  given  to  Tug  and  Towers”.  The  insurer  rejected  the  loss, 
contending  that  this  warranty  had  been  breached  when  the assured  came into  a  towage 
contract in the form of TOWCON, provided for extensive mutual exceptions of liability and 
cross  indemnities  between  the  tug  owner  and  the  hirer  of  the  tug.  The  Court  of  Appeal 
reaffirmed the judgment of The Good Luck, and held that: 
When  an  assured  has  been  in  breach  of  a  warranty  in  a  policy  of  marine 
insurance  then  the  breach  automatically  discharges  the  insurer  from  further 
liability  under  the  policy.  No  other  positive  action,  whether  described  as 
avoidance  or  acceptance  of  repudiation  or  otherwise,  is  needed  to  make  that 
discharge  of  liability  effective.  Because  the  discharge  of  the  insurer’s  liability 
under the policy takes place automatically upon the breach of warranty and no 
further  positive  action  is  needed  to  bring  about  the  discharge,  the  insurer 
therefore  does  not  need  to  “elect”  whether  to  terminate  the  contract  or  its 
liability under it, or continue with the contract in being. Thus, logically, when it is 
alleged that an insurer has “waived” a breach of a warranty in a marine policy by 
an assured, this must mean that the insurer has waived the breach because the 
insurer is now estopped from relying upon it. So, where section 34(3) of the MIA 
1906 states that “a breach of warranty may be waived by the insurer”, this must 
refer  to  that  type  of  “waiver”  which  is  concerned  with  the  forebearance  from 
exercising a legal right. 
Aikens LJ continued that, to constitute waiver by estoppel, it has to be proved that the other 
party  had  relied  upon  the  unequivocal  representation  and  such  an  unequivocal 
representation is tested in an objective manner, without reference to the parties’ subjective 
belief or understanding.  
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Based upon the above explanation, it should be remarked that no causal link between the 
breach and the loss is necessitated in triggering the legal effect of breaching the warranty, 
which also embodies the strict effect of warranty. Regardless, in the current law, the implied 
warranty of seaworthiness in a voyage policy should still comply with these principles. 
5.2.2 Seaworthiness in Cargo Policies 
Koebel v Saunders
414 laid down the rule that there is no warranty in a cargo policy that the 
subject-matter insured should at the commencement of the voyage be fit to encounter the 
ordinary perils of the sea. This rule has been statutorily embodied by s 40(1) of the 1906 
Act, followed by a subsection providing that a duty is levied upon the assured to warrant 
that the ship is fit to carry the cargo. In contrast, s 40(2) provides the vessel for carrying 
cargo in a voyage policy is warranted to be seaworthy, despite the fact that the cargo owner 
has little control over and specific knowledge of the condition of the vessel. Therefore, an 
express waiver of the implied warranty of seaworthiness has been inserted into the cargo 
policy  in  order  to  avoid  unexpected  and  undesired  consequence  for  the  assured  cargo 
owner, where the vessel is proved to be unseaworthy at the commencement of the voyage 
designated.  
The  prominent  “seaworthiness  admitted  clause”
415  was  employed  for  the  aforementioned 
purpose prior to the modern Institute Cargo Clauses. This form is no longer in common use 
in  English  market.  Instead,  Clause  5  of  the  Institute  Cargo  Clauses  1982  is  designed  to 
modify  s  40(2)  currently.  Cl.  5.2  contains  an  express  waiver  of  seaworthiness  warranty, 
reading that “The Underwriters waive any breach of the implied warranties of seaworthiness 
of the ship and fitness of the ship to carry the subject-matter insured to destination, unless 
the Assured  or their servants are  privy to  such unseaworthiness  or unfitness.”  The 2009 
version  contains  an  even  broader  clause,  Cl  5.3,  providing  that  “The  Insurers  waive  any 
breach of the implied warranties of seaworthiness of the ship and fitness of the ship to carry 
the subject-matter insured to destination.” 
Although  Clause  5  has  yet  to  be  judicially  construed,
416  the clause literally contains two  
meanings. On the one hand, the privity of either the assured or their servants will revive the 
effect  of  the  implied  warranty.  “The  servants”  must  be  construed  narrowly  and  as  being 
confined to employees of the assured, excluding independent contractors or agents.
417 On 
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the other hand, unlike s 39(5), the phrase “at the commencement of the voyage” is absent. It 
may  imply  the  attachment  of  the  implied  warranty  is  extended  to  every  moment  of  the 
voyage.
418 However, as the general principle of contractual construction provides, as there is 
no express words to indicate an extending implied warranty against the statutory stipulation 
of the 1906 Act, the judiciary ought not to interpret the term to levy a heavier burden on the 
assured of the cargo policy. 
In addition, Cl 5.1 of the Institute Cargo Clause is also a part of the “Unseaworthiness and 
Unfitness Exclusion Clause”, yet, unrelated to warranty. The clause focuses upon excluding 
the loss “arising from” unseaworthiness, subject to a causal link between seaworthiness with 
the  privity  of  the  assured  or  their  servants  at  the  time  of  loading.  It  contemplates  that 
despite the insurer waives the right of an implied warranty under certain circumstances, it 
does  not  affect  the  status  of  unseaworthiness  as  an  uninsured/excluded  peril,  which  is 
subject to s 55 of the 1906 Act.  
5.2.3 Law Reform Proposal: a Causal Connection or Suspensive Condition? 
The insurance law reform project has been carried out by the Law Commissions since 2006 
in response to the long-standing criticisms of insurance law. The Consultation Paper 2007 
pointed out the existing problems of the law of warranty and proposed a set of far-reaching 
recommendations. It is said that “the greatest and most obvious problem” is that the current 
law allows the insurer to discharge his liability for technical breaches without reference to 
the loss itself. S 33(3) permits the insurer to refuse a loss that has arisen, despite there 
being no connection to the breach of warranty. On the other hand, its effect also expands to 
further liabilities  after the  breach,  even  lacking  a  more  remote  connection  to  the  losses. 
Thus, there is a need to introduce a causal connection between the breach of future conduct 
warranties  and  the  loss  in  consideration  of  justice  and  fairness;  whereas,  if  terms  were 
understood  as  suspensive  conditions  rather  than  warranties,  the  causal  connection  test 
would  not  apply.  For  consumer  insurance,  the  rule  requiring  a  causal  connection  is 
mandatory. For business insurance it would be possible for the parties to agree on the effect 
a  breach  of  warranty  should  have,  provided  they  use  clear  language  to  express  their 
intentions. Where the insured contracted on the insurer’s standard terms, there would also 
be controls to ensure that the cover was not substantially different from what the insured 
reasonably  expected.
419  The need of reform has been continuously  acknowledged  in the 
latest  Consultation  Paper  20 12;
420  however,  the  Law  Commission  shows  much  less 
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enthusiasm for the causal requirement method and proposes a set of different approach. 
Regardless, both proposals are worthy of detailed scrutinizing. 
In the Consultation Paper 2007, however, having noted that the law has traditionally taken a 
stricter approach  to marine  warranties,  the Law  Commission  rejected treating  the marine 
insurance  differently  in  terms  of  proposing  reform  of  warranties.  Accordingly,  the  Law 
Commission  has  provisionally  proposed  that  the  causal  connection  test  should  apply  to 
warranties in marine insurance in the same manner as non-marine insurance. That is to say, 
the insurer should pay a claim where the assured can prove on a balance of probabilities 
that the event constituting the breach did not contribute to the loss. Three questions are 
noteworthy in this recommendation and its implementation, namely, the causation test, the 
phrasing of the causal requirement and the burden of proof. 
Three models have been taken into account in the Consultation Paper for reforming the law 
of warranty in a general insurance law, including the 1980 Report,
421 the Australian statutes 
and the New Zealand  model respectively. Additionally, in terms of seaworthiness, the law 
review of Australia Marine Insuran ce Act 1909   has referred to the Norwegian Marine 
Insurance Plan. On balance, every formulation has remarkable advantages but problems  
remaining. The Consultation Paper preferred to follow primarily the pattern of New Zealand. 
Law Commission Report 1980 has summari sed four defects in the present law concerning 
warranty. First, the existence of technical breaches enables the insurer to reject claims 
without materiality to the risk. Secondly, due to the previous defect, the  insurer can escape 
liability, no matter how irrelevant the breach  is to the losses. Thirdly, formality should be 
required to clarify the legal status of a warranty clause. The last  addresses  the  mischief 
arising from the phrasing   of the terms. In order to   resolve the first two, the Report 
recommended that an assured should be able to challenge the insurer’s refusal to indemnify 
in the absence of links between the breach and the loss. The link suggested in the Report 
focuses on whether the breach is first “material to the risk” and second “increased the risk”.  
Before measuring whether a breach increased the risk, it should be noted that, as the Report 
recommended, a term should only constitute a warranty if it is material to the risk, in the 
sense that the term would influence a prudent insurer in deciding whether to accept the risk 
and on what terms. In comparison with the materiality test concerning the breach of the 
utmost good faith, the recent case Sealion Shipping Ltd v Valiant Insurance Co (The “Toisa 
Pisces”)
422 expressed a new attitude to the causation test. In a loss-of-hire policy, the alleged 
inaccurate representations as to a “one-hull claim” and off-hire period have been examined 
and  decided  by  the  Court.  The  conclusion  was  neither  of  the  statements  was  material. 
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Interestingly, Blair J held that the materiality in term of “one hull claim” was linked to the 
extent  to  which  they  caused  loss  of  hire.  Generally  speaking,  the  conventional  test  of 
materiality, indicated in s 18(2) and s 20(2) respectively, is that “which would influence the 
judgment of a prudent insurer in fixing the premium, or determining whether he will take 
the risk.” The materiality lies in a matter which a prudent underwriter entertaining a renewal 
would wish to take into account in deciding whether to write the risk and, if so, on what 
terms.
423 It seems that in the recent case, Blair J has set up a more specific test compared 
with the well-known “prudent underwriter test”. A certain degree of causal link ought to be 
considered  in  deciding  the  materiality  of  a  nondisclosure  or  misrepresentation  as  to  the 
claim record. The proposition reflects a judicial trend  of resorting to causation even in a 
case concerning utmost good faith in order to eliminate unjust rescission. 
However,  the  1980  Report  iterated  that  a  solution  depending  on  a  presence  of  causal 
connection  between  the  breach  and  the  loss  was  inappropriate  in  light  of  the  nature  of 
restricting the effect of a warranty. Attention should always be paid to a particular risk, as 
the purpose of a promissory warranty is to prevent the risk from unexpected increase by 
clarifying and confining the basis of the contract. Although it is self-evident that a causative 
connection between the breach and the loss alone would entitle the insurer to reject the 
claim, it seems that a causative connection was only regarded as one of various forms of 
connections, and the test should embrace less direct links as far as the breach is material to 
and increases the same type of the risk incurred. 
Thus,  the  test  suggested  that  the  warranty  was  intended  to  reduce  the  likelihood  of  a 
particular type of loss occurring and the actual loss being of a different type; alternatively, 
though falling in the same type, the breach should not have increased the risk that the loss 
would occur in the same way in which it did in fact occur. The burden of proof was should 
be on the assured to rebut the presumption that a warranty should be material to the risk by 
proving that the breach was irrelevant to the loss in either way mentioned above. However, 
this approach is not recommended in the Consultation Paper 2007, as the test seems less 
favourable  and  practical  to  the  assureds  compared  with  the  law  of  Australia  and  New 
Zealand. 
S 54 of Australian Insurance Contracts Act 1984 indicates that the insured needs to prove 
that the breach did not “cause” the loss. The Act is not applicable to marine insurance cases 
pursuant to s 9, and the marine insurance cases remain governed by the Marine Insurance 
Act 1909, which adopts almost identical structure and provisions to the English 1906 Act. 
The English Law Commission interprets the Australian approach as being generous to the 
policyholders:
424  the  breach  should  be  the  proximate  cause  in  the  marine  insurance 
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425 or one of the “but-for” causes in the non-marine types. According to s 54(4), the 
loss can be partially recovered subject to the absence of a causal connection to the breach 
of warranty. That is to say, where it is established that the breach has a minor causative 
impact  on  the  occurrence  of  loss  in  a  marine  insurance  case,  the  insurer  may  lose  the 
ground of breach of the warranty and the assured’s claim may stand.  
S 11 of the New Zealand Insurance Contracts Act 1977 states that  
the insured should not be disentitled to be indemnified by the insurer by reason 
only of such provisions of the contract of insurance if the insured proves on the 
balance of probability that the loss in respect of which the insured seeks to be 
indemnified was not caused or contributed to by the happening of such events or 
the existence of such circumstances. 
Two distinctions between this provision and the Australian one can be observed and they 
also explain why the English Law Commission is more attracted to the substance of the New 
Zealand model.
426 In the first place, the phrase used in this provision, “caused or contributed 
to”, literally differs and indicates a broader test than the test of proximity, which does not 
require the breach to be the dominant cause of loss. Accordingly, it seems sound to say that 
if  the  breach  satisfies  the  “but  for”  test,  as  one  of  the  necessary  causes,  the  insurer  is 
entitled to reject the claim related thereto. The assured undertakes a fairly heavy burden of 
proof in the sense that the breach is not even a contributory cause of loss on the balance of 
probabilities. The other crucial difference is the proportional recovery of a single claim. The 
New  Zealand  Law  Commission’s  reform  on  s  11
427  explicitly  pointed  out  the  proportional 
approach  provided  by  s  54  (4)  of  the  Australian  Insurance  Contracts  Act  should  not  be 
adopted  in  New  Zealand;  instead,  the  all-or-nothing  approach  should  be  insisted. 
Surprisingly, the English insurance law, though famous for the “winner-takes-all” principle as 
mentioned in Chapter 2, seems to intend to adopt the proportional recovery in a claim in 
respect of breach of a warranty on the basis of the statistical likelihood according to the 
Consultation Paper.
428 Leaving aside the problematic methods  of calculating proportions in 
court, this propos al seems incompatible with long -standing English indemnity insurance 
principles and operations. The least desirable quality in legislation is uncertainty and it may 
be too ambitious to introduce such provisions into English insurance contract law. 
In summary, the English Law Commission in 2007 preferred a lesser test of causation than 
the proximity  test  in determining the exclusion of the effect of breach   of  a warranty by 
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adopting expressions such as “contribute to”. The insurer should bear the primary burden of 
proof to establish a broken warranty. The assured then undertakes a secondary burden of 
proof  to  rebut  the  rejection  of  liability  by  proving  there  was  no  causal  link  between  the 
breach and the loss on the balance of probabilities.  
Although the provisional proposal as to the requirement of a connection in causal form has 
obtained widespread support, several criticisms have arisen in the four years, viz., that the 
whole  set  approach  was  too  complicated,  particularly  in  identifying  of  future  conduct 
warranties  and  the  issue  of  causation;  accordingly,  the  Law  Commission  proposed  in  its 
Consultation Paper 2012 an even further-reaching recommendations: 
1.  To abolish the basis of the contract clauses 
2.  To treat warranties as suspensive conditions 
3.  To introduce special rules for terms designed to reduce the risk of a particular type 
of loss, or the risk of loss at a particular time or in a particular location 
 
Instead of  justifying  the traditional harsh  effect  of  a  requirement of  causal  link,  the new 
recommendation  fundamentally  changes  the  effect  of  breach  of  warranty  itself.  To 
rationalize  this  formulation,  the  Law  Commission  reviewed  several  jurisdictions’ 
experiences, including New Zealand, Australia, New York, Canada and civil jurisdictions in 
Europe. This time the Law Commission expressed substantial concerns over the limitations 
and “problems” of the approaches of New Zealand and Australia. The main conclusion drawn 
from their lessons by the Law Commission is “the test is not appropriate for all terms” and 
“it would generate too much uncertainty.” 
Specifically, s 54 of Australian Insurance Contracts Act is regarded as a complex provision in 
the Consultation Paper 2012. It was observed by Dr Baris Soyer that s 54 has “generated a 
good deal of litigation over the years” and the rule is still “in flux” to some extent after two 
decades.
 429  FAI Insurance Limited v Australian Hospital Care Pty Ltd
430 is often cited as the 
leading case of s 54, on the issue of whether an event amounts to an act or omission in the 
provision. In this case, a professional indemnity policy was issued and contained a clause 
saying  that  “The  Insured  should  as  a  condition  precedent  to  his  or  their  right  to  be 
indemnified under this Policy to [sic] give to the [insurer] immediate notice in writing of any 
claim made against him or them.” A claim by a third party was made after expiry of  the 
coverage period but the insured became aware of the event  which gave rise to claim during 
period of cover but failed to notify the insurer. The court finally held that “No distinction can 
be made, for the purposes of s 54, between provisions of a contract which define the scope 
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of cover, and those provisions which conditions are affecting an entitlement to claim. The 
substantive effect of the contract can be determined only by examination of the contract as 
a whole.” and thus s 54 was applicable in this case of failing to deliver such a notice. The 
decision has been applied in several subsequent cases.
431 However, in pure causation terms, 
Australian court did not find much difficulty in defining whether the breach was capable of 
“causing or contributing to” the loss by the nature of the act.
432 
On the other hand, The New Zealand Law Commission did  express reservations about its 
provision and proposed to modify  it by adding the following circumstances under which a 
requirement of a causal connection would not apply:
 433 
(a) defines the age, identity, qualifications or experience of a driver of a vehicle, a 
pilot of an aircraft, or an operator of a chattel; or 
    (b) defines the geographical area in which a loss must occur if the insurer is to be 
liable   to indemnify the insured; or 
(c) excludes loss that occurs while a vehicle, aircraft, or other chattel is being used 
for commercial purposes other than those permitted by the contract of insurance. 
Moreover, Prof Malcolm Clarke has also expressed reservations on the approach of a causal 
link. The learned professor expressed three concerns which have been taken into account by 
the Law Commission when producing the 2012 Paper.
434 For one reason, the burden of proof 
on the assured to prove a lack of a causal connection between the b reach and the loss is a 
departure from the pattern that who alleges must prove. Also, Sir Aikens doubted whether 
the onus of the two parties can be integrated.
435  It has to be admitted that it is indeed 
unusual in the sense that the causative requirement is  a defence upon another defence. It is 
also more difficult to prove a negative condition. The breach of warranty is a powerful policy 
defence of the insurer and the importance of a warranty implicates a presumptive relation to 
and effect on the loss, if bre ached. Therefore, the lack of a causal link is deemed as an 
exception to the presumption which ought to be alleged by the assured in order to revive 
the insurer’s liability. It breaks the conventional pattern of rebuttal in revert; instead, the 
argument  is  diverted  to  another  question  of  law,  namely,  the  causal  connection. 
Nevertheless,  the  well-known  principle  of  “who  alleges  must  prove”  remains  properly 
complied with.  
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Secondly, Prof Clarke in his article was concerned that the drift of the reform to assimilate 
the effect of breach of a warranty and the law of exceptions, such as the excluded perils, 
might  put  the  law  into  a  difficult  position.  It  seems  true  that  the  trend  to  redress  the 
“absolute” or harsh effects of warranty by resorting to a legal requirement is an approach 
commonly employed in the case of exceptions. However, compared with the Paper 2007, it 
is  interesting  that  suspensive conditions  in  the  Consultation  Paper  2012  are  much  more 
likely to assimilate the two kinds of terms. The test of causation in 2007 Paper as mentioned 
above differs from those of exception clauses, as well as the party to undertake the burden 
of  proof.  Moreover,  the  significance  and  effect  of  warranty  remain  independent  from  the 
exceptions of the policy in law. The mere requirement of a connection in a causative form 
would not lead to a substantial assimilation of the two regimes without more. However, to 
treat  warranties  as  suspensive  conditions  is  something  seriously  different;  without  the 
special harsh effect of breach, a warranty is in no way unique from an excluded occasion, 
despite  these  terms  would  not  take  account  of  whether  the  breach  has  caused  or 
contributed to the loss.
436 Moreover, as to “the special rules to all kinds of terms to reduce 
particular risks”, this suggestion essentially aims to ascertain the cause of loss and the risk 
warranted  free  from  are  related  or  the  same  type.  Although  a  causal  connection  is  not 
favoured at present, it shows a connection is still called for. 
The last reason of Prof Clarke’s hesitation happens to address the root of this thesis, since 
Prof  Clarke  questioned  the  necessity  of  a  sophisticated  analysis  of  the  law  of  causation. 
Instead,  resorting  to  common-sense  was  suggested  to  be  more  widely  accepted,  but  it 
remains problematic in terms of certainty. This thesis precisely purports to conclude a set of 
concrete causation rules which is far from theoretical to tackle the uncertainty arising from 
facts  and  common-sense.  The  warranty  agreed  in  the  contract  may  be  more  fruitful  and 
more related to the factual background; however, the legal theory of causation ought to be 
universally  applicable  in  the  context  of  the  insurance  law.  Therefore,  respectfully 
disagreeing with Prof Clarke’s concerns, I suggest that a “but for” causal link undertaken by 
the assured can be one of the efficient ways to resolve the harshness in current law. 
Essentially, the two reform plans both aim to redress the unfairness and impracticalities of 
the old warranty law, but from different focus with different degrees of reform. It is pretty 
clear that if the effect of warranty retains as before, a causal link is the most appropriate 
manner;  if  the  effect  itself  is  totally  altered  in  law,  it  simply  implies  that  warranties  are 
removed from insurance law and have become obsolete. One cannot generally come to a 
conclusion as to which one is better. This is all about how far the reform is  intended to 
reach. However, in terms of certainty, which is recognised as the most important feature of 
English  common  law  and  for  commercial  reasons,  it  would be  more sensible  to  abandon 
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warranty  in  law  completely  and  leave  the  issues  to  freedom  of  contract  and  matters  of 
construction.  
With  respect  of  marine  insurance,  it  is  the  prevailing  customary  legislative  operation  in 
common  law  jurisdictions  to  separate  marine  insurance  from  the  general  insurance 
contracts, in which case the marine insurance law remains unprejudiced.
437 In light of the 
new trend in reforming the warranty in all types of insurance contracts, the marine sector 
seems  to   face  a  more  complex  and  challenging  task.  The  Consultation  Paper  2007 
suggested that express warranties in  a  marine policy, though very rare, ought to  be 
connected to the loss. The implied marine warranties should also contribute to the loss if 
the defence seeks to succeed. However, the standard is lessened compared with the 
proximate cause of loss. That is to say, in the case of seaworthiness, the implied warranty in 
a voyage policy need not be the dominant cause, which is distinguished from the exception 
in the case of a time policy.
438 
This plan is strikingly different from the reform plan of Australia which is considerably 
influenced  by  the  Norwegian  Marine  Insurance  Plan.
439  The  Norwegian  Plan  does  not 
differentiate between time and voyage policies in term s of seaworthiness in the 1999 
version, which stated that “The assured has the burden of proving that he neither knew nor 
ought to have known of the defects, and that there is no causal connection between the 
unseaworthiness  and  the  casualty.”
440  However,  this  section,  concerning  exclusively 
unseaworthiness, has been removed since 2003 version. Instead, unseaworthiness will be 
governed  by  the  general  rule  s  3-9  “alteration  of  the  risk  caused  or  agreed  to  by  the 
assured”: “If it must be assumed that the insurer would have accepted the insurance, but on 
other conditions, he is only liable to the extent that the loss is proved not to be attributable 
to the alteration of the risk.”  
Also  having  treated  time  policies  and  voyage  policies  identically  in  this  regard,  the 
Australian  Law  Commission  intended  to  abolish  the  concept  of  “implied  warranty”  in  the 
marine insurance law entirely but to introduce a regime similar to an express warranty in the 
policy  and  apply  the  rules  of  an  express  warranty.  The  causation  standard  should  be 
whether loss was “attributable to” the breach, adopting the language of the 1906 Act s 45(5) 
(words identical to s 39(5) of the English 1906 Act). Particularly, the phrase “attributable to” 
should  be  interpreted  as  “proximately  caused  by”.
441  Therefore,  it  recommended  that 
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unseaworthiness ought to be the proximate cause of loss against which the insurer defends 
either on the ground of breach of the warranty or as an excluded risk. Moreover, the burden 
of proving the lack of causal link undoubtedly should be placed on the side of the assured.  
Prof Howard Bennett has warned that seaworthiness should be considered within the whole 
picture of international shipping law, in particular with reference to shipping safety.
442 It has 
more legal  significance  than a contractual term in  a marine policy. Therefore, an implied 
warranty of seaworthiness in voyage policies ought to remain. However, The Australian Law 
Commission  explained  the  removal  of  implied  warranty  of  seaworthiness   would  not 
jeopardize marine safety, as the deterrent effect   of unseaworthiness not only rem ains 
working, but also it grapples with the unfairness to the assureds in terms of recovery. After 
all, it is open for the parties to agree to the effect by a contractual express warranty. 
When it comes to the Consultation Paper 2012, the causal link issue in marine insurance is 
not  recommended. The Law Commission continues  to suggest  that, subject to  contrary 
agreement, the express warranties in marine insurance should comply with the general view 
of insurance law. As to implied warranties, since there is no great support for  the removal 
and since they have been employed over hundreds years in English marine insurance law, 
the Law Commission intends to retain implied   warranties in current form; however, the 
effect of breach should be the same as proposed in the case of   express warranties. For 
instance, if the ship left the port in an unseaworthy condition but  was repaired  in an 
intermediary call, the insurer should co ntinue to cover the loss caused by an insured peril 
after the remedy. On the other hand, during the unseaworthy period, the insurer ought not 
to be liable for the loss, as  the concept of  seaworthiness is  necessary  to reduce marine 
perils, the breach of which will lead to the discharge of the insurer’s liability. Regardless, it 
seems ascertained that warranties in marine insurance law will be subjected to the reform of 
general  insurance  contract  law.  Compared  with  the  Australian  proposal,  English  Law 
Commissions take a milder step in terms of the implied warranty of marine insurance. “No 
harm to retain it” seems to be the best reason and answer. Moreover, it is more plausible 
and  logical  to  maintain  most  consistency  between  marine  and  non-marine  law  in  this 
respect,  since the proposal  “suspensive”  effect  of  warranty  would  remove the grounds  of 
Australian Law Commission’s confidence in maintaining the marine safety in the absence of 
the implied warranty of “seaworthiness”. 
5.3 Seaworthiness as a cause of loss 
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Per Tindal C.J in Sadler v Dixon,
 443 it was held that there was no distinction as to the implied 
warranty of seaworthiness under a voyage policy and a time policy. Before long, in Gibson v 
Small,
444  the  House  of  Lords  established  that  by  the  law  of  England,  there  is  no  implied 
warranty that the ship should be seaworthy on the day when the policy is intended to attach. 
The  majority  (seven  out  of  nine)  found  that  no  analogy  could  be  drawn  between  time 
policies and voyage policies in terms of an implied warranty of seaworthiness. Besides all 
cases that had ever been decided were related to voyage policies, most Lords found it would 
be implausible and impractical to imply such a warranty in law, as the shipowner might even 
not be able to control the vessel in every voyage designated in the duration of the policy. In 
particular, Talford J pointed out that the definition of seaworthiness was exclusively related 
to one particular voyage, rather than to an overly flexible and uncertain manner as in a time 
policy;  Baron  Martin  and  Baron  Alderson  further  iterated  how  it  was  inappropriate  to 
determine the commencement  of  the implied  warranty  of  seaworthiness  in  a  time  policy, 
unlike  a  voyage  policy.  In  contrast,  Williams  J  and  Erle  J,  in  their  dissenting  judgment, 
insisted that time policies should be subject to the implied warranty. Williams J considered 
that  seaworthiness  was  a  common  foundation  of  both  time  policies  and  voyage  policies, 
though the degrees differed. Erle J reasoned that such warranty was the insurer’s basis of 
calculating premium and presented fruitful expositions of the Jurists in order support his 
judgment,  though  most  of  which  had  been  re-cited  and  opposed  by  Baron  Parke  in  the 
following  judgment.  Erle  J  suggested  the  terms  and  the  constructions  in  both  types  of 
policies should be identical except that “in voyage-policies, they are measured by the motion 
of the ship; in time-policies, by the motion of the earth.” Regardless, the rule has been set 
up and has been codified into the 1906 Act. Pursuant to s 39(5), in a time policy, although 
unseaworthiness is not an implied warranty, the insurer is still entitled to refuse the liability 
caused by unseaworthiness with the privity of the assured. Sir Mackenzie, who codified the 
Act, cited and relied upon McArthur, The Contract of Marine Insurance, 2nd ed. (1890): 
... if the assured knowingly send the vessel to sea in an unseaworthy state, and 
she be lost in consequence thereof, the loss will not be recoverable, though the 
direct cause of loss be a peril insured against, because it was originally caused 
by the wrongful act of the assured.
445 
Over a century, various arguments and even alterations of this provision have arisen, 
surrounding two important issues: first the test of causation,  the second, how to define the 
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privity of the assured.
446 Besides, as above mentioned, seaworthiness and perils of the sea 
have an unavoidable link arising from the definitions. Therefore, this connection,  and in 
particular, whether unseaworthiness and perils of the sea can jointly result   in a lo ss as 
concurrent causes will be analysed and answered. 
5.3.1 Test of Causation  
Per Lord Mance in The Cendor Mopu: 
When the Act was passed, the language “loss attributable to unseaworthiness” 
catered for the Victorian reluctance to look behind the last cause in time to any 
previous cause. How far the word “attributable” now allows regard to be had to 
causes which would, under modern conceptions, not be regarded as proximate 
appears undecided, and may in turn depend upon how far modern conceptions 
of  proximity  can,  in  cases  of  unseaworthiness,  lead  the  eye  back  beyond  the 
immediate  cause  to  initial  unseaworthiness  as  the  real,  dominant  or  effective 
cause. 
The important “how far” question, regretfully, still remains open in this case, as the focus of 
the decision was diverted to “inherent vice” and its proximity test in s 55(2). 
The legal connection between unseaworthiness and losses has been analysed in a carriage 
case,  Smith,  Hogg  v  Black  Sea  &  Baltic.
447  The  shipowner claimed  a  general  average 
contribution from the charterer under a charterparty concluded for carrying  an amount of 
timber. The charterparty stated that the shipowner should not be liable for loss or damage 
resulting from unseaworthiness unless caused by want of due diligence on the part of the 
shipowner  to  make  the  vessel  seaworthy;  and  also  that  the  shipowner  should  not  be 
responsible for loss or damage arising from (amongst other things) act, neglect or default 
of  the  master  in  the  navigation  or  management  of  the  ship  or  from  perils,  dangers  and 
accidents of the sea. The vessel had been overloaded and commenced the voyage. She put 
into a port on the way to replenish her bunkers and she fell on her beam end subsequently.  
Before  the  appeal  to  the  House  of  Lords,  both  courts  below  decided  the  vessel  was  not 
seaworthy and the shipowner had not exercised due diligence. However, the first instance 
decision  found  that  unseaworthiness  did  not  cause  the  loss,  having  considered  that  the 
unseaworthy condition had been remedied after the bunkering (which actually was not the 
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case); whereas the Court of Appeal held the cause of loss was unseaworthiness due to a 
failure to exercise due diligence. 
Lord  Wright  in  the  House  of  Lords  looked  into  the  pure  causation  on  the  divergent 
conclusions of the two courts below. Lord Wright supported that “A shipowner is responsible 
for loss or damage to goods, however caused, if his ship was not in a seaworthy condition 
when  she  commenced  her  voyage,  and  if  the  loss  would  not  have  arisen  but  for  that 
unseaworthiness.”
448 Therefore, unseaworthiness in the law of carriage by sea applies a “but 
for” test in terms of causation. Moreover, as to the possibility of an intervening cause, Lord 
Wright doubted “whether there could be any event which could supersede or override the 
effectiveness of the unseaworthiness if it was a cause.” 
Most importantly, Lord Wright attempted to distinguish the test in carriage cases from those 
in marine insurance law, as “the selection of the relevant cause or causes will generally vary 
with the nature of the contract.” In particular with seaworthiness, he continued: 
In the former [marine insurance], unseaworthiness is a condition precedent (at 
least in voyage policies) and if not complied with the insurance never attaches. In 
carriage of goods by sea, unseaworthiness does not affect the carrier's liability 
unless it causes the loss, as was held in The Europa [[1908] P. 84] and in Kish v. 
Taylor [[1912] A. C. 604]. (Brackets added) 
However, Lord Wright’s analysis on the distinction between the carriage by sea and marine 
insurance law seems ineffective in the case of a time policy. In time policies, it is explicit 
that seaworthiness is not a “condition precedent” according to s 39(5). Literally speaking, 
unseaworthiness is simply to be uninsured peril.
449 Thus, there seems no distinction from 
the nature of the contracts be tween the carriage contract and a time policy in this regard. 
Moreover,  “attributable  to”
450  employed  in  the  subsection  is  literally  different  from  the 
wording of s 55(1), but the same as the phrase in respect of “wilful misconduct”. Based upon 
these observations, is the test of proximity redundant in determining the liability when one 
cause of loss is unseaworthiness based upon the nature of the marine insurance contract? 
The answers provided in the case law are hardly consistent. 
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In an old case, Thompson v Hopper,
 451 an action on a time policy on a ship for a total loss, 
the  majority  of  the  judges  in  the  Exchequer  Chamber  held  that  the  act  of  the  insured 
knowingly sending the ship to sea could only discharge the liability of the underwriter if the 
unseaworthiness was the immediate cause of loss. In that era, the causation test was known 
as  the  immediate  cause  in  time  order.  Therefore,  it  seems  the  courts  had  held  a  high 
standard of causation between unseaworthiness and the loss. However, Crowder J dissented 
in the sense that the unseaworthiness should be sufficient to affect the liability if it was 
acting as a mere “but for” cause. Furthermore, in West India and Panama Telegraph Co Ltd v 
Home and Colonial Marine Insurance Co Ltd,
452 it was affirmed that though unseaworthiness 
in a time policy was a  causa sine qua non, the explosion, an insured peril, was a proximate 
cause. Accordingly, the underwriter was held liable, as only the effective cause mattered. 
However, after the enactment of the 1906 Act and the recognition of the test of efficiency, a 
few  cases  supported  the  “but  for”  test.  George  Cohen  Sons  &  Co  v  Standard  Marine 
Insurance  Co  Ltd
453  has  followed  the  principle  set  up  in  Thomas  v  London  and  Provincial 
Marine  and  General  Insurance  Co  Ltd,
454  which  is  “it  is  enough  if  the unseaworthiness  to 
which the assured is privy forms part of the cause of the loss.” Both cases were concerned 
with the loss of vessel under a time policy. 
Again, the prevailing test has returned to the proximate cause of efficiency in the last few 
decades.  In  the  celebrated  case,  The  Miss  Jay  Jay,
455  the Court of Appeal has held ill -
designed and ill-constructed hull and adverse conditions of sea had concurrently and equally 
contributed to the loss. The unseaworthiness of the vessel had been examined as exclusion 
of the coverage in accordance with the express indication in the time policy. Subsequently, 
even though the forms of unseaworthiness are not enumerated under the exclusion clause, 
cases have still been determined  by  a test of proximity. In  Marina  offshore  v  China 
Insurance  co  (Singapore),
456  the  court  found  that  “no  finding  as  to  how  the  crew’s 
incompetence had on its own operated as a proximate cause of the loss. Accordingly, the 
insurers had some difficulty in meeting this requirement.” [Emphasis added] More recently, 
in view of the analysis of Lord Mance in The Cendor Mopu on the distinguished causation 
wording,  “attributable  to”,  it  is  suggested  that  such  wording  is  equivalent  to  the 
“proximately  caused  by”  in  the  modern  context,  as  the  test  of  efficiency  has  tackled  the 
problem  caused  by  the  test  of  the  last  cause  in  time  order.
457  Moreover,  the  Law 
Commission’s  Consultation  Paper  recognised  that  the  causal  connection  in  time  policies 
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required the insurer to “prove that the breach was a real or dominant cause of the loss,”
458 
which  differs  from  the  proposed  “but  for”  test  in  terms  of  breach  of  the  warranty  of 
seaworthiness in voyage policies. 
However,  some  scholars,  such  as  Prof  Howard  Bennett  and  Dr  Susan  Hodges  prefer  to 
support the formulation in carriage cases that unseaworthiness ought to affect the insurer’s 
liability as long as it had been one of the contributing causes and with the privity of the 
assured.
459 One commonly recognised reason by the two scholars is that if unseaworthiness 
itself is the proximate cause, it means it is superfluous  whether the condition is under the 
assured’s knowledge or not, as the coverage is simply negated in light of the loss caused by 
an uninsured peril. Moreover, Prof Bennett suggests that the significance of subsection (5) 
lies in the “privity” requirement in modern marine insurance law. Therefore, reading s 39(5) 
as a whole, the test of causation should be “a” cause instead of “the proximate” cause. 
Given that the “but for” test is the genuine test of causation in s 39(5), where a loss was 
proximately caused by an insured peril, such as perils of the sea, and that unseaworthiness 
contributed a lesser causal effect to the loss (or even an equal efficiency), (1) the insurer is 
liable if the assured was not aware of such unseaworthiness; (2) the insurer is not liable if 
the privity of the assured had been proved. Therefore, unseaworthiness can affect liability of 
the insurer without being the proximate cause under the condition of the assured’s privity, 
even though the proximity has been established between an insured peril and the loss in 
compliance with s 55.  
However, an attention should be paid to contractual variation, which is allowed by s 33(3), 
whether express or implied warranties. In a time hull policy, seaworthiness may be either 
agreed as an express warranty or as a form of exclusion. In the former instance, no causal 
link is required according to the current law but subject to the reform in future which is 
prone to apply the “a cause” test. Under the latter circumstance, on the contrary, the test 
ought to be the proximate cause under s 55, or the otherwise-agreed test in the clause.
 460 So 
far  as  s  39(5)  is  concerned,  the  “attributable  to”  should  be  interpreted  in  the  manner 
suggested  by  the  learned  scholars  as  above,  viz.,  the  “but  for”  test.  However,  it  is 
noteworthy  in  the  case  that  unseaworthiness  is  an  insured  peril  that  Lord  Denning 
emphasised that there still remains room for the operation of s 39(5) so as to disentitle the 
assured from recovering if such unseaworthiness was in his privity and merely attributable 
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to  the  loss.
461  Furthermore, per Roskill LJ, an express provision is required in  order to 
exclude the effect of s 39(5) under such circumstances.
462 
5.3.2 “The Privity of the Assured” 
In Fawcus v Sarefield,
 463 it was considered that although “the defects were not known to him 
and he has acted without fraud” and although “there be no warranty of seaworthiness”, the 
insurer  should  not  recover  the  expenses  incurred  as  a  consequence  of  the  unseaworthy 
state  of  the  vessel  in  a  time  policy.  However,  two  decades  later,  the  House  of  Lords  in 
Dudgeon v Pembroke
464 declared that if a shipowner knowingly and wilfully sent his ship to 
sea in an unseaworthy condition in a time policy, the knowledge and wilfulness are essential 
elements in the consideration of his claim to recover. Consequently, s 39(5) stipulates that 
such unseaworthiness attributable to the loss should be under “the privity of the assured”; 
otherwise, the insurer should remain liable. If the assured has established that he lacks the 
privity or the courts have found no privity of the assured exists, it is necessary for the courts 
to enquire into the causation issue and the subsequent effect of s 39(5).
465 Therefore, this 
phrase has received judicial attention and two important cases have given clear i llustrations 
and established the principle of privity in  The Eurysthenes and The Star Sea.
466 Two crucial 
questions have been clarified, namely, who is the assured and what is privity. 
The issue of identifying the assured has been basically resolved by the two landmark cases. 
In The Eurysthenes, the assured shipowner found a cover against the damage to or loss of 
cargo  arising  from  unseaworthiness  or  unfitness  of  the  vessel  from  a  P&I  club.  Much  of 
cargo was lost, but the insurer rejected the claim on the ground of s 39(5), contending that 
the vessel was sent to sea in an unseaworthy condition with the shipowner’s privity. The fact 
showed that the vessel was not equipped with certified deck officers and proper charts, etc. 
Lord  Denning  held  that  “The  knowledge  must  also  be  the  knowledge  of  the  shipowner 
personally, or of his alter ego, or, in the case of a company, of its head men or whoever may 
be considered their alter ego,” but excluding those who merely acted as the servants of the 
assured.
467 This issue has been illustrated in  the extreme scenario  of The Star Sea, where 
four individuals (the beneficial shipowner, the registered shipowner, the manager and the 
registered manager) had been all involved and regarded as the “assured” on the basis of 
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Lord Denning’s formulation. The material question of ascertaining the assured ought to be 
who participated in making the decision to send The Star Sea to sea.
468 
In terms of the meaning of privity, in  the first place, it has been questioned and argued 
whether the neutral wording of “privity” altered the real law which appears to demand an 
element  of  fault.
469  Per Atkin J in  Thomas  v  Tyne  and  Wear  Steamship  Freight  Insurance 
Association:
470 
In the case of in surance under a time policy the intention was that the assured 
should be unable to recover in respect of a loss occasioned by his own fault. That 
was the rule under the law as it existed before the Act. It was always necessary to 
show that the loss was the   result of some misconduct. Now the statute has 
defined the degree of misconduct required as sending the ship to sea in an 
unseaworthy state with the privity of the assured. 
However, Prof Bennett suggests that “privity is not synonymous with any species of fault, but 
connotes instead knowledge of the vessel’s unseaworthiness, and an assured that, correctly, 
suspects  unseaworthiness  and  refrains  from  enquiry  in  order  to  avoid  having  suspicion 
transformed  into  certainty  is  taken  as  having  the  requisite  knowledge.”  The  same 
proposition can also be found in The Arnould’s. Furthermore, a reconciling approach to the 
interpretation of this term was employed by the Singapore Court of Appeal, who understood 
the privity as the situation in which the assured knowingly or recklessly closed its eyes to an 
unseaworthy condition based upon the English authority, The Eurysthenes.
471 It seems true 
that privity is not equivalent to any particular type of fault; it may connote various states of 
mind, such as wilful misconduct, reckless and even sometimes negligence.
472 S 39(5) seems 
to stress that the assured has to undertake the consequence s of his own decision without 
reference to the mentality or purpose of such  a decision to send an unseaworthy vessel to 
sea. This is also echoed  in the approach of identifying the assured, i.e. the decision-maker. 
Therefore, the law would be narrowed down if it had been codified from the aspect of the 
assured’s fault. 
Regardless,  the  predominant  construction  of  “privity”  refers  not  only  to  the  actual 
knowledge of the assured, but also to the fact that he had turned a blind eye in ascertaining 
such  unseaworthiness.  Lord  Denning  gave  the  celebrated  test  in  The  Eurysthenes,  with 
which Roskill LJ and Geoffrey Lane LJ concurred: 
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To disentitle the shipowner, he must, I think, have knowledge not only of the 
facts  constituting  the  unseaworthiness,  but  also  knowledge  that  those  facts 
rendered  the  ship  unseaworthy,  that  is,  not  reasonably  fit  to  encounter  the 
ordinary  perils  of  the  sea.  And,  when  I  speak  of  knowledge,  I  mean  not  only 
positive  knowledge,  but  also  the  sort  of  knowledge  expressed  in  the  phrase 
"turning a blind eye." If a man, suspicious of the truth, turns a blind eye to it, and 
refrains from inquiry - so that he should not know it for certain - then he is to be 
regarded  as  knowing  the  truth.  This  "turning  a  blind  eye"  is  far  more 
blameworthy than mere negligence. Negligence in not knowing the truth is not 
equivalent to knowledge of it.
473 
Again, the House of Lords in The Star Sea have reviewed and analysed the cited decision, 
concentrating  especially  on  the  “blind  eye  test”.  A  fire  started  in  the  engine  room  and 
resulted  in  the  constructive  total  loss  of  the  ship  with  cargo  on  board.  The  underwriter 
sought to deny the liability on the ground of s 39(5) and the breach of utmost good faith. In 
terms of the blind eye test, in Lord Clyde’s judgment, the test requires a “conscious reason 
for blinding the eye”, or “at least a suspicion of a truth which you do not want to know and 
which you refuse to investigate.” Lord Hobhouse approved of Lord Clyde’s statement and 
further posed the illuminating question: “why did he not inquire?” The purpose should be in 
the hope avoid certain knowledge of the truth, in this case, unseaworthiness, as provided by 
Roskill LJ and Geoffrey Lane LJ in  The Eurysthenes. Lord Scott upheld the same view and 
limited the suspicion in the way that “the suspicion must be firmly grounded and targeted 
on specific facts. The deliberate decision must be a decision to avoid obtaining confirmation 
of facts in whose existence the individual has good reason to believe.” Ultimately, the blind-
eye test with all these statements has been applied and highlighted by Lord Hobhouse’s 
conclusion on the factual privity: 
The inadequate response to the previous casualties was evidence consistent with 
a number of states of mind of those concerned with the management of the fleet 
and  does  not  without  more  establish  that  there  was  privity  in  relation  to  any 
individual vessel. [Emphasis added] 
5.3.3 Concurrent Causes: Unseaworthiness and Perils of the Sea? 
Unseaworthiness in a time policy may simply act as an uninsured peril and s 39(5) does not 
apply, for instance, where no privity of the assured has been established, and both perils of 
the sea and such unseaworthiness were causative of the loss; alternatively, where the policy 
explicitly  indicates  that  some  forms  of  unseaworthiness  is  insured  against  or  excluded. 
Under such circumstances, the principle of proximity under s 55 subject to otherwise agreed 
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is  revived  and  becomes  determinant  of  the  insurer’s  liability.  Returning  to  the  question 
posed  in  the  overview  of  the  definition  of  seaworthiness,  the  meaning  of  seaworthiness 
unavoidably leads to a tangled relationship with perils of the sea, especially when both of 
them are acting as causes of a loss. 
The Miss Jay Jay is the most relevant and direct authority on debility of the ship and perils 
of the sea jointly and proximately causing the loss of an insured yacht. Against the wording 
as to “solely caused by” contained in the time policy in  The Miss Jay Jay, Lord Wright in 
Smith,  Hogg  v  Black  Sea  &  Baltic
474  stated  that  unseaworthiness  could  never  be  the  sole 
cause. It must always be only one of several co-operating causes. Moreover, Lord Wright in a 
later case, A/B Karlshamns Oljefabriker v Monarch Steamship Co Ltd,
475 reiterated that:  
Seaworthiness as a cause cannot from its very nature operate by itself; it nee ds 
the "peril" in order to evince that the vessel, or some part or quality of it, is less 
fit than it should have been and would have been if it had been seaworthy, and 
hence the casualty ensues. 
However, Lord Mance in  The Cendor Mopu
476 implied contributory causes of internal nature, 
such  as  inherent  defects  of  ships  and  cargo,  ought  not  to  be  regarded  as  a  concurrent 
proximate  cause  with  perils  of  the  sea.  This  proposition  may  affect  the  possibility  of 
seaworthiness  to  apply  the  rules  of  “concurrent  causes”  thereafter.  After  all,  as 
demonstrated  in  Chapter  Four  Inherent  Vice,  The  Cendor  Mopu  may  be  deemed  as  an 
authority to reject the concurrency between internal risks and external ones. Thus, it seems 
doubtful  whether  unseaworthiness  and  perils  of  the  sea  can  be  concurrent  proximate 
causes. 
At the outset, a few observations and conditions need to be clarified and admitted. Firstly, 
“perils  of  the  sea”  is  the  peril  defined  under  r  7  of  the  Schedule  in  the  1906  Act,  as 
distinguished from perils at sea. Secondly, seaworthiness is not a warranty in the dispute 
and  the  doctrine  of  proximity  applies  in  determining  the  recovery.  Thirdly, 
(un)seaworthiness has to be testified by perils of the sea along with the factual evidence of 
defects, and thus in most cases these two causes coexist. The key question is remaining to 
be  how  to  judge  the  efficiency  in  law.  It  seems  that  the  definition  of  seaworthiness  has 
already  provided  an  answer,  which  is  whether  the  “perils  of  the  sea”  in  question  is 
ordinary/reasonable or not. 
(1) If there were no perils of the sea but merely an ordinary movement of the sea, the loss of 
an unseaworthy vessel should be regarded as solely caused by unseaworthiness. Therefore, 
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unseaworthiness was the proximate cause. For instance, in E. D. Sassoon & Co. v Western 
Assurance Company
477, the insured opium stored on a wooden hulk moored in a river was 
damaged by water percolating through a leak caused by the rotten condition of the hulk 
unknown to the assured, the Privity Council recognised the loss was proximately caused by 
unseaworthiness of the vessel instead of perils of the sea. 
(2)  If  perils  of  the  sea  were  ordinary  and  the  vessel  was  still  lost  due  to  its  defect,  it 
amounted to unseaworthiness and both perils were attributable to the loss. In this occasion, 
the  two  factors  are  likely  to  be  concurrent  proximate  causes  and  The  Miss  Jay  Jay  rule 
should apply.  
“Ordinary”  in  this  context  coincides  with  the  “ordinary”  in  the  statutory  definition  but 
describing “actions of wind and waves”. However, “ordinary” in the face of perils of the sea is 
the  test  of  seaworthiness  and  also  an  insured  peril  in  most  policies,  while  the  statutory 
definition is the test of existence of perils of the sea and uninsured. These two “ordinary” 
are  somewhat  confusing,  which  may  be  relative  to  and  have  affected  the  decisions  of 
Mountain v Whittle
478 and the Mayban case, in the way that the court held perils of the sea 
should  be  exceptional  in  order  to  outweigh  the  causal  effect  of  unseaworthiness  and 
inherent vice of the goods insured for the voyage.  
An  effective  manner  in  which  to  define  whether  perils  of  the  sea  is  ordinary  or  not  is 
whether  the  condition  of  the  sea  is  foreseen  or  foreseeable  based  upon  customary  and 
seafaring common-sense and experience. A more specific and clear way is illustrated in the 
Garnat Trading & Shipping (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Baominh Insurance Corp,
479 although the 
argument concerning unseaworthiness  primarily  focused on the factual basis, both an 
Assessment of Strength, Stability and Unsinkability in Towage Plan and Instructions g iven to 
the Captain stated that the floating dock insured was only allowed for ocean towing on the 
basis of the permissible wave scale 5 at a maximum wave height of approximately 3.5 
metres. The Court   of Appeal held that ,  “We  think  that  the  correct  analysis  is  that  the 
adventure insured was one where it was contemplated by the parties that there would be a 
maximum wave height of 3.5 m, so that the Dock had to be fit in all respects to encounter 
the ordinary perils of the seas for that adventure, rather than some other voyage. In short, 
the contemplated voyage for insurance purposes was one where the maximum wave height 
would be 3.5 m.” 
On  applying  The  Miss  Jay  Jay  rule,  where  an  insured  peril  and  an  uninsured  peril 
concurrently cause a loss, the insurer should be liable for that loss. This result is compatible 
with the House of Lord’s intention to broaden scope of perils of the sea and the insurer’s 
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coverage. Also, it is consistent with the law that perils of the sea do not have to contain 
exceptional elements. 
 (3) On the contrary, where the perils of the sea were extraordinary and unseaworthiness is 
also  proved,  even  if  both  factors  had  contributed  to  the  loss,  perils  of  the  sea  should 
outweigh  unseaworthiness  in  efficiency,  as  the  vessel  was  not  expected  to  survive  such 
perils and such perils of the sea are exactly what had been agreed to cover against under 
the  policy.  This  is  where  the  aim  and  commercial  sense  of  the  policy  lie.  Therefore,  the 
proximate cause of loss should be perils of the sea and the loss should be recoverable. 
In conclusion,  in conformity  with the view expressed  in Chapter Two Concurrent  Causes, 
unlike internal risks of goods, it is legally possible that unseaworthiness and perils of the 
sea  can  be  regarded  as  concurrent  proximate  causes  when  ascertaining  the  insurer’s 
liability. M. SONG 
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Chapter 6: Burden of Proof 
Lord Hoffman commented on the regime of burden of proof as follows:
480 
If a legal rule requires a fact to be p roved (a “fact in issue”), a judge or jury must 
decide whether or not it happened. There is no room for a finding that it might 
have happened. The law operates a binary system in which the only values are 0 
and 1. The fact either happened or it did not. If the tribunal is left in doubt, the 
doubt  is  resolved  by  a  rule that  one  party  or  the other  carries  the  burden  of 
proof. If the party who bears the burden of proof fails to discharge it, a value of 
0 is returned and the fact is treated as not having happened. If he does discharge 
it, a value of 1 is returned and the fact is treated as having happened. 
Proof is an intermediary and crucial session between the facts, supporting evidence and the 
application of the substantive law. This chapter will discuss the burden of proof regarding 
causation  under  the  law  of  marine  insurance.  Assureds  and  insurers  undertake  different 
matters and standards of proof, which reflects balanced of allocation of the obligation and 
the protection of the interests. If a party fails to discharge this onus he will bear the risk of 
the  adverse  consequences  in  proceedings.  The  general  principles,  presumptions  and 
exceptions will be demonstrated and analysed by virtue of a detailed studying of English 
case law.  
6.1 General Principles  
6.1.1 Burden of Proof on the Assureds 
It has been universally recognised that the assured bears the onus to show the loss was 
proximately  caused  by  an  insured  peril  on  balance  of  probabilities  in  English  marine 
insurance law. The assured would be disentitled to the recovery, if he failed to meet the 
burden  of  proof.
  481  For  instance,  Lord  Dunedin  stated  in  Becker  Gray  &  Co  v  London 
Assurance Corp
482 that the assured had failed to discharge his burden of proving that there 
was a present and actual peril which proximately resulted in the loss. The House of Lords 
held the frustration of the adventure was caused, not by a peril insured against, but by the 
voluntary act of the captain in putting the ship into a port of refuge to avoid risk of capture. 
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Likewise, in The Tropaioforos,
483 the shipowner sought for the recovery of  a vessel sunk by 
perils of the sea, while the insurer re fused and contended the loss was caused by scuttling. 
Pearson J reaffirmed that it has been well established that the assured bears the burden of 
proof of demonstrating that the accidental loss was proximately caused by an insured peril, 
notwithstanding the mere standard of balance of probabilities. Nevertheless, the Judge still 
held the assured failed to discharge his burden of proof; instead he found in favour of the 
insurer’s theory which provided the sole explanation of the loss, namely, the scuttling.    
Besides English law, the Australian Law Reform Commission recognises the same principle 
relating to burden of proof and intended to codify it as follows:
 484 
To make a claim under a marine insurance contract, an insured has the burden to 
prove, on the balance of probabilities, that  
  the loss was caused by a peril which was insured against in the contract, and  
  the alleged cause of loss was the proximate cause.  
Theoretically speaking, the onus may be varied by explicit otherwise words in the contract.
485 
Where a policy issued by the insurer stated that “the Insured should prove that such loss or 
damage happened independently of the existence of such abnormal conditions” which refers 
to the excluded perils, the court held that the clause effectively reversed the onus of proof.
486 
It has been further clarified by Mustill J in  The Spinney’s
487 that in order to benefit from this 
type of clause, the underwriters must produce prima facie evidence demonstrating that the 
loss was caused by an excepted peril, and only when the cause of loss becomes arguable the 
assured should disapprove the exclusions. Thus, this type of clause seems to impose on the 
assured of contractual secondary onus of proof; whereas, the conventional burdens of proof 
on both  parties  remain  unchanged. Otherwise,  in  the absence of  such  an  agreement,  the 
assured does not have an initial or secondary burden to disprove the loss was caused by an 
excepted peril.
488 
It is noteworthy that the wordings in the agreement must be explicitly refe rring to the issue 
of burden of proof, rather than a mere warranty or precedent condition to the claim. In  Bond 
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Air  Services  v  Hill,
489  the policy provided that the obse rvance and performance of the 
conditions by the claimants and their servants were conditions precedent to their right to 
recover. The insurer alleged that the assured should prove the fulfilment of the conditions; 
yet the court held that it was the insurer ’s burden to prove the breach of such condition or 
warranty, and the clause merely showed the nature of the condition rather than a switch of 
onus of proof. Therefore, the assured may undertake a higher burden of proof, subject to 
clear agreement in the policy. 
Notwithstanding the insurer’s defence in particular  regarding infringement of the duty of 
utmost good faith or warranties, the assured’s burden to prove the loss was caused by an 
insured peril initially in order to bring a sustainable claim remains unaffected.
490 Had these 
types of defence been proved by the insurer and approved by the court, they will have the 
effect of rendering the issue  immaterial as to  whether the loss was caused by an insured 
peril, as they go to the root of the policies or the in surer’s liability. Nevertheless, it does 
infer that the assured’s burden of proof as to the cause of loss is discharged or becomes 
unnecessary  in  the  proceedings.  Under  such  circumstances,  not  only  does  he  need  to 
undertake different burdens of proof to rebut the insurer’s defences, but also in order to 
finally succeed in the claim, it is necessary for the assured to establish the required causal 
link between an insured peril and the loss.  
6.1.2 Burden of Proof on the Insurers 
It has been indicated since late eighteenth century that the assured does not need to prove 
the loss was not attributed to an excepted cause.
491 It has been further clarified by Bailhache 
J in Munro Brice & Co v War Risks Association,
492 that if the assured has proved his loss, the 
burden then switches to the underwriters to demonstrate that the peril proximately causing 
the loss was uninsured or that some other defence exists; and it is necessary for the assured 
to bear the burden of proof to navigate the “exception” only when the term covers the whole 
scope  of  the  coverage,  in  this  case,  for  example,  a  deductible  condition.  Although  the 
conclusion of the judgment was reversed by the Court of Appeal
493 due to an inference of 
fact,  Bailhache  J’s  analysis  and  proposition  as  to  burden  of  proof  was  supported  by  the 
Court of Appeal. In general, if the underwriter attempts to avail himself of a non-insured or 
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an excluded cause in order to rebut the prima facie evidence provided by the assured, the 
burden  of  proof  will  be  shifted  to  him,  which  is  consistent  with  the long-established  yet 
significant principle of that the burden of proof lies upon him who claims. 
Lord Brandon in The Popi M
494 expressed a lenient attitude to the insurer’s burden to prove 
his defence in the sense that what remains on the part of the insurer is merely a choice or 
right to suggest and prove an alternative story of the causation accordingly which is not 
within the scope insured against under the policy on the balance of probabilities as well; 
there  is  no  obligation  to  suggest  some  other  cause  of  loss,  nor  even  to  prove  it  if  he 
suggested. Apparently, the learned Judge did not mean to impose any duty in terms of proof 
on the part of the insurer. It is indeed so only when the assured is initially trying to establish 
a prima facie recoverable loss by an insured cause. However, once the assured has managed 
to present a theory on the balance of probabilities to the courts, the insurer should be liable 
for  the  recovery  without  more.  However,  if  the  insurer  is  unhappy  with  the  result  and 
attempts to defend on the ground of an uninsured or excluded cause of loss, the burden of 
proof will practically shift to him.
495  
Echoing  to  the  freedom  and  boundary  of  the  insurer’s  position,  a  clear  “ambit”  of  the 
insurer’s burden of proof has been summarised in The Vergina (No.1)
496 on the basis of a 
few celebrated precedents regarding burden of proof in insurance law: the insurer is free to 
suggest and to prove a positive defence as to causation or not to do so; the insurer is free to 
disprove  the  assured’s  ground  for  his  claim  by  calling  evidence  or  cross-examining  the 
assured’s  witnesses.  However,  when  he  does  not  present  a  positive  defence,  he  is  NOT 
allowed to adduce any form of evidence to support such a positive defence and the court 
cannot work outside this ambit.
497 
6.1.3 Balance of Probabilities 
It has to be noted here that the test of proximity and test of balance of probabilities are 
different  issues  and  not  in  conflict.  Which  cause  is  proximate  is  a  substantive  question 
regarding  the  test  of  causation  which  has  been  solved  in  the  first  chapter;  contrariwise, 
burden of proof concerns procedural issues such as whether the insured peril, alleged to be 
the proximate cause by the assured, had in fact ever occurred and whether it is likely to be 
efficiently connected to the loss. For example, it was proposed by the Law Commission’s 
reform  on  the  insurance  contract  law  that  a  causal  link  between  such  a  breach  and  the 
consequence of loss should be required upon a test of balance of probabilities. Despite the 
fact that the substantive test of causation proposed differs from the doctrine of proximity, 
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however, the standard of proof is identical under the two circumstances, namely, balance of 
probabilities. 
Balance of probabilities is the renowned civil standard of proof, as opposed to the one in 
criminal law, “beyond reasonable doubt”. The balance of probability standard means that a 
court  is  satisfied  an  event  occurred  if  the  court  considers  that,  on  the  evidence,  the 
occurrence of the event was more likely than not,
498 and it must be applied with common 
sense.
499 
However, the civil standard of proof does not invariably mean a literal meaning of “balance 
of probability”. It is a flexible standard of different degrees of strictness according to the 
seriousness  of  what  has  to  be  proved  and  the  implications  of  proving  those  matters.
500 
Insurance is well known for the consideration of fortuity. Moral hazard inherently attaches to 
every policy. A few perils, in particular with the uninsured/excluded ones , overlap with the 
occasion of crimes, such as  barratry and wilful misconduct in the form of scuttling. 
However, it has been suggested that the standard of proof in this regard in unsettled.
501 
Barratry of the master or crew other than the assured himself is normally an insured peril 
subject to the insertion of The Inchmaree Clause in the policy. Given that the barratry of the 
master and crew is insured, the burden of proof in respect of  such kind of barratry lies on 
the assured. The owners must establish a loss and the absence of the owners' consent on a 
clear balance of probability. If in the end the court is left in doubt whether the owners 
consented or not, then the claim should fail.
502 Furthermore, it has been held that “in the 
absence of  suspicious  circumstances,  lack  of  consent  might  readily  be  inferred,  and very 
little in the way of proof might be necessary.”
503 
Occasionally, the assured may need to prove the loss was not caused by the barratry of the 
master and etc in order to prove an insured peril was the proximate cause. The standard of 
burden  of  proof  was  held  to  be  on  a  balance  of  probability.  The  Grecia  Express
504  is 
concerned with a claim by the owners against the insurers, alleging that the sinking of a car 
ferry was caused by unknown persons acting maliciously, an insured peril under the war 
risks cover. In terms of burden of proof, the commercial court held that the assured was 
required to establish that the deliberate sinking of the vessel fell within the scope of war 
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risk cover which did not include barratry, unlike the hull and machinery policy. The assured 
therefore had to prove on the balance of probabilities that the sinking was not caused by the 
master, the watchman or the crew so as to constitute barratry.  
In contrast, the barratry of the assured which is excluded from the coverage of the policy 
should  be  established  by  the  counter  party,  the  insurer.  In  Issaias  (Elfie  A)  v  Marine 
Insurance Co Ltd (The Elias Issaias),
505 Bailhache J, the judge at first instance, favoured the 
insurer’s argument that the sinking of the insured vessel was caused by the owner’s wilful 
scuttling along with the master. Bailhache J adopted the test of “beyond reasonable doubt”. 
This proposition was affirmed by the Court of Appeal, as the shipowner had been accused of 
the  severest  form  of  fraud  in  English  law,  which  would  constitute  a  crime;  however,  the 
result of the decision was overruled due to a contrary view and evaluation on the fact and 
evidence.  Atkin  LJ  in  the  Court  of  Appeal  held  that  the  assured  could  invoke  the  well-
recognised resumption of innocence in his favour in English law, when the insurer contended 
that he was guilty and privy to the scuttling. The judges unanimously concluded that the 
evidence was not solid enough to remove their doubts, so that the court the loss should be 
recovered either as a peril of the sea or as barratry of the master.  
The higher standard established in The Elias Issaias was recognised and followed by a few 
celebrated  cases,  The  Zinovia
506  and  The  Captain  Panagos  DP
507  relied  upon  the  obiter 
decision, contemplating that “once the owners have proved a casting away by the deliberate 
act of the master or crew, it is for the insurers to establish to the high standard required for 
the proof of fraud in a civil case that the owners consented to, or connived at, the casting 
away.” Furthermore, The Ny-Eeasteyr reaffirmed the standard of beyond reasonable doubt 
on the insurer, however, interestingly yet subtly describing it as “a balance of probability 
appropriate to the seriousness of the charge, a standard falling not far short of the rigorous 
criminal standard.”
508 
Nevertheless, some expositions oppose the application of the criminal test, insisting that 
the  civil  standard  should  be  applicable  in  cases  of  scuttling.
509  The  presumption  of 
innocence ought not to be invoked in such civil cases
510 and the criminal standard of burden 
of proof is too harsh to the insurer to defend himself of the assured’s wilful misconduct. 
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Particularly,  Arnould’s  suggests  that  the  civil  cases  involved  with  fraudulent  elements  or 
criminal  act  should  be  ultimately  decided  on  balance  of  probabilities  without  exception. 
Although all the aforementioned dicta seemingly indicated a different standard, in practical 
terms, there was  no difference in indicating  that “a  finding of  wilful misconduct  requires 
strong  evidence,  of  sufficient  strength  to  induce  a  high  level  of  confidence  that  the 
allegation is true.”
 511 
As  the  perils  of  a  severe  moral  hazard  normally  become  rarer  in  modern  context,  it  is 
natural and common-sensible to demand strong evidence to be convinced of the existence 
of the misconducts even in a civil case. Regardless, the balanced effect of burden of proof 
between the two parties in this regard has been succinctly concluded by Branson J in The 
Gloria:
 512  
The law is, in my opinion, clear. The onus of proof that the loss was fortuitous 
lies upon the plaintiffs, but that does not mean that they will fail if their evidence 
does not exclude all reasonable possibility that the ship was scuttled. Before that 
possibility  is  considered  some  evidence in  support  of  it  must  be  forthcoming. 
Scuttling is a crime, and the Court will not find that it has been committed unless 
it is proved with the same degree of certainty as is required for the proof of a 
crime. If, however, the evidence is such that the Court, giving full weight to the 
consideration that scuttling is a crime, is not satisfied that the ship was scuttled, 
but finds that the probability that she was is equal to the probability that her loss 
was fortuitous, the plaintiffs will fail. 
6.2 Generic Perils: All Risks and Perils of the Sea  
It is  suggested  that  the scope  of coverage  largely  determines  how  specific  the assured’s 
factual evidence ought to be in order to convince the court on balance of probabilities.
513 
Specifically, if insured perils are enumerated in the policy one by one, it indicates that the 
assured cannot discharge his burden of proof unless a causal link with a specified insured 
peril has been established on balance of probabilities. On the contrary, if the insured perils 
are described in a generic manner in the policy, the assured does not have to  prove which 
specific form of the type has caused the loss, but just need to prove the cause of loss 
occurred accidentally and “prima facie” falls in the generic scope.
514 
All Risks 
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“All risks” policies cover a significantly broad scope of risks except for some exclusion by 
agreement or statutes. English courts consider that the due to the nature of all risks cover, 
the assured is only required to prove an actual and fortuitous loss, irrespective of the exact 
form of the cause of loss. 
Wilson v Jones
515 came to the conclusion without reference to a specific peril insured against. 
The judges approved that the assured, who was the shareholder of the company, acquired 
insurable interest in the adventure on the profits deriving from the success of laying a cable 
in  a  marine  policy.  It  covered  “every  risk  and  contingency  attending  the  conveyance  and 
successful laying of the cable”. The operation failed and a portion of the cable was lost. Per 
Willes J., in answering whether the loss was caused by perils insured against, in the absence 
of mala fide or evidence of inherent defect of the cable, it was impossible to come to the 
conclusion that there was no evidence that the loss was caused by perils insured against. 
Moreover, in British & Foreign Marine Insurance Co Ltd v Gaunt,
516 Lord Birenhead provided 
the most frequently-cited basis for the assured’s burden of proof in an all risks cover: 
We are, of course, to give effect to the rule that the plaintiff must establish his 
case, that he must show that the loss comes within the terms of his policies; but 
where all risks are covered by the policy and not merely risks of a specified class 
or classes, the plaintiff discharges his special onus when he has proved that the 
loss was caused by some event covered by the general expression, and he is not 
bound to go further and prove the exact nature of the accident or casualty which, 
in fact, occasioned his loss.  
Croom-Johnson  J  cited  the  former  dictum  in  Theodorou  v  Chester
517  as  the  authority 
regarding the issue as to whether the assured should enjoy the recovery in an “all-risks” 
policy. Although the learned judge spent most of his judgment in analysing the evidence 
and witnesses, the law he considered was quite clear that “all risks of loss however arising” 
is not all-embracing. It requires the assured to show that the loss was due to “abnormal 
perils”. The wording used by the judge may be misleading to some extent; but based upon 
his  detailed  analysis.  “Abnormal  perils”  should  be  interpreted  as  some  accidental  cause 
instead  of  inevitable  events  or  “ordinary  actions  of  the  winds  and  waves”.  However,  the 
learned judge did go too far by declaring that “the assured was also required to disprove 
any counter-theory put forward by the insurer which was designed to show that the loss was 
due to normal transit risks.” The judge’s opinion is therefore incompatible with the general 
principle that the assured is not obliged to disprove the insurer’s explanation of causality. 
Even  if  the  insurer  directly  denies  the  assured’s  theory  by  a  mere  cross-examining  the 
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assured’s evidence without doing anything more, the assured is still not obliged to remove 
every doubt and question of the insurer, let alone disprove the insurer’s alterative account 
of events. The analysis of the case strangely reflects a strict attitude to the assured’s onus 
of proof in an “all-risks” cover, although in the end the judge granted the partial recovery.   
Recently, AXL Resources Ltd v Antares Underwriting Services Ltd
518 cited and addressed the 
obiter dictum of the former paragraph. The assured took a cargo policy on the terms of the 
Institute Cargo Clauses (A) with an additional exception of “Mysterious Disappearance and 
Stocktaking  Losses”.  The  assured  claimed  for  the  lost  cobalt  insured  in  the  policy  and 
provided the evidence saying that the cargo was likely to be stolen by a group of local gang. 
However,  the  insurer  rejected  the  claim  relying  upon  the  Mysterious  disappearance 
exception. So far as an “all-risks” cover is concerned, the Judge held that the only onus on 
the assured under such circumstance is to establish that the loss occurred accidentally. This 
means the assured’s burden of proof will be discharged as long as he can prove the fortuity 
of the loss. The Judge also relied upon the renowned treatise, MacGillivray
519 which indicates 
the  same  proposition.  Thus,  it  is  settled  that  the  law  discharges  the  assured’s  primary 
burden of proof in an “all-risks” cover by merely requesting a proof of fortuity in general 
situations. 
Perils of the Sea 
As discussed in Chapter Three, the statutory definition of perils of the sea
520 embraces quite 
a wide spectrum of fortuitous incidents of sea apart from the ordinary action of winds and 
waves. Thus, it has been  recognised that when the assured claimed in demnity by the perils 
of the sea, he should establish that there was an accidental event amounting to a peril of the 
sea.
521 Normally, it is not difficult to find some event amounting to perils of the sea (on a 
balance of probability) in a marine insurance case, notably the ingress of sea water, adverse 
weather conditions,  etc. That is why it appears simple for the assured to establish a loss 
caused by perils of the sea.  
However, it was held in The Cendor Mopu that the most frequent event, the ingress of water, 
does not automatically discharge the assured’s burden; the assured also has to prove the 
event is fortuitous.
522 The burden of proving fortuity in terms of perils of the sea enumerated 
in the policy differs from the burden to prove a fortuitous loss in the case of an “all risks” 
policy. In an “all-risks” cover, the requirement of fortuity does not derive from causation, but 
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from the fundamental doctrine of fortuity in insurance law; whereas, in terms of perils of the 
sea, the nature and concept of the peril requests a proof of fortuity. Proving the existence of 
a peril of the sea is the prerequisite to establishing the causal link between the peril and the 
loss.  
Thus, although peril of the sea is the most common form of the marine risks, the assured 
need to identify an event of perils of the sea and proves it has occurred accidentally. Once 
the two conditions have been satisfied, there is a prima facie case of perils of the sea. 
6.3 Unexplainable Losses 
Unexplainable losses are  interchangeably known as  mysterious losses/disappearance.
523  It 
has been  decided that a sweeping definition is not necessary as  the concept depends on 
context. “Normally it will involve a situation where the cause of the loss cannot be identified 
or the circumstances in which the property has been lost arouse speculation or are hard to 
explain.”
524 Unexplained losses may be rare in the light of modern developments of the ship 
engineering and technology. However, cases concerning unexplained losses have appeared 
since  the  earliest  stages  of  English  insurance  history.  The  concept  is  extremely 
unwelcoming,  as  it  brings  the  assureds  considerable  difficulty  in  proving  they  deserve 
indemnity; while insurers are reluctant to recover some losses which they do not even know 
what  had  happened.  As  above  indicated,  the  assured  undertakes  the  primary  burden  of 
proof, if failed, the loss would not be recovered. However, this rule is not always applicable, 
as English courts have developed a few presumptions and solutions in order to tackle the 
difficulty of providing evidence and the question as how to balance burden of proof between 
the two parties.  
In the old case Green v Brown,
525 the ship sailed out of port on her intended voyage, and was 
never been heard  from again. The ship was  assumed to  have  sunk based upon several 
witnesses’  opinions.  In  the  absence  of  a  clear  explanation  of  the  loss,  the  Chief  Justice 
considered that it would be unreasonable to expect certain evidence of such a loss from the 
assured  to  establish  the  loss  was  caused  by  a  certain  insured  peril;  and  all  that  can  be 
required is the best proof the nature of the case admits. 
Based  upon  the  former  case,  the  Court  in  La  Compania  Martiatu  v  Royal  Exchange 
Assurance  Corporation  (The  Arnus)
526  pronounced  a  further  presumption  that  when  a 
seaworthy  vessel  was  lost  by  unascertained  peril,  the  peril  must  be  presumed  to  be  an 
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insured  peril.  Two  evident  yet  strict  conditions  must  be  satisfied  in  order  to  apply  the 
presumption, viz., seaworthiness and “unexplainability”.
527  
Seaworthiness 
As  addressed  in  the  previous  chapter,  seaworthiness  is  either  an  implied  warranty  in  a 
voyage  policy  or,  generally,  an  uninsured  peril  in  a  time  policy.  Although  there  is  a 
presumption in English law that the vessel was seaworthy and therefore the burden of proof 
as to unseaworthiness is on the insurer,
528  the assured will find it necessary to establish 
seaworthiness in order to prove his case when he has no direct evidence of loss due to a 
fortuitous event, an unascertained peril of the sea.
529 There is a presumption that  without 
apparent evidence a missing ship was due to unseaworthiness, however it is a mere  prima 
facie presumption.
530  Therefore, where no direct evidence is left since the ship vanished 
without a trace, proving seaworthiness is not only  the only thing that  the assured may be 
only able to do, but also an act that rebuts such a presumption in fact.
531 On the other hand, 
in Davidson v Burnand,
532 when there is no proof that the vessel is not se aworthy, it had to 
be accepted that the cause should be marine perils and alike. The rationale is that as 
seaworthiness warrants the vessel is fit for the voyage against ordinary perils of the sea, it 
turns more probable that the loss was due to an unordinary action of the sea. 
Moreover, it is noteworthy that when the loss is not totally unexplainable, a presumption in 
fact that the ship is prima facie lost by unseaworthiness and   that therefore  the assured 
bears the burden of proof has also been drawn by En glish courts.
533 The classic scenario of 
these cases is that the vessel is known having been lost in calm sea shortly after departure. 
This presumption can be traced back from early nineteenth century in Watson v Clark.
534 The 
insured vessel became leaky without apparent reason a few days after the sail; the master 
ordered to return during which the ship struck on the reef and was lost. The insurer denied 
liability on the ground of unseaworthiness. The House of Lords held that if there is any other 
sufficient cause of this inability to perform the voyage in such a short time after sailing, then 
the ship might have been seaworthy; otherwise, the presumption is that she had not been 
seaworthy  and  the  onus  to  prove  its  seaworthiness  is  on  the  assured.  Additionally,  as 
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unseaworthiness would render the policy void in this case, the judges found hitting the reef 
did not break the chain of causation if unseaworthiness had been recognised. 
Subsequently, in the first instance trial of Anderson v Morice,
535 a case mainly concerning the 
issue of evidence, when the insured cargo was  being loaded, the ship suddenly began to 
leak,  and sank at her anchors in port in fine weather. The judges found reaffirmed the 
presumption  that  when  there  is  no  other  evidence  about  the  condition  of  the  ship, 
unseaworthiness can be presumed by the fact that the ship sunk without apparent cause in 
calm water and weather. However, it had been stressed that as long as other explanation s 
exist, the presumption cannot be invoked, and the fact in dispute should be judged by the 
jury. 
The presumption has been highlighted in the leading case  Pickup v The Thames and Mersey 
Marine Insurance Company.
536 This case is concerned with an insurance policy on freight. 
The insurer rejected recovering the loss on the ground of unseaworthiness as the vessel was 
compelled to return in a leaky state merely in eleven days after the sail, while the assured 
claimed the loss was caused by perils of the sea as she encountered hea vy seas  before 
deciding to return. An application was made to the Queen's Bench Division for a new trial on 
the ground that the jury had been misdirected by the judges in terms of burden of proof 
and then concluded a fact of unseaworthiness in favour of th e insurer. The Queen’s Bench 
Division with the approval of the Court of Appeal ordered a new trial. 
Cockburn  CJ  stated  that  the  presumption  is  merely  an  inference  of  fact,  namely  a 
presumption of fact, rather than a presumption in law:  
If  a  vessel  very  shortly  after  leaving  port  founders,  or  becomes  unable  to 
prosecute her voyage, in the absence of any external circumstances to account 
for such disaster or inability the irresistible inference arises, that her misfortune 
has been due to inherent defects existing at the time at which the risk attached. 
But this is not by reason of any legal presumption or shifting of the burden of 
proof, but simply as matter of reason and common sense brought to bear upon 
the question as one of fact, inasmuch as in the absence of every other possible 
cause  the  only  conclusion,  which  can  be  arrived  at,  is  that  inherent 
unseaworthiness must have occasioned the result…. 
In  terms  of  shifting  the  burden  of  proof  to  the  assured,  Thesiger,  L.J  explained  in  the 
following judgment: 
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…the burden of proof which originally lay upon the underwriters had shifted, and 
the burden was thrown upon the plaintiff of shewing that the loss of the vessel 
was due to the causes which had arisen subsequently to her sailing. The meaning 
of that was obviously this, that the jury must, from the short time that elapsed 
after  her  voyage  commenced,  presume  prima  facie  that  instead  of  the  vessel 
being  seaworthy,  as  they  would  have  presumed  without  any  evidence,  they 
presume that she was unseaworthy at the commencement, unless such evidence 
was given on the part of the plaintiff as to satisfy them that the loss was not due 
to unseaworthiness, but due to perils insured against. Therefore it appears to me 
that,  although  the  words  “as  a  matter  of  law”  may  have  been  used,  what  the 
learned judge really intended to say was, that the burden in point of fact had 
been shifted. But even in this point of view it seems to me that the learned judge 
misdirected  the  jury,  and  that  there  was  nothing  to  shew  or  to  justify  him  in 
saying that the burden of proof, as a matter of fact, had shifted, because at the 
very same time that it was proved that a short time had elapsed since the vessel 
had  started,  it  was  also  proved  that  there  was  weather  which  might  possibly 
account  for  the  loss  which  took  place.  Therefore,  upon  the  question  of 
seaworthiness, it seems to me that there was a clear misdirection. 
The case has at least contributed to clarifying the presumption of unseaworthiness, which 
requires the assured to prove the contrary, is simply an inference of fact based upon the 
circumstantial evidence showing that the loss could not be wholly explained. It has twofold 
meanings. On the one hand, generally speaking, seaworthiness in favour of the assured has 
been recognised as the presumption in law and the insurer undertakes the burden of proof 
if he opts to challenge it. On the other hand, “not wholly explained” refers to a situation 
between the mysterious situation where the ship had never been heard from again and an 
arguable situation where both parties contend different explanations of the cause of loss. In 
the latter case, the presumption in fact does not occur and the onus of proof does not shift. 
This is also echoed with the proposition that another explanation defeats the presumption 
as  held  in  the  two  precedents  mentioned  above.  These  dicta  have  been  considerably 
analysed and affirmed by the later cases, such as the frequently-cited case Ajum Goolam 
Hossen & Cov Union Marine Insurance Company.
537 
Unexplainable  
The basis of the presumption and the reason why it could be established and applied in 
Green v Brown, is the remarkable fact in the way that the ship had never been heard from 
after  the  sailing  and  no  positive  evidence  was  available.  The  case  should  be  completely 
impossible to ascertain what happened to the insured subject-matter. However, when the 
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crew on board are alive or heard from and some evidence remains available, despite the fact 
could not be wholly ascertained, the presumption is not applicable.
538 For examples, in both 
The Arnus and The Elias Issaias, where the ships were known to have sunk but the cause 
was  unascertainable,  as  some  evidence  from  the  board  was  still  available.  The  judges 
distinguished that the cases  were not unexplainable losses  and the presumption did  not 
apply. It should leave to the court to inquire and determine the dispute on such evidence. 
Moreover, when both parties provided two equally reasonable yet incompatible explanations 
of the cause of loss, the presumption should not be applied and the issue will be left to the 
court to decide which cause of loss is more persuasive. The landmark case The Popi M
 has 
perfectly demonstrated how the regime of burden of proof works under such circumstances. 
In this case, assured’s ship The Popi M sank in calm weather in deep water with a cargo of 
sugar  on  board.  The  assured  sought  to  claim  for  the  recovery  of  a  total  loss  due  to  an 
alleged collision with a submerged object. The decision of the trial judge and the Court of 
Appeal  respectively  approved  the  assured’s  claim,  despite  the  fact  that  whether  the  loss 
caused  proximately  by  the  alleged  perils  of  the sea  remained  in  doubt,  while  the  theory 
contended  by  the  underwriters  as  to  wear  and  tear  was  ruled  out  because  of  its  lower 
probability compared with the perils of the sea. Nevertheless, the House of Lords ultimately 
reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal and held the underwriters were not liable for 
the  indemnity  since  the  assured  failed  to  discharge  his  burden  of  proof.  Lord  Brandon 
explained that the loss did not occur in unexplained circumstances and the presumption in 
The Arnus was not applicable, despite the courts face a dilemma where the both parties’ 
theories remain in doubt. Nevertheless, Lord Brandon in this case stated a “third possible 
solution”  theory:  not  in  every  case  the  proximate  cause  of  the  loss  has  been  clearly 
ascertained by the proof of either the assured or the insurer; the judges do not have to 
select one between the two options. Rather, the “third possible solution” should be adopted 
that the assured has to bear the adverse consequence of failing to prove that the proximate 
cause was within the perils insured. That is to say, the assured bears a primary burden of 
proof on the proximate cause of the loss when he reports a loss for indemnity. Nevertheless, 
the “primary” duty does not imply a high threshold of discharging such burden. 
The approach set up by the House of Lords in The Popi M was cited and reaffirmed in The 
Marel.
539  Likewise, water entered in to the engine room and hold of  The  Marel  without 
apparent reason. The ship sank but the crew were rescued. The assured claimed for the loss 
by perils of the sea, probably hit by an object. The insurer rejected the claim merely alleging 
the loss was not caused by perils of the sea, without presenting another explanation. The 
Court of Appeal, approving the first instance decision, found the assured’s claim failed as he 
did not discharge his initial burden of proof on a balance of probability of establishing the 
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loss was proximately caused by the perils of the sea, even though the real cause of loss 
remained  unascertained. 
Colman J further explained for the application of the “third possible solution” in Glowrange 
Ltd v CGU Insurance Plc:
540 
In many cases there may be primary evidence which, although suggesting from 
where water entered a ves sel, does not indicate why the entry occurred. In such 
cases, if the assured is to establish a case of loss by perils of the seas strong 
enough to displace all other uneliminated but uninsured perils as possible causes of 
the loss, he will need to advance  a cogent explanation for the seawater entry on 
which he relies. Omission to do so may lead to the court being left in such doubt 
that it is unable to infer that the loss was more probably caused by perils of the 
seas than by an uninsured peril. That was th e case in both The POPI M and The 
MAREL.  
It is clear indicated that both precedents have been confined by  their  limited primary 
evidence that to no good explanation could be established nor eliminated. This is what has 
been  recognised by Thomas LJ in  Ide  v  ATB  Sales  Ltd,
541  that  The  Popi  M  was  unusual 
regarding the burden of proof, as courts frequently grapple with the situation that two or 
more  competing  theories  to  a  particular  event.  In  such  cases,  as  Thomas  LJ  concluded, 
courts  are  allowed  to  make decisions  by  ruling  out  all  of  the  explanations  but  one  AND 
examining the likelihood of the remaining one on balance of probabilities. If both conditions 
are satisfied, the remaining explanation should be declared the cause of loss. This approach 
is  somewhat  similar  to  the  “Sherlock  Holmes”  dictum  which  was  commented  by  Lord 
Brandon  in  The  Popi  M,  saying  that  “When  you  have  eliminated  the  impossible,  whatever 
remains,  however  improbable,  is  the  truth.”  Lord  Brandon  explained  that  when  all  the 
relevant facts of the case were known, though not the case of The Popi M, this dictum could 
be applicable.  
A  crucial  point  has  to  be  stressed  in  terms  of  applying  the “Sherlock  Holmes”  dictum  to 
prove the cause of loss. This approach has been accepted and followed in English courts, 
but  only  when  a  few  competing  and  possible  causes  have  been  and  could be  suggested 
before  courts  in  the  light  of  the  factual  basis.  In  a  fire  insurance  case,  Milton  Keynes  v 
Nulty,
542 a large fire broke out and was followed by a second one which destroyed a recycling 
centre insured under the policy. Only three competing causes of the first fire were focused 
on by virtue of quantities of investigations and evidence, which are a cigarette end carelessly 
discarded by an unknown person, arcing from a live electric cable or arson by an intruder. 
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Edwards-Stuart  J  held  that  Thomas  LJ’s  decision  was  not  incompatible  with  The  Popi  M. 
Instead, what Thomas LJ suggested was that if all of the explanations but one are remote or 
extremely improbable, it is logical to come to the conclusion that the remaining “possibility” 
is in fact the desired answer. On this basis, Edwards-Stuart J was convinced that only three 
possible causes were presented before him and he had no difficulty to have eliminated two 
of them on evidence. Finally, the Judge held that the only possible one, the cigarette end 
should be the cause of the first fire.  Thus, adequate factual information but limited possible 
theories are the essential preconditions to resort to the “Sherlock Holmes” approach rather 
than the “third possible solution”. 
It  is  also  noteworthy  that  despite  all  the  improbable  explanations  being  eliminated,  the 
probability of the remaining one is still required to be examined on a balance of probability. 
This is the legal application of the “Sherlock Holmes” dictum and it is what has been read 
from the Ide case by Popplewell J in European Group v Chartis.
543 An “all risks” marine policy 
and an “EAR” policy were placed to insure a business project. A loss was caused by fatigue 
stress cracking of the tubes used for the project. The insurers under the two policies agree 
to undertake an equal liability if it was impossible to ascertain under which policy’s duration 
that the loss occurred. A claim concerning the contribution of the liability under this term 
was brought up by the “EAR” policy underwriter against the marine insurance insurer. The 
former insurer alleged that either the loss should be completely covered by the opponent 
insurer, as the loss was happened during transport, or the time of loss was unascertained 
and  thus  they  should  equally  share  the  amount  of  indemnity  in  accordance  the  clause. 
However,  the  marine  insurer  notably  contended  that  the  fatigue  was  more  likely  caused 
during  restoration  by  wind;  alternatively  one  of  the  proximate  causes  was  inherent  vice, 
excluded in the marine policy. Accordingly, on either ground, the marine insurer should not 
be liable at all. 
Notwithstanding the scientific limitation in determining with certainty whether the loss was 
occurred  by  wind  during  restoration  or  by  transport  in  certainty,  however,  sufficient 
evidence  was  available  before  the  court.  Having  ruled  out  the  theory  which  the  marine 
insurer attempted to prove, instead of jumping to the conclusion in favour of the claimant 
“EAR”  policy  underwriter,  the  Judge  considered  he  must  examine  whether  the  other 
explanation was more likely than not to have occurred. If the test failed, though the Judge 
himself had already ruled out the other explanation, the court would still not recognise the 
remaining  one  as  the  cause  of  loss.  This  appears  to  differ  from  the  “whatever  remains, 
however improbable” part of the dictum; however, what the Judge did is logical in the legal 
sense in terms of applying the approach, instead of simply following the literal meaning. 
Being probable with satisfactory evidence was also a fundamental element to be one of the 
candidates referred in the dictum, before complying with the logic underlying in the dictum.   
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In  summary,  notwithstanding  the  recognition  of  and  adherence  to  The  Popi  M,  the  “third 
possible  solution”  is  no  more  than  one  of  the  approaches,  which  applies  in  exceptional 
cases. The “Sherlock Holmes” approach in the legal sense, which essentially eliminates the 
impossible  and remains  the more  possible,  is  applicable to  the  majority  cases  when  it  is 
argued which  one of  the only  few  possible  explanations drawn  from  the fruitful  evidence 
should  be  the  one.  These  methods  are  reconcilable  and  accepted  by  English  courts,  but 
simply  applied  under  different  situations.  Besides,  in  the  most  extreme  case,  a  genuine 
unexplainable loss, the presumption which reduces the standard of proof should respond. 
Mysterious Disappearance Clauses 
It has been increasingly common that “all risks” covers include a “mysterious disappearance 
clause”,  providing  that  the  insurer  will  not  be  liable  for  mysterious  or  unexplainable 
disappearance  of  the  insured  subject-matter.  AXL  Resources  Ltd  v  Antares  Underwriting 
Services Ltd
544 has been exclusively addressed this clause. The judgment shows that there 
are few dicta and expositions commenting on this clause for the judge to refer to, except for 
Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance
545, which was deemed important to this case by Gloster J. The 
book  pointed  out  the  clause  is  unlikely  to  have  much  effect.  According  to  the  learned 
authors,  the  clause  adds  nothing  to  the  insurer’s  rights  in  a  policy  against  enumerated 
perils, as the assured is obliged to prove the specific cause of loss. Failure to do so will 
entitle the insurer to discharge the indemnity. In contrast, in an “all risks” policy, this clause 
undermines the basic cover of the loss, as the all-risks clause only requires the assured to 
prove the loss is caused by a fortuitous event. 
In a real case of a mysterious or unexplainable loss, which is distinguished from a cause of 
loss  in  doubt,  there  is  no  difference,  respectfully  disagreeing  with  the  highly  reputed 
Colinvanx’s, between an “all risks” cover from the others, as the presumption favouring the 
perils of the sea should be invoked instead of the general principles of burden of proof. In 
essence,  “mysterious  disappearance  clauses”  are  no  more  than  contradicted  by  the 
presumption established in The Arnus, rather than the basis of cover. The underwriters may 
think they are smart enough to narrow down their liability when the cause of loss is doubtful 
by introducing such a clause into the policy, however, fully agreeing with the Colinvaux’s, 
this clause has little effect in modern context, since the real mysterious disappearance in 
literal meaning is remarkably rare. Thus, unless under genuine circumstances of mysterious 
disappearance, the clause will not be affected and the conventional burden of proof in “all 
risks” covers and other covers will not be affected despite the insertion of such a clause.  
6.4 Concurrent Causes 
                                                 
544 Supra 335 
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In ‘concurrent causes’ situation, the assured should not undertake the onus to prove that 
there is more than one proximate cause. The law merely requires him to provide prima facie 
evidence in establishing the casual link of proximity between an insured peril and the loss 
regardless of the concurrency involved with uninsured perils or excluded perils. As the law 
provides that when an insured peril and an excluded peril concurrently caused the loss, the 
insurer is not liable, the insurer is provided with an alternative to contend that an excluded 
peril has equally resulted in the loss, instead of a direct denial of the assured’s evidence and 
grounds. Nevertheless, there is practically no difference in burden of proof between the two 
approaches of defence, as the two alternatives derive from the test of proximity and have no 
relation to the standard of “on balance of probabilities”. 
 
In conclusion, the assured bears the initial burden of proof on balance of probabilities to 
establish the loss was proximately caused by an insured peril. The parties can opt to impose 
the assured of the burden of proof concerning the excluded peril by clear agreement. In 
contrast, the insurer is not obliged to submit such evidence to court unless he so alleges. 
Likewise,  had  the  insurer  provided  a  different  theory  and  evidence  that  the  loss  was 
proximately  caused  by  an  excluded  peril;  there  is  no  secondary  burden  of  proof  on  the 
assured  against  the  insurer’s  defence.  It  is  the  court’s  duty  to  consider  the  evidence 
provided  by  both  parties  and  give  judgment  accordingly.  The  generic  terms  such  as  “all 
risks” and “perils of the sea”, which indicate a wide scope of coverage, entitle the assured of 
a lesser burden of proof, and discharge the assured from seeking the specified form of the 
perils. In the rare cases of unexplained losses, the presumption in favour of the assured can 
be  only  relied  upon  in  a  strict  condition;  whereas  most  frequently,  the  case  falls  in  the 
argument between the parties by submitting different stories in respect of the cause of loss. 
Under  such  circumstances,  courts  normally  weigh  the  evidence  and  give  judgments  by 




The theory of causation in marine insurance law context has been dramatically developed, in 
particular after the enactment of the 1906 Act. The test of identifying the proximate cause 
of loss has been changed from the last cause occurring before the loss to measuring the 
efficiency  of  contribution. Nonetheless,  it  does  not imply that all the judgments prior to 
1906 are no longer good law in ascertaining the proximate cause of the loss. On occasion, 
direct  and immediate  causes  in time sequence  are  the efficient  ones  contributing to  the 
consequential loss in the legal sense. Accordingly, whether a decision has precedential value 
nowadays  is  determined  by  its  legal  reasoning  in  applying  a  certain  test,  rather  than  in 
which era it was made. Moreover, the time order in which the perils and loss occurred still 
remains a helpful reference but need to be replaced by the chain of efficiency. Basically, the 
starting  peril  which  introduces  the  risk  of  loss  initially  and  substantively  should  be 
considered  as  the proximate cause,  except  for  other intervening  events  which  break  the 
chain  of  causation.  The  last  but  not  least,  the  test  of  common  sense  assists  the judges 
substantially in identifying fair grounds to determine insurers’ liability.  
In the case of two equally competing causes, English courts used to hold a mild attitude in 
recognizing a loss arising from more than one proximate cause and they seem to have set 
up a rather harsh standard at present. Particularly after the Supreme Court’s judgment, The 
Cendor Mopu, it is clear that an internal cause of the goods and external fortuitous event 
cannot be considered as concurrent causes. However, it is necessary and legally possible to 
retain  the  notion  “concurrent  causes”  in  weighing  the  causal  connections  in  marine 
insurance cases.  
In respect of proof, generally, the assured bear the initial burden of proof on balance of 
probabilities of establishing that the loss was proximately caused by an insured peril, unless 
otherwise agreed. The insurer is not obliged to submit such evidence to court unless he 
alleges so. The generic terms such as “all risks” and “perils of the sea”, which indicate a wide 
scope  of  coverage,  entitle  the  assured  to  a  lesser  burden  of  proof,  which  discharge  the 
assured from seeking the specified form of the perils. In exceptional cases of unexplained 
losses,  the  presumption  in  favour  of  the  assured  is  subject  to  extremely  unusual 
circumstances; whereas most frequently, the case falls in the argument between the parties 
by submitting different stories in respect of the cause of loss. Under such circumstances, 
courts normally weigh the evidence and give judgments by following the general principles 
of burden of proof. 
The main aim to clarify and conclude a theory of causation in marine insurance law is to 
serve practical applications involving the specified perils in every case. It is a matter of fact M. SONG 
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that what kind of perils would be referred to in the case, however, the research shows that 
the perils comply with the general rules summarised above in causation terms. 
Inherent  vice  is  frequently  questioned  on  the  grounds  of  lack  of  fortuity  and  has  been 
mismatched  with  the  events  of  certainty  for  long.  Thus,  one  of  the  aims  of  setting  up 
inherent vice as a separate chapter is to distinguish inherent vice from inevitability and also 
to prove that inevitability is not the test of inherent vice. More importantly, as the ultimate 
conclusion  of  this  issue,  when  applying  the  doctrine  of  proximity  in  order  to  ascertain 
whether inherent vice is the cause of loss, the current situation should be that, it must be an 
internal-triggered case, solely attributed to the internal cause within the ordinary standard. 
It  should  be  emphasised  that  it  is  the  external  and  internal  conflict  that  eliminate  the 
recognition  of  concurrent  causal  effects,  rather  than  an  inconsistency  arising  of  the 
requirement of fortuity. 
Seaworthiness in hull policies is in the same position as inherent vice as to cargo policies. 
However, it has different legal effect in voyage hull policies and time hull policies. It is an 
implied warranty in voyage policies; whereas, it is a cause, if under the privity of the assured, 
which ought to apply “but for” test when determining the insurer is not liable for the loss. In 
the latter case, it is also noteworthy that unseaworthiness may be a concurrent cause with 
perils of the sea, unlike inherent vice and the like.  
It  is  more  important  that  the  law  of  seaworthiness  as  an  implied  warranty  is  subject  to 
reform,  as the device of  warranty has been under  review by the Law  Commissions since 
2006 as a part of insurance law reform project. Initially, the Law Commission intended to 
borrow the operations of Australian insurance contract law and that of New Zealand, with 
reservations, in a way to require a causal connection between the breach of warranty and the 
loss before approving the harsh effects of warranty. It is a brave advancement to propose 
such  a  causal  link.  However,  the  Law  Commission  heard  opposing  views  and  feels  less 
confident in the approach of causal connection. One of the concerns is stated to be the 
complexity and uncertainty of causation in law. Although this dissertation does not purport 
to provide a thorough analysis on reforming the law of warranty, it at least shows in the 
context  of  marine  insurance  law,  a  causation  theory  related  to  perils  and  losses  can  be 
concluded and consistently applied. Uncertainty is a prospective hazard of law reform as a 
whole.  Although  the  Law  Commission  appears  unlikely  to  recommend  and  employ  the 
approach  of  causal  connection  in  law  reform,  an  excessive  concern  and  aversion  to 
causation is not necessary. So far, the decisive questions ought to be whether to completely 
abandon the harsh effect of warranty or to introduce a causal connection, and how to set up 
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